The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Decision Affect Theory: Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Risky Options
Abstract
How do people feel about the outcomes of risky options? Results from two experiments demonstrate that the emotional reaction to a monetary outcome is not a simple function of the utility of that outcome Emotional responses also depend on probabilities and unobtained outcomes Unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes Furthermore any given outcome is less pleasant if an unobtained outcome is better We propose an account of emotional experiences associated with outcomes of decisions called decision affect theory It incorporates utilities expectations and counterfactual comparisons into hedonic responses Finally we show that choices between risky options can be described as the maximization of expected emotional experiences as predicted by decision affect theory That is people choose the risky option for which they expect to feel better on average
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“It is widely acknowledged that emotion plays a role in decision-making, drawing on evidence from numerous behavioral studies using emotional stimuli as well as physiological, neuroimaging, and lesion studies.”
From Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals' loss aversion (2009) · cites this paper as [8]
Citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 5,955
Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x · Cited by 3,885
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.146 · Cited by 3,325
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Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000) · Cognition & Emotion · doi:10.1080/026999300402763 · Cited by 3,171
Validation of a Decision Regret Scale
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I.
- Affiliations
- The Ohio State University (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Boston University (US)
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Mellers, Barbara A
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1997-11
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 423-429
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2125458573
- Cited by
- 736
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 39 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 26 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 47 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 7.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- potential outcomes, hedonic response, risk preferences
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