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Cited by 2,386

Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice

Lerner, Jennifer S., Keltner, Dacher·2000·Cognition & Emotion
DOI 10.1080/026999300402763
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Abstract

Most theories of affective influences on judgement and choice take a valence-based approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not specified if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article, we propose a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. We posit that each emotion is defined by a tendency to perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent with the original cognitive-appraisal dimensions of the emotion. To pit the valence and appraisal-tendency approaches against one another, we present a study that addresses whether two emotions of the same valence but differing appraisals—anger and fear—relate in different ways to risk perception. Consistent with the appraisal-tendency hypothesis, fearful people made pessimistic judgements of future events whereas angry people made optimistic judgements. In the Discussion we expand the proposed model and review evidence supporting two social moderators of appraisal-tendency processes.

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  • When potential consequences are vivid and personally contingent, decision-makers may attend more to their own causal agency and less to the algorithm's assessment, disrupting anchoring by changing the object of attention before deliberation begins.

    “When potential consequences are vivid and personally contingent, decisionmakers may attend more to their own causal agency and less to the algorithm's assessment (Lerner et al. 2015;Lerner and Keltner 2000), disrupting anchoring by changing the object of attention before deliberation begins.”

    From Limits of Interventions in AI-Assisted Decision Making (2026) · cites this paper as Lerner and Keltner 2000

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Authors
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D.
Venue
Cognition & Emotion
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2000-07
Volume
14
Issue
4
Pages
473-493
ISSN
  • 0269-9931
  • 1464-0600
DOI
10.1080/026999300402763
Cited by
2,386
References
15
Language
en

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