Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity
Abstract
How it is that one’s own thoughts can seem to be someone else’s? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first‐person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a ‘fractured phenomenology’ responsible for schizophrenic patients’ reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations. Supporting work on virtual environments is discussed, and lessons concerning the fixity of delusional belief are drawn.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Where the sense of agency and ownership conferred on one's own inner speech is disrupted, inner speech may feel like it is coming from another agent or entity.
“Where this is disrupted, inner speech may feel like it is coming from another agent or entity, as is the case in examples of thought insertion (Langland-Hassan, 2008).”
From Inner Speech: Development, Cognitive Functions, Phenomenology, and Neurobiology (2015) · cites this paper as Langland-Hassan, 2008
Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734 · see citing works
From presence to consciousness through virtual reality.
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., & Slater, M. (2005) · Nature reviews. Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1651 · Cited by 1,831 · see citing works
Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion
Sperry, R. W. (1950) · Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055479 · Cited by 1,789 · see citing works
The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception
Grush, R. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000093 · Cited by 1,387 · see citing works
Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 · Cited by 1,324 · see citing works
Is the cerebellum a Smith predictor?
Miall, R. C., Weir, D. J., Wolpert, D. M., & Stein, J. F. (1993) · Journal of Motor Behavior · doi:10.1080/00222895.1993.9942050 · Cited by 1,071 · see citing works
The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological survey
Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s003329170003381x · Cited by 710 · see citing works
When is early visual cortex activated during visual mental imagery?
Kosslyn, S. M., & Thompson, W. L. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.5.723 · Cited by 515 · see citing works
Evidence for sensory prediction deficits in schizophrenia
Shergill, S. S., Samson, G., Bays, P. M., Frith, C. D., & Wolpert, D. M. (2005) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.162.12.2384 · Cited by 432 · see citing works
Virtual reality exposure therapy for PTSD Vietnam veterans: A case study
Rothbaum, B. O., Hodges, L., Alarcon, R., Ready, D., Shahar, F., Graap, K., Pair, J., Hebert, P., Gotz, D., Wills, B., et al. (1999) · Journal of Traumatic Stress · doi:10.1023/a:1024772308758 · Cited by 328 · see citing works
Corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia: Can it explain auditory hallucinations?
Ford, J. M., & Mathalon, D. H. (2005) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.01.014 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Thought as action: inner speech, self-monitoring, and auditory verbal hallucinations
Jones, S. R., & Fernyhough, C. (2007) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.12.003 · Cited by 188 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Inner Speech: Development, Cognitive Functions, Phenomenology, and Neurobiology
Alderson-Day, B., & Fernyhough, C. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000021 · Cited by 808 · see citing works
Petrolini, V., Jorba, M., & Vicente, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.572035 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
- Authors
- LANGLAND‐HASSAN, P.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- Corresponding author
- LANGLAND‐HASSAN, PETER
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-08-25
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 369-401
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2004276250
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3
- FWCI
- 12.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind & Language (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
- Keywords
- thought insertion, inner speech, auditory verbal hallucinations, schizophrenia, efference copy, corollary discharge, first-person phenomenology, delusions, virtual reality, extraneity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review