Cited by 97Mental Health and PsychiatryPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceSchizophrenia research and treatment

Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity

LANGLAND‐HASSAN, PETER·2008·Mind & Language

Abstract

How it is that one’s own thoughts can seem to be someone else’s? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first‐person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a ‘fractured phenomenology’ responsible for schizophrenic patients’ reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations. Supporting work on virtual environments is discussed, and lessons concerning the fixity of delusional belief are drawn.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00348.x

Cites

12 of 12 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Where the sense of agency and ownership conferred on one's own inner speech is disrupted, inner speech may feel like it is coming from another agent or entity.

    “Where this is disrupted, inner speech may feel like it is coming from another agent or entity, as is the case in examples of thought insertion (Langland-Hassan, 2008).”

    From Inner Speech: Development, Cognitive Functions, Phenomenology, and Neurobiology (2015) · cites this paper as Langland-Hassan, 2008

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Authors
LANGLAND‐HASSAN, P.
Affiliations
The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
Corresponding author
LANGLAND‐HASSAN, PETER
Venue
Mind & Language
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2008-08-25
Volume
23
Issue
4
Pages
369-401
ISSN
  • 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0017
OpenAlex
W2004276250
Cited by
97
References
12
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3
FWCI
12.93
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Mind & Language (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
Keywords
thought insertion, inner speech, auditory verbal hallucinations, schizophrenia, efference copy, corollary discharge, first-person phenomenology, delusions, virtual reality, extraneity

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review