The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE LOGIC OF AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS
Abstract
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an “authoritarian bargain” by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision‐making in non‐democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields implications for empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non‐democratic states between 1975 and 1999 generally confirm the predictions of the authoritarian‐bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
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Citations
Cites
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Boix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
POWELL, G. B. (1982) · doi:10.4159/9780674042353 · Cited by 874
Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis
Gasiorowski, M. J. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082515 · Cited by 538 · cited 2×
“transitions seems to confirm that recessions have preceded regime transitions (in both democratic and non-democratic directions) from the 1950s to the 1980s (Gasiorowski, 1995).”
Gassebner, M., Lamla, M. J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2013) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712446132 · Cited by 190
Grossman, H., & Kim, M. (1995) · doi:10.3386/w5357 · Cited by 154
Cited by
SHIH, V., ADOLPH, C., & LIU, M. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000566 · Cited by 840
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy
Escribà-Folch, A. (2013) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512113488259 · Cited by 283
Gassebner, M., Lamla, M. J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2013) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002712446132 · Cited by 190
Remittances and Democratization
Escribà-Folch, A., Meseguer, C., & Wright, J. (2015) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12180 · Cited by 169
Metadata
- Authors
- DESAI, R. M., OLOFSGÅRD, A., & YOUSEF, T. M.
- Venue
- Economics & Politics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-02-24
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 93-125
- ISSN
- 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0343
- OpenAlex
- W1972146919
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 9.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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