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Cited by 244

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing

Open access
ALBUQUERUE, RUI, WANG, NENG·2008·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premia, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22%, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11% of their capital stock.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01309.x

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Metadata

Authors
ALBUQUERUE, R., & WANG, N.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2008-01-10
Volume
63
Issue
1
Pages
1-40
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W3123992882
Cited by
244
References
7
FWCI
54.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01309.x
The paper
ALBUQUERUE, R., & WANG, N. (2008). Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01309.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.