The Role of Moral Commitments in Moral Judgment
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.
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Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231 · cited 5×
“However, this reasoning makes it likely that all participants would have generated more consequentialist judgments when the scenarios were evaluated side by side, even if the effect were attenuated among more deontological participants (see also Greene et al., 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialThinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions
Tetlock, P. E. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00135-9 · Cited by 915
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666 · cited 17×
“However, this reasoning makes it likely that all participants would have generated more consequentialist judgments when the scenarios were evaluated side by side, even if the effect were attenuated among more deontological participants (see also Greene et al., 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialRozin, P., Markwith, M., & Stoess, C. (1997) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00685.x · Cited by 540
Negotiating with Yourself and Losing: Making Decisions with Competing Internal Preferences
Bazerman, M. H., Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Wade-Benzoni, K. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259372 · Cited by 510 · cited 1×
“In light of past findings that presenting scenarios side by side facilitates the application of rules (Gentner & Medina, 1998) and normative beliefs (Bazerman et al., 1998; O’Connor et al., 2002)—precisely the content of moral commitments—the finding that joint presentation exaggerates differences…”
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Cited by
Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
SCHWITZGEBEL, E., & CUSHMAN, F. (2012) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x · Cited by 391
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005 · Cited by 315
Moral dilemmas in cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making: A principled review
Christensen, J. F., & Gomila, A. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.008 · Cited by 307
Religiosity, political orientation, and consequentialist moral thinking
Piazza, J., & Sousa, P. (2014) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550613492826 · Cited by 160
“This is not to say that intuition (i.e., automatic thinking processes) more generally never plays a role in such judgments, only that, as argued by Lombrozo (2009), moral commitments, whether consequentialist or deontological, appear to be an important contributor to moral judgments beyond the role…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Lombrozo, T.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-02-24
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 273-286
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2015963122
- Cited by
- 121
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 3.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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