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fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust

Bigoni, Maria, Fridolfsson, Sven‐Olof, Le Coq, Chloé, Spagnolo, Giancarlo · 2012 · The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well‐run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white‐collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x

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Metadata

Authors
Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S., Le Coq, C., & Spagnolo, G.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2012-06
Volume
43
Issue
2
Pages
368-390
ISSN
  • 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-2171
OpenAlex
W1530620382
Cited by
180
References
4
FWCI
41.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x
The paper
Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S., Le Coq, C., & Spagnolo, G. (2012). fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x

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