Time to get rid of the ‘Modular’ in neuropsychology: A unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cognitive neuroscience, being more inclusive and ambitious in scope than cognitive neuropsychology, seems to have taken the place of the latter within the modern neurosciences. Nevertheless, recent advances in the neurosciences afford neuropsychology with epistemic possibilities that simply did not exist even 15 years ago. Human lesion studies still have an important role to play in shaping such possibilities, particularly when combined with other methods of enquiry. I first outline theoretical and methodological advances within the neurosciences that can inform and shape the rebirth of a dynamic, non‐modular neuropsychology. I then use an influential computational theory of brain function, the free energy principle, to suggest an unified account of anosognosia for hemiplegia as a research example of the potential for transition from a modular, cognitive neuropsychology to a dynamic, computational and even restorative neuropsychology. These and many other adjectives that can flexibly, take the place of ‘cognitive’ next to ‘neuropsychology’ will hopefully designate the much needed rebirth and demarcation of a field, neuropsychology itself, that has somehow lost its place within the modern neurosciences and yet seems to have a unique and important role to play in the future understanding of the brain.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 6×
“Second, aberrant perceptual inference (suboptimal synaptic activity, Friston, 2010) can be caused by deficits that lead to weak, or absent signals about prediction errors.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483 · cited 1×
“…the (arguably reductionistic) notion that the brain as a whole works as an Helmholtzian inference machine (Helmholtz, 1878/1971) that is trying to optimize its own Bayesian probabilistic model of the world by actively predicting the causes of its sensory inputs (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005).”
BackgroundAffective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions
Panksepp, J. (1998) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195096736.001.0001 · Cited by 4,428
From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure
Shallice, T. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511526817 · Cited by 4,072
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 · Cited by 4,022
What we can do and what we cannot do with fMRI
Logothetis, N. K. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06976 · Cited by 3,612 · cited 1×
“…Beyond Cognitivism Progressive efforts in cognitive and computational neuroscience focused on acknowledging some of the limitations of these methods and where possible, improving their methodological potential and correcting their theoretical inferences (e.g. Logothetis, 2008; Friston, 2009b).”
BackgroundUnderstanding motor events: a neurophysiological study
di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/bf00230027 · Cited by 3,539 · cited 1×
“Following some extraordinary discoveries, e.g. mirror neurons in the macaque monkey (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992), and other similar insights, a diverse and growing community of researchers views mental abilities as defined also by emotions and motivation, as embedded in the acting, sensing and…”
BackgroundGallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
Cattaneo, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2009) · Archives of Neurology · doi:10.1001/archneurol.2009.41 · Cited by 3,137
Sridharan, D., Levitin, D. J., & Menon, V. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0800005105 · Cited by 2,892
Functional and effective connectivity in neuroimaging: a synthesis
Friston, K. J. (1994) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.460020107 · Cited by 2,452
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.001.0001 · Cited by 2,449
The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Friston, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 · Cited by 1,831
Neuronal Coding of Prediction Errors
Schultz, W., & Dickinson, A. (2000) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.473 · Cited by 1,427 · cited 1×
“…of previous learning and genetics; Friston, 2005) and ‘prediction errors’ (discrepancies between expected and actual inputs based on ascending interoceptive and exteroceptive signals, e.g. Schultz and Dickinson, 2000) at different levels and domains of the neurocognitive hierarchy (Mesulam, 2012).”
BackgroundVisual field maps in human cortex.
Wandell, B. A., Dumoulin, S. O., & Brewer, A. A. (2007) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2007.10.012 · Cited by 1,231 · cited 1×
“…into functionally specialised and hierarchically organised areas in the human cortex (spatial segregation) can benefit from tools such as fMRI (Wandell et al., 2007), assuming that a similar kind of strictly modular and one-to-one mapping would apply to complex cognitive and emotional…”
BackgroundWhole brain resting-state analysis reveals decreased functional connectivity in major depression
Veer, I. M. (2010) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2010.00041 · Cited by 753
Cortex and memory: emergence of a new paradigm
Fuster, J. M. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21280 · Cited by 559 · cited 3×
“…already taken the cognitive neuroscience community by storm, implicitly demanding that new epistemological criteria for cognitive theories are set, e.g. modular, information-processing theories and computer metaphors are constantly reevaluated (e.g. see Fuster, 2009; Piccinini & Scarantino, 2011).”
BackgroundModalities, Modes, and Models in Functional Neuroimaging
Friston, K. J. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1174521 · Cited by 489
The social brain: allowing humans to boldly go where no other species has been
Frith, U., & Frith, C. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0160 · Cited by 443 · cited 1×
“…feeling body, and as subject to intricate couplings between organisms and their interpersonal, social and technological environments (e.g. Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Knoblich et al., 2006; Decety and Ickes, 2009; Benedetti, 2010; Frith & Frith, 2010).”
BackgroundToward a neurobiology of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Taylor, J. R., Wang, X.-J., Fletcher, P. C., & Krystal, J. H. (2010) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007 · Cited by 394
Dopamine, affordance and active inference
Friston, K. J., Shiner, T., FitzGerald, T., Galea, J. M., Adams, R., Brown, H., Dolan, R. J., Moran, R., Stephan, K. E., & Bestmann, S. (2012) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327 · Cited by 381 · cited 1×
“…al., 2011) may have a modulatory role in AHP, leading to a more general difficulty in optimizing the precision (uncertainty) of prediction errors (Friston et al., 2012), affecting their salience and ultimately both short- and long-term learning (suboptimal synaptic gain and plasticity, Friston,…”
BackgroundShared cortical anatomy for motor awareness and motor control
Berti, A., Bottini, G., Gandola, M., Pia, L., Smania, N., Stracciari, A., Castiglioni, I., Vallar, G., & Paulesu, E. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1110625 · Cited by 351
GERSTMANN, J. (1942) · Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archneurpsyc.1942.02290120042003 · Cited by 282
Vuilleumier, P., Sagiv, N., Hazeltine, E., Poldrack, R. A., Swick, D., Rafal, R. D., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.051436898 · Cited by 223
Robbins (2012) · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.005 · Cited by 134
Computational and dynamic models in neuroimaging
Friston, K. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2010) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.068 · Cited by 131
Cited by
Hallucinations and strong priors
Corlett, P. R., Horga, G., Fletcher, P. C., Alderson-Day, B., Schmack, K., & Powers, A. R. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.001 · Cited by 534
“In The Modularity of Mind (1983), Jerry Fodor sketched a blueprint of mental architecture comprised of modules, or systems that process a single specific kind of information [127], strictly segregated into discrete mental faculties that can be damaged in isolation [128].”
Mentalizing homeostasis: the social origins of interoceptive inference
Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2017) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2017.1294031 · Cited by 428
Self-citationThe hierarchically mechanistic mind: A free-energy formulation of the human psyche
Badcock, P. B., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2019) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2018.10.002 · Cited by 217
Hallucinations as Top-Down Effects on Perception
Powers, A. R., Kelley, M., & Corlett, P. R. (2016) · Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2016.04.003 · Cited by 138
“The latter finding is difficult to reconcile with cognitive neuropsychology, which depends on very circumscribed damage effects (7).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Fotopoulou, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Neuropsychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-03-07
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-19
- ISSN
- 1748-6645 (ISSN-L)
- 1748-6653
- OpenAlex
- W1966381600
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 4.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.