Cited by 534Hallucinations in medical conditionsVisual perception and processing mechanismsSchizophrenia research and treatment

Hallucinations and strong priors

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Corlett, Philip R., Horga, Guillermo, Fletcher, Paul C., Alderson-Day, Ben, Schmack, Katharina, Powers, Albert R.·2019·Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

Hallucinations, perceptions in the absence of objectively identifiable stimuli, illustrate the constructive nature of perception. Here, we highlight the role of prior beliefs as a critical elicitor of hallucinations. Recent empirical work from independent laboratories shows strong, overly precise priors can engender hallucinations in healthy subjects and that individuals who hallucinate in the real world are more susceptible to these laboratory phenomena. We consider these observations in light of work demonstrating apparently weak, or imprecise, priors in psychosis. Appreciating the interactions within and between hierarchies of inference can reconcile this apparent disconnect. Data from neural networks, human behavior, and neuroimaging support this contention. This work underlines the continuum from normal to aberrant perception, encouraging a more empathic approach to clinical hallucinations.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.001

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  • The predictive processing framework explains psychosis and associated alterations in salience processing as a result of aberrant encoding of precision in different regions or circuits.

    “This framework explains psychosis and associated alterations in salience processing as a result of aberrant encoding of precision in different regions or circuits (28, 94) (figure 2).”

    From Aberrant Salience, Information Processing, and Dopaminergic Signaling in People at Clinical High Risk for Psychosis (2020) · cites this paper as [94]

    The ‘Hallucinations and Perception’ and ‘Corollary Discharge’ sections link hallucinations and psychosis-related experiences to the relative precision of priors and sensory information. ‘Neural Network Models of Hallucinations’ also distinguishes dysfunction at different hierarchical levels and in different brain regions. The paper’s account is chiefly about hallucinations, however; the cited passages do not establish the broader claim about psychosis and associated alterations in salience processing. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Relying more on prediction rather than on sensory evidence may create false beliefs that lead to psychosis.

    “Relying more on prediction rather than on sensory evidence may create false beliefs that lead to psychosis (16).”

    From A Predictive Coding Perspective on Mismatch Negativity Impairment in Schizophrenia (2020) · cites this paper as [16]

    In “Hallucinations and Perception” (page unavailable), the paper proposes that predictions outweighing sensory input may produce hallucinations. In “Neural Network Models of Hallucinations” (page unavailable), it links priors about agency to auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, alongside delusions and other false concepts. It does not say that prediction-driven false beliefs lead to the onset of psychosis. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In each psychiatric condition, symptoms are linked to particular disturbances in how predictions, prediction errors, or their precision weights are handled in the brain.

    “In each case, symptoms are linked to particular disturbances in how predictions, prediction errors, or their precision weights are handled in the brain (32).”

    From Predictive coding and neurocomputational psychiatry: a mechanistic framework for understanding mental disorders (2026) · cites this paper as [32]

    In ‘Data consistent with the strong prior account’ (page unavailable), the paper links hallucinations in psychosis and Parkinson’s disease to prior expectations and their precision. In ‘Corollary Discharge’ (page unavailable), it also links impaired prediction of self-generated actions to psychotic symptoms. It does not establish a particular disturbance for symptoms in each psychiatric condition; the authors say that distinguishing how underlying pathologies produce different symptoms remains a challenge. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The more sensory prediction error is generated, the more likely it is that an action or thought has external as opposed internal or endogenous causes.

    “This means that the more sensory prediction error is generated, the more likely it is that an action or thought has external as opposed internal or endogenous causes (Frith 2005; Corlett et al. 2019).”

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. [30]Ellson DG, Hallucinations produced by sensory conditioning, Journal of Experimental Psychology, American Psychological Association, 1941, p. 1.
  2. [89]Teufel C (2015) Shift toward prior knowledge confers a perceptual advantage in early psychosis and psychosis-prone healthy individuals. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 112 (43), 13401– 6. 26460044 PMC4629373
  3. [127]Fodor JA (1983) The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology, MIT Press.
  4. [132]Firestone C and Scholl BJ (2016) Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behav Brain Sci 39, e229. 26189677

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Authors
Corlett, P. R., Horga, G., Fletcher, P. C., Alderson-Day, B., Schmack, K., & Powers, A. R.
Affiliations
  • Yale University (US)
  • Columbia University (US)
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
  • Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory (US)
Corresponding author
Corlett, Philip R.
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-02
Volume
23
Issue
2
Pages
114-127
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2905702364
Cited by
534
References
138
Citations by year
2026: 74 · 2025: 76 · 2024: 79 · 2023: 76 · 2022: 69 · 2021: 64 · 2020: 78 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
FWCI
5.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Institutional Repository (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (submittedVersion)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • National Institute of Mental Health (R01MH112887, R21MH116258)
  • Wellcome Trust (WT108720)
  • Leopoldina–German National Academy of Sciences
  • Bernard Wolfe health Neuroscience Fund
  • NIMH (R01MH114965)
  • Brain and Behavior Research Foundation
  • Burroughs Wellcome Fund
  • Yale University
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
Keywords
hallucinations, prior beliefs, prior distributions, perception, psychosis, hierarchical inference, artificial neural networks, neuroimaging
MeSH terms
Hallucinations, Humans, Illusions, Nerve Net, Speech Perception

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