The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms
Open accessAbstract
Many believe that compensation, misaligned from shareholders’ value due to managerial entrenchment, caused financial firms to take risks before the financial crisis of 2008. We argue that, even in a classical principal‐agent setting without entrenchment and with exogenous firm risk, riskier firms may offer higher total pay as compensation for the extra risk in equity stakes borne by risk‐averse managers. Using long lags of stock price risk to capture exogenous firm risk, we confirm our conjecture and show that riskier firms are also more productive and more likely to be held by institutional investors, who are most able to influence compensation.
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Cites
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · Cited by 3,669
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
Laeven, L. A., & Levine, R. E. (2008) · Cited by 3,269
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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Intermediary asset pricing: New evidence from many asset classes
He, Z., Kelly, B., & Manela, A. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.08.002 · Cited by 784
Speaking of the short-term: disclosure horizon and managerial myopia
Brochet, F., Loumioti, M., & Serafeim, G. (2015) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-015-9329-8 · Cited by 515
Corporate culture: Evidence from the field
Graham, J. R., Grennan, J., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.07.008 · Cited by 428
What's in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance
King, T., Srivastav, A., & Williams, J. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.003 · Cited by 329
The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis
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Metadata
- Authors
- CHENG, I., HONG, H., & SCHEINKMAN, J. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-03-12
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 839-879
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2168009245
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 140.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CHENG, I., HONG, H., & SCHEINKMAN, J. A. (2015). Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12225
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.