Socially adaptive belief
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I clarify and defend the hypothesis that human belief formation is sensitive to social rewards and punishments, such that beliefs are sometimes formed based on unconscious expectations of their likely effects on other agents – agents who frequently reward us when we hold ungrounded beliefs and punish us when we hold reasonable ones. After clarifying this phenomenon and distinguishing it from other sources of bias in the psychological literature, I argue that the hypothesis is plausible on theoretical grounds and I show how it illuminates and unifies a range of psychological phenomena, including confabulation and rationalisation, positive illusions, and identity‐protective cognition.
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Cites
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Cited by
Dorst, K. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498 · Cited by 108
Bell, V., Raihani, N., & Wilkinson, S. (2021) · Clinical Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2167702620951553 · Cited by 78
“Williams (2020) suggested that understanding the social function of belief better accounts for both its function and phenomenology but also better explains phenomena such as confabulation, positive illusions, and identityprotective cognition.”
BackgroundOn the Randomness of Suicide: An Evolutionary, Clinical Call to Transcend Suicide Risk Assessment
Soper, C. A., Ocejo, P. M., & Large, M. M. (2022) · Evolutionary Psychiatry · doi:10.1017/9781009030564.011 · Cited by 16
Levy, N. (2021) · Bad Beliefs · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895325.003.0005 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Williams, D.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2020-04-16
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 333-354
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2997232666
- Cited by
- 140
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 105.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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