The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences.
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Citations
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NOT ENOUGH THERE THERE EVIDENCE, REASONS, AND LANGUAGE INDEPENDENCE
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Self-citation
Cited by
Weatherson, B. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 · Cited by 302
Dorst, K. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498 · Cited by 108
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement
Aslantatar, N. (2025) · İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi · doi:10.29288/ilted.1657637 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Schoenfield, M.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-12-27
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 193-218
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W1483280526
- Cited by
- 375
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 51.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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