Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to ‘philosophical Vulcans’. I defend a middle position, Motivational Sentientism, on which what matters is motivating consciousness: any kind of consciousness which presents its subject with reasons for action.
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Citations
Cites
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What is the role of dopamine in reward: hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience?
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness
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“Nagel, 1974, Block, 1995, 2008, Chalmers, 1995; for a prolonged defence of this approach to defining consciousness, see Schwitzgebel, 2016).”
BackgroundJackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
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Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
The Humean Theory of Motivation
SMITH, M. (1987) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcvi.381.36 · Cited by 1,005
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Consciousness and Moral Status
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The Moral Status and Rights of Artificial Intelligence
(2020) · Ethics of Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190905033.003.0018 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“Though they may seem far-fetched at present, we should consider the possibility of 1 day encountering beings like this – or intentionally or unintentionally creating something like them with future advances in AI or bioengineering (cf. Liao, 2020; Schwitzgebel and Garza, 2015, 2020).”
Background
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“8 In particular, while most agree that sentience is sufficient for moral status, there is less agreement that sentience is necessary (Kagan 2019; Roelofs 2022).”
BackgroundSentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6 · Cited by 36
Long, R., Sebo, J., Butlin, P., Finlinson, K., Fish, K., Harding, J., Pfau, J., Sims, T., Birch, J., & Chalmers, D. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.00986 · Cited by 27
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Roelofs, L.
- Venue
- Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2022-07-12
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 301-323
- ISSN
- 0031-5621 (ISSN-L)
- 0279-0750
- 1468-0114
- OpenAlex
- W4285092547
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 56.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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