Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however, about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation‐concerned literatures, this article argues that a reputation‐based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how account‐giving actors and account‐holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account‐giver and account‐holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-4796 · Cited by 3,795
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, the
(2008) · Encyclopedia of Political Communication · doi:10.4135/9781412953993.n530 · Cited by 3,771
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936 · cited 1×
“Principals will, for instance, choose between resource-intensive “police patrolling” and less costly (yet dependent on third parties) “fire alarms” (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), or even dispense with providing for monitoring mechanisms altogether.”
BackgroundAnalysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework 1
Bovens, M. (2007) · European Law Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x · Cited by 2,667 · cited 3×
“Both the exercise of accountability and concerns with reputation are relational: they refer to the relationship or the interaction between the account-giving actor and the account-holding forum (Bovens 2007; Dubnick and Fredrickson 2010).”
BackgroundMethod‘Accountability’: An Ever‐Expanding Concept?
Mulgan, R. (2000) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00218 · Cited by 1,609 · cited 1×
“Audit offices, administrative tribunals, ombudsmen are “institutions of accountability” for which accountability is a primary, defining competence, whereas for other accountholders such as legislatures, it is only one of several functions (Mulgan 2000).”
BackgroundWHAT’S MEASURED IS WHAT MATTERS: TARGETS AND GAMING IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
BEVAN, G., & HOOD, C. (2006) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00600.x · Cited by 1,580 · cited 1×
“Resulting demand overloads, conflicting expectations, “multiple accountabilities disorders” and such pathologies are widely diagnosed (Koppel 2005; Dubnick 2005; Bevan and Hood 2006; Hood 2007; Bovens et al. 2008; Messner 2009; Flinders 2011).”
BackgroundAccountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy
Romzek, B. S., & Dubnick, M. J. (1987) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.2307/975901 · Cited by 1,042 · cited 2×
“Accountability is said to be about “the management of expectations” (Romzek and Dubnick 1987); but how do public organizations actually manage the diverse expectations and demands placed on them by different audiences?”
BackgroundPower, M. (1999) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296034.001.0001 · Cited by 992
Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA
Carpenter, D. (2014) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400835119 · Cited by 848
DOES PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY WORK? AN ASSESSMENT TOOL
BOVENS, M., SCHILLEMANS, T., & HART, P. ’. (2008) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2008.00716.x · Cited by 659 · cited 1×
“Resulting demand overloads, conflicting expectations, “multiple accountabilities disorders” and such pathologies are widely diagnosed (Koppel 2005; Dubnick 2005; Bevan and Hood 2006; Hood 2007; Bovens et al. 2008; Messner 2009; Flinders 2011).”
BackgroundTetlock, P. E. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.109.3.451 · Cited by 632
Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance
Majone, G. (2001) · European Union Politics · doi:10.1177/1465116501002001005 · Cited by 598 · cited 1×
“For example, agency-type relationships might be said to differ considerably from those defined as “trustee”-type relationships (Majone 2001; Hood and Lodge 2006).”
BackgroundEnvironment and EnforcementRegulation and the Social Definition of Pollution
Hawkins, K. (1984) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198275145.001.0001 · Cited by 575
What happens when transparency meets blame-avoidance?
Hood, C. (2007) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719030701340275 · Cited by 573 · cited 1×
“Resulting demand overloads, conflicting expectations, “multiple accountabilities disorders” and such pathologies are widely diagnosed (Koppel 2005; Dubnick 2005; Bevan and Hood 2006; Hood 2007; Bovens et al. 2008; Messner 2009; Flinders 2011).”
BackgroundReputation and Public Administration
Carpenter, D. P., & Krause, G. A. (2012) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02506.x · Cited by 549 · cited 2×
“More generally, reputation has been identified as being crucial for understanding individual and organizational behavior (Carpenter 2001; 2010; Moffitt 2010, 2014; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Gilad 2015; Maor 2015; Busuioc 2016).”
BackgroundMessner, M. (2009) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2009.07.003 · Cited by 535
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise
Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00286.x · Cited by 496 · cited 1×
“…2015) in the relationship, such approaches often ignore the co-produced nature of accountability interactions and the relevance of agent preferences in shaping principal responses (see however, Callander 2008; Gailmard and Patty 2007, 2013), the control process, and actual oversight outcomes.”
BackgroundPathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple accountabilities disorder”
Koppell, J. G. (2005) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00434.x · Cited by 495
The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame
Hood, C., & Lodge, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/019926967x.001.0001 · Cited by 479 · cited 1×
“For example, agency-type relationships might be said to differ considerably from those defined as “trustee”-type relationships (Majone 2001; Hood and Lodge 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-citationAccountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the Mechanisms
Dubnick, M. J. (2014) · University of New Hampshire Scholars Repository (University of New Hampshire at Manchester) · doi:10.1080/15309576.2005.11051839 · Cited by 389
Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study of Executive Agencies
Pollitt, C. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui045 · Cited by 383 · cited 3×
“This is consistent with the often limited and sporadic interest in accountability processes among political actors that has been documented in a variety of accountability studies (Dudley 1994; Hogwood et al. 2000; Mulgan 2003; Pollitt 2006; Verhoest et al. 2010).”
BackgroundResultPredicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290 · cited 1×
“So-called “forum drift” (Busuioc 2013; Schillemans and Busuioc 2015) ranges from poor preparation for accountability moments and lack of engagement with the actor, to altogether being absent at hearings and the absence of sanctions despite documented agent non-compliance.”
BackgroundSelf-citationReputational Risk as a Logic of Organizing in Late Modernity
Power, M., Scheytt, T., Soin, K., & Sahlin, K. (2009) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840608101482 · Cited by 290 · cited 1×
“It matters for both the intensity of interest in giving or holding to account, as well as the ways in which these different degrees of interest are channeled (Power et al. 2009).”
BackgroundA Preliminary Theory of Informal Accountability among Network Organizational Actors
Romzek, B. S., LeRoux, K., & Blackmar, J. M. (2012) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02547.x · Cited by 256 · cited 2×
“Organizations, just as individuals, seek support and acceptance from their networks of audiences (Romzek et al. 2012), driven to a considerable extent by an “audience approval motive” and “concerns with falling in the esteem of others” (Tetlock 2002, 455, reflecting (Tetlock’s) “intuitive…”
BackgroundThe Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open Government
COGLIANESE, C. (2009) · Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2009.01451.x · Cited by 254
Flawed by design: the evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-5364 · Cited by 223 · cited 4×
“For instance, the literature on political accountability points at variation in account-holders’ involvement and interest ranging from high intensity to largely ineffectual account-holding activities characterised by “undersight” (Zegart, 1999; 2011) and “passive principals” (Brandsma 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialFRIEND OR FOE? INTER‐AGENCY COOPERATION, ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION, AND TURF
BUSUIOC, E. M. (2016) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12160 · Cited by 202 · cited 1×
“More generally, reputation has been identified as being crucial for understanding individual and organizational behavior (Carpenter 2001; 2010; Moffitt 2010, 2014; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Gilad 2015; Maor 2015; Busuioc 2016).”
BackgroundOrganizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk, and Strategic Silence
Maor, M., Gilad, S., & Bloom, P. B.-N. (2013) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mus047 · Cited by 196 · cited 2×
“…to external criticism are documented in practice and this differentiated responsiveness is found to be shaped by reputational considerations, i.e. by an organization’s understanding of its core reputation and associated reputational threats (Carpenter 2001; Maor et al. 2013; Gilad et al. 2013).”
BackgroundOrganizational Reputation in the Public Sector
(2014) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315850825 · Cited by 191
Organizational Reputation, the Content of Public Allegations, and Regulatory Communication
Gilad, S., Maor, M., & Bloom, P. B.-N. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mut041 · Cited by 178 · cited 1×
“…to external criticism are documented in practice and this differentiated responsiveness is found to be shaped by reputational considerations, i.e. by an organization’s understanding of its core reputation and associated reputational threats (Carpenter 2001; Maor et al. 2013; Gilad et al. 2013).”
BackgroundTransactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics
Carpenter, D., & Krause, G. A. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu012 · Cited by 149
Callander, S. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00007024 · Cited by 141 · cited 1×
“…2015) in the relationship, such approaches often ignore the co-produced nature of accountability interactions and the relevance of agent preferences in shaping principal responses (see however, Callander 2008; Gailmard and Patty 2007, 2013), the control process, and actual oversight outcomes.”
BackgroundEuropean Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability
Busuioc, M. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699292.001.0001 · Cited by 138
Self-citationPromoting Agency Reputation through Public Advice: Advisory Committee Use in the FDA
Moffitt, S. L. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s002238161000023x · Cited by 138 · cited 2×
“More generally, reputation has been identified as being crucial for understanding individual and organizational behavior (Carpenter 2001; 2010; Moffitt 2010, 2014; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Gilad 2015; Maor 2015; Busuioc 2016).”
BackgroundSchillemans, T. (2011) · Administration & Society · doi:10.1177/0095399711412931 · Cited by 137 · cited 3×
“…have been documented amongst a broad array of regulatory agencies are said to be primarily horizontal in nature i.e., they are geared towards actors outside the hierarchical or supervisory chain as attempts to broaden networks of support (Schillemans 2011), as opposed to traditional principals.”
BackgroundCongress Oversees the Bureaucracy
Ogul, M. S. (1976) · University of Pittsburgh Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/jj.12612582 · Cited by 124
(2013) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226924427.001.0001 · Cited by 112
THEORIZING AND EXPLAINING VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTABILITY
Koop, C. E. (2014) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12058 · Cited by 104 · cited 3×
“Account-givers are not just seeking to “drift”, instead numerous instances of voluntary and proactive account-giving have been identified, even if such activities come with significant opportunity costs (Reiss 2011; Koop 2014; Karsten 2015).”
BackgroundGilad, S. (2015) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12155 · Cited by 104 · cited 1×
“More generally, reputation has been identified as being crucial for understanding individual and organizational behavior (Carpenter 2001; 2010; Moffitt 2010, 2014; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Gilad 2015; Maor 2015; Busuioc 2016).”
BackgroundAccountable Agents: Federal Performance Measurement and Third-Party Government
Dubnick, M. J., & Frederickson, H. G. (2010) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mup039 · Cited by 101 · cited 1×
“Both the exercise of accountability and concerns with reputation are relational: they refer to the relationship or the interaction between the account-giving actor and the account-holding forum (Bovens 2007; Dubnick and Fredrickson 2010).”
BackgroundPolitics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy
(2003) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.17809 · Cited by 74
The Politics of Detection in Business Regulation
Etienne, J. (2014) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu018 · Cited by 73 · cited 1×
“In fact, control mandates were redefined on this basis: “for many fieldmen, the working definition of a ‘serious’ pollution is ‘basically anything that’s going to cause a great amount of public reaction’” (also Etienne 2015).”
BackgroundDaring to be a Daniel: The Pathology of Politicized Accountability in a Monitory Democracy
Flinders, M. (2011) · Administration & Society · doi:10.1177/0095399711403899 · Cited by 64 · cited 1×
“Resulting demand overloads, conflicting expectations, “multiple accountabilities disorders” and such pathologies are widely diagnosed (Koppel 2005; Dubnick 2005; Bevan and Hood 2006; Hood 2007; Bovens et al. 2008; Messner 2009; Flinders 2011).”
BackgroundMoffitt, S. L. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107588141 · Cited by 56
Karsten, N. (2015) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12164 · Cited by 50
The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies
Puppis, M., Maggetti, M., Gilardi, F., Biela, J., & Papadopoulos, Y. (2014) · Swiss Political Science Review · doi:10.1111/spsr.12118 · Cited by 34 · cited 2×
“Regulators in other settings have also increasingly been reported to pro-actively set up public hearings and organize public consultations (Löfstedt and Bouder 2014) and to pro-actively communicate to justify their actions (Puppis et al. 2014).”
BackgroundTransparency and trust in the European pharmaceutical sector: outcomes from an experimental study
Löfstedt, R. E., & Balog‐Way, D. H. P. (2014) · Journal of Risk Research · doi:10.1080/13669877.2014.919517 · Cited by 32
Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information
Bertelli, A. M., & Sinclair, J. (2015) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12396 · Cited by 25 · cited 1×
“…persist across government, public sector activities are likely to generate political heat, and, therefore, organisational/individual survival cannot be taken for granted (even if organisational “death” is rarely diagnosed) (see also Bertelli et al. 2015, Bertelli and Sinclair 2015).”
BackgroundAccount Me In Agencies in Quest of Accountability
Reiss, D. R. (2010) · Journal of law and policy · Cited by 12
Research works printed but not linked: 15
- 10.1111/padm.12190 · doi:10.1111/padm.12190
- 10.1057/9781137319647 · doi:10.1057/9781137319647
- Carpenter Daniel P., 2001, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928
- Dubnick Melvin, 2005, Accountability and the Promise of Performance, Public Performance and Management Review, 28, 376
- Dubnick Melvin, 2011, Move, Over Daniel: We Need Some “Accountability Space”. Administration & Society, 43, 704
- Dubnick Melvin J., 2011, Accountable Governance: Promises and Problems, xi
- 10.1111/j.1467-9299.1994.tb01009.x · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1994.tb01009.x
- Hogwood Brian, 2000, Transforming British Government, vol. 1, Changing Institutions, 195
- Löfstedt Ragnar E., 2014, Effective Risk Communication, edited by Joseph Arvai and Louie Rivers III, 73
- Mashaw Jerry.2006. Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance.http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924879[accessed June 30 2016].
- Meier Kenneth J., 2003, Politics, Policy, and Organizations, 292
- 10.1037/0033-295X.109.3.451 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.3.451 · Paper page
- Tremblay‐Boire Joannie AsseemPrakash andMaryKay Gugerty.2016. Regulation by Reputation: Monitoring and Sanctioning in Nonprofit Accountability Clubs.Public Administration Review.76(5):712–22. · doi:10.1111/puar.12539
- 10.1057/9780230277274 · doi:10.1057/9780230277274
- 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2011.tb00692.x · doi:10.1002/j.1538-165x.2011.tb00692.x
Cited by
Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account
Busuioc, M. (2021) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13293 · Cited by 652
Self-citationBuhmann, A., Paßmann, J., & Fieseler, C. (2020) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-019-04226-4 · Cited by 167
Brummel, L. (2021) · Administration & Society · doi:10.1177/0095399720988529 · Cited by 40
Rimkutė, D., & Mazepus, H. (2025) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13916 · Cited by 20
Liu, R., & Han, Y. (2026) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70043 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Busuioc, M., & Lodge, M.
- Venue
- Public Administration Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-08-04
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 91-100
- ISSN
- 0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6210
- OpenAlex
- W2417601898
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 34.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.