Cited by 38Corruption and Economic DevelopmentElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationAdministrative Law and Governance

The effects of transparency regulation on political trust and perceived corruption: Evidence from a survey experiment

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Crepaz, Michele, Arikan, Gizem·2024·Regulation & Governance

Abstract

Scholarly evidence of transparency's beneficial effects on trust and perceptions of corruption remains debated and confined to the study of public administration. We contribute to this debate by extending the study of its effects to transparency legislation concerning members of parliament (MPs), political parties, and business interest groups. In an online experiment conducted in Ireland with 1373 citizens, we find that transparency in political donations improves trust in political parties, while asset declaration for conflict of interest prevention reduces perceptions of corruption toward MPs. However, transparency in lobbying is found to have no impact on attitudes toward business interest groups. This supports the common expectation that transparency improves political trust and reduces perceptions of corruption, but also confirms its complex effects. The study improves our understanding of transparency beyond open government providing an evaluation of different regulatory policies aimed at making the activities of parties, MPs, and lobby groups transparent.

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Chari, R., Hogan, J., Murphy, G., & Crepaz, M. (2020). Regulating lobbying: A global comparison. Manchester University Press.
  2. Crepaz, M., & Arikan, G. (2021). Information disclosure and political trust during the COVID-19 crisis: Experimental evi- dence from Ireland. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 31(sup1), 96-108.
  3. Druckman, J. N., & Kam, C. D. (2011). Students as experimental participants. Cambridge handbook of experimental political science, 1, 41-57.
  4. Fenno, R. F. (2003). Home style: House members in their districts. Pearson College Division.
  5. Kollman, K. (2004). Interest groups and public opinion. In C. S. Thomas (Ed.), Research guide to US and international interest groups (pp. 89-91). Greenwood Publishing Group.
  6. Rose-Ackerman, S. (2001). Trust, honesty and corruption: Reflection on the state-building process. European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 42(3), 526-570.
  7. Sances, M. W. (2013). Is money in politics harming trust in government? Evidence from two survey experiments. Election Law Journal, 12(1), 53-73.

Authors
Crepaz, M., & Arikan, G.
Affiliations
  • Queen's University Belfast (GB)
  • Trinity College Dublin Dublin Ireland
Corresponding author
Crepaz, Michele
Venue
Regulation & Governance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2023-09-12
Volume
18
Issue
3
Pages
896-913
ISSN
  • 1748-5983 (ISSN-L)
  • 1748-5991
OpenAlex
W4386724492
Cited by
38
References
72
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 5
FWCI
16.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Regulation & Governance (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Research Portal (Queen's University Belfast) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
Irish Research Council (GOIPD/2018/52)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Administrative Law and Governance
Keywords
transparency regulation, public trust in government, corruption perception, campaign contributions, asset declaration, conflicts of interest, lobbying transparency, Members of Parliament, political parties, business interest groups, open government, Ireland

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