Cited by 76Safety Systems Engineering in AutonomyEthics and Social Impacts of AIRisk and Safety Analysis

Learning from the Failure of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems: Accidents, Safety, and Sociotechnical Sources of Risk

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Macrae, Carl·2022·Risk Analysis

Abstract

Efforts to develop autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS) have exploded across a range of settings in recent years, from self‐driving cars to medical diagnostic chatbots. These have the potential to bring enormous benefits to society but also have the potential to introduce new—or amplify existing—risks. As these emerging technologies become more widespread, one of the most critical risk management challenges is to ensure that failures of AIS can be rigorously analyzed and understood so that the safety of these systems can be effectively governed and improved. AIS are necessarily developed and deployed within complex human, social, and organizational systems, but to date there has been little systematic examination of the sociotechnical sources of risk and failure in AIS. Accordingly, this article develops a conceptual framework that characterizes key sociotechnical sources of risk in AIS by reanalyzing one of the most publicly reported failures to date: the 2018 fatal crash of Uber's self‐driving car. Publicly available investigative reports were systematically analyzed using constant comparative analysis to identify key sources and patterns of sociotechnical risk. Five fundamental domains of sociotechnical risk were conceptualized—structural, organizational, technological, epistemic, and cultural—each indicated by particular patterns of sociotechnical failure. The resulting SOTEC framework of sociotechnical risk in AIS extends existing theories of risk in complex systems and highlights important practical and theoretical implications for managing risk and developing infrastructures of learning in AIS.

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  • In 2020, an AI-powered self-driving car was involved in a fatal accident because it was unable to understand the context of the situation and collided with a pedestrian.

    “In 2020, an AI-powered selfdriving car was involved in a fatal accident.The car was unable to understand the context of the situation and it collided with a pedestrian [100].”

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Authors
Macrae, C.
Affiliations
University of Nottingham (GB)
Corresponding author
Macrae, Carl
Venue
Risk Analysis
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2021-11-23
Volume
42
Issue
9
Pages
1999-2025
ISSN
  • 0272-4332 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-6924
OpenAlex
W3215206150
Cited by
76
References
135
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2
FWCI
6.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Risk Analysis (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (213632/Z/18/Z)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Risk and Safety Analysis
Keywords
autonomous vehicles, risk management, organizational risk, epistemic risk, cultural risk, technological risk, structural risk, complex systems, learning from failure, safety governance
MeSH terms
Accidents, Humans, Causality

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