Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why do people cooperate? We address this classic question by analyzing and discussing the role of reputation: people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation in their social environment. Reputation is a key element fueling a system of indirect reciprocity, where cooperators establish a good reputation and are thus more likely to receive future benefits from third parties. The tendencies to monitor, spread, and manage each other's reputation help explain the abundance of human cooperation with unrelated strangers. We review research on the phenomenon of reputation‐based cooperation in the domains of how people manage their reputation in response to varying cues of reputation, when reputation can promote cooperation, and individual differences in reputation management. We also propose three directions for future research: group stability and reputation‐based cooperation, solutions to cope with noise and biased reputation, and the relative efficiency of positive versus negative reputation systems.
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Citations
Cites
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“Moreover, the tendencies to punish noncooperators that occur in behavioral experiments (Fehr & Gächter, 2002) may be uncommon in real-life situations, because peer punishment is costly and may lead to retaliation (Guala, 2012; Sigmund, 2007).”
BackgroundEvolution of indirect reciprocity
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“Indeed, much research demonstrates that reputation can promote cooperation, and ultimately solve the “tragedy of the commons” (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).”
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Cited by
Wu, J., Balliet, D., Peperkoorn, L. S., Romano, A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02956 · Cited by 156
Self-citationNetworks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation and cooperation in human groups
McKee, K. R., Hughes, E., Zhu, T. O., Chadwick, M. J., Koster, R., Castaneda, A. G., Beattie, C., Graepel, T., Botvinick, M., & Leibo, J. Z. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2103.04982 · Cited by 5
“The laboratory has primarily focused on abstract economic games where the main task for participants is to choose how much to cooperate [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Wu, J., Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M.
- Venue
- Social and Personality Psychology Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 350-364
- ISSN
- 1751-9004 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2417360922
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 21.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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