Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?
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Abstract
For more than two decades, researchers have argued that young children do not understand mental states such as beliefs. Part of the evidence for this claim comes from preschoolers' failure at verbal tasks that require the understanding that others may hold false beliefs. Here, we used a novel nonverbal task to examine 15-month-old infants' ability to predict an actor's behavior on the basis of her true or false belief about a toy's hiding place. Results were positive, supporting the view that, from a young age, children appeal to mental states—goals, perceptions, and beliefs—to explain the behavior of others.
Overview
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TL;DR
In a nonverbal violation-of-expectation task, 15-month-old infants looked longer when an actor searched for a hidden toy in a location inconsistent with her true or false belief about where it was. The authors conclude that infants already possess at least a rudimentary, implicit representational theory of mind.
Key findings
- The predicted interaction between the actor’s belief about the toy’s location and the actor’s search action was reliable, \(F(1, 48) = 31.24\), \(P < 0.0001\).
- The interaction was also reliable within the true-belief condition, \(F(1, 24) = 14.49\), \(P < 0.0008\), and within the false-belief condition, \(F(1, 24) = 16.69\), \(P < 0.0004\).
- In each of the four belief conditions, infants looked reliably longer when the actor searched where she did not believe the toy to be hidden (all \(F > 5.34\), \(P < 0.05\)).
- The authors argue these results suggest 15-month-olds expect an actor to search based on her belief, “rightly or wrongly,” and call into question the notion that preschoolers undergo a fundamental change from a nonrepresentational to a representational theory of mind.
Methods
- Participants were 56 healthy-term infants, 27 female and 29 male, mean age 15 months, 7 days (range: 14 months, 27 days to 15 months, 18 days). Seven infants were randomly assigned to each of eight groups formed by crossing actor’s belief about the toy’s location (green or yellow box), belief status (true or false), and actor’s search location during test (green or yellow box). Another 14 infants were tested but eliminated.
- Infants received three familiarization trials in which an actor hid a toy in a green box, then a single belief-induction trial with four versions yielding two true-belief and two false-belief conditions, followed by a single test trial in which the actor reached into either the green or yellow box.
- Looking times during the test trial were compared using an analysis of variance with actor’s belief about the toy’s location, belief status, and actor’s action as between-subject factors, plus planned comparisons.
Limitations
- The paper explicitly considers an alternative interpretation: infants might use a superficial expectation that a person looking for an object will search where she last saw it disappear, which would require tracking the actor’s perceptions but not attributing a belief to her. The authors prefer the belief interpretation but acknowledge this alternative.
- The paper describes the infants’ understanding as “at least in a rudimentary and implicit form,” indicating that the findings do not establish explicit or verbal false-belief understanding.
- Evident from the text: the sample was small, with only seven infants per group; the study tested only one narrow age range; and the dependent measure was infant looking time in a violation-of-expectation paradigm, which does not directly assess verbal report or later behavior.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 2 Not checked · 15 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The predicted interaction between actor’s belief and actor’s action was reliable [F(1, 48) = 31.24, P < 0.0001]”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“planned comparisons indicated that, in each of the four belief conditions, infants expected the actor to search for her toy where she believed it to be hidden and looked reliably longer when she did not (for all conditions, F > 5.34, P < 0.05)”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This interaction was also reliable within the true-belief [F(1, 24) = 14.49, P < 0.0008]”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and the false-belief [F(1, 24) = 16.69, P < 0.0004] conditions.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In short, we propose that the present results suggest that 15-month-old infants expect an actor to search for a toy where she believes, rightly or wrongly, that it is hidden.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
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The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“To date, spontaneous-response tasks have shown that infants can attribute to an agent a false belief about an object's location [16-19], a false perception of an object [21], and a false belief about an object's identity [4]; these findings are described below.”
From False-belief understanding in infants (2010) · cites this paper as [16]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“In each condition, the infants expected the agent to reach where she falsely believed the toy to be hidden, and they looked reliably longer when she reached to the other location instead.”
From False-belief understanding in infants (2010) · cites this paper as [16]
In the citing paper
“Recent findings with infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) and young children (Friedman & Leslie, 2005), however, have cast doubt on this strong conclusion about onset.”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005
Statistics that don’t add up
Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“F(1, 24) = 14.49, P < 0.0008”
Reported p < .0008 · recomputed p < .001
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Doesn’t add upF(1, 24) = 14.49reported p < .0008 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 24) = 14.49, p < .0008”
- Not confirmedF(1, 24) = 16.69reported p < .0004 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 24) = 16.69, p < .0004”
- ConsistentF(1, 48) = 31.24reported p < .0001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1, 48) = 31.24, p < .0001”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.
Citations
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Scott, R. M., Richman, J. C., & Baillargeon, R. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.08.003 · Cited by 122
Self-citationHow Children and Adults Represent God's Mind
Heiphetz, L., Lane, J. D., Waytz, A. G., & Young, L. (2015) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12232 · Cited by 122
Buttelmann, F., Suhrke, J., & Buttelmann, D. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2014.11.009 · Cited by 122
A Comparison of American and Nepalese Children's Concepts of Freedom of Choice and Social Constraint
Chernyak, N., Kushnir, T., Sullivan, K. M., & Wang, Q. (2013) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12046 · Cited by 121
A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence: The complexity of mindreading
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Rakoczy, H., Harder‐Kasten, A., & Sturm, L. (2011) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02040.x · Cited by 120
13-Month-Olds’ Understanding of Social Interactions
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The Pervasive Role of Pragmatics in Early Language
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Observant, nonaggressive temperament predicts theory‐of‐mind development
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Infants Understand How Testimony Works
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Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind
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Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children
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I’ve got your number: Spontaneous perspective-taking in an interactive task
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Neural Theory-of-Mind? On the Limits of Social Intelligence in Large LMs
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Metadata
- Authors
- Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
- Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1B1, Canada.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2005-04-08
- Volume
- 308
- Issue
- 5719
- Pages
- 255-258
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3357322
- OpenAlex
- W1974955132
- Semantic Scholar
- 284f1997864fbf90c6d1fabbd429e03ed1713125
- Cited by
- 2,350
- References
- 26
- Citations by year
- 2026: 53 · 2025: 73 · 2024: 123 · 2023: 82 · 2022: 162 · 2021: 143 · 2020: 143 · 2019: 189 · 2018: 184 · 2017: 107 · 2016: 159 · 2015: 139 · 2014: 131 · 2013: 118 · 2012: 111
- FWCI
- 86.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of Mental Health (T32MH019990)
- Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R01HD021104, HD 21104)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Language Development and Disorders
- Keywords
- false belief understanding, theory of mind, infant cognition, hidden object task, social cognition development
- MeSH terms
- Behavior, Child Development, Psychology, Child, Female, Humans, Infant, Male, Mental Processes, Psychology, Social, Comprehension
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-05, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-05 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.