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Cited by 138Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentAutism Spectrum Disorder ResearchAction Observation and Synchronization

What's domain-specific about theory of mind?

Stone, Valerie E., Gerrans, Philip·2006·Social Neuroscience
DOI 10.1080/17470910601029221
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Abstract

Twenty years ago, Baron-Cohen and colleagues argued that autistic performance on false belief tests was explained by a deficit in metarepresentation. Subsequent research moved from the view that the mind has a domain-general capacity for metarepresentation to the view that the mind has a domain-specific mechanism for metarepresentation of mental states per se, i.e., the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM). We argue that 20 years of data collection in lesion patients and children with autism supports a more parsimonious view closer to that of the 1985 paper. Lower-level domain-specific mechanisms--e.g., tracking gaze, joint attention--interacting with higher-level domain-general mechanisms for metarepresentation, recursion, and executive function can account for observed patterns of deficits in both autism and neurological patients. The performance of children with autism or orbitofrontal patients on ToM tests can be explained more parsimoniously by their deficits in lower-level domain-specific mechanisms for processing social information. Without proper inputs, the intact capacity for metarepresentation by itself cannot make correct ToM inferences. Children with autism have no impairment in false photograph tests because their metarepresentational capacity is intact and they have no impairment in inputs required for such tests. TPJ patients have equivalent deficits on ToM and non-ToM metarepresentational tasks, consistent with a failure in domain-general processing. If deficits on ToM tasks can result from deficits in low-level input systems or in higher-level domain-general capacities, postulating a separate ToM mechanism may have been an unnecessary theoretical move.

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  • Non-social cognitive mechanisms such as reward, executive function, attention, and visual and auditory processing can influence social behavior presentation independently of specific impairment or domain-specific social cognitive mechanisms.

    “A thorough review of cognitive mechanisms underlying ASD suggested that non-social cognitive mechanisms, including reward, executive function, attention, visual and auditory processing, may affect the presentation of social behavior regardless of specific impairment or the existence of domain-specific social cognitive mechanisms7.”

    From Subtyping cognitive profiles in Autism Spectrum Disorder using a Functional Random Forest algorithm (2018) · cites this paper as [7]

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Authors
Stone, V. E., & Gerrans, P.
Affiliations
  • The University of Queensland (AU)
  • The University of Adelaide (AU)
Corresponding author
Stone, Valerie E.
ORCID
Gerrans, Philip
Venue
Social Neuroscience
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2006-09
Volume
1
Issue
3-4
Pages
309-319
ISSN
  • 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
  • 1747-0927
DOI
10.1080/17470910601029221
OpenAlex
W2057687803
Cited by
138
References
78
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 11
FWCI
2.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Social Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
Keywords
theory of mind, metarepresentation, autism spectrum disorder, false belief test, domain-general mechanisms, temporoparietal junction, joint attention, gaze tracking, executive function, recursion, social cognition
MeSH terms
Autistic Disorder, Brain Mapping, Humans, Mental Processes, Psychological Theory

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