Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments
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Abstract
High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's “moral sentiments.” Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.
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“Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment45–47.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [45]
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“Paying donors for giving blood, for example, actually decreases willingness to donate [14]”
From The social motivation theory of autism (2012) · cites this paper as [14]
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Raghu, S. J., & Rodrigues, L. L. R. (2020) · Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association · doi:10.1080/10962247.2020.1823524 · Cited by 166
Performance Implications of Mismatched Governance Regimes Across External and Internal Relationships
Kumar, A., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2011) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.75.2.1 · Cited by 116
“Such scenarios have received some attention in prior research (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002; Zenger, Lazzarini, and Poppo 2002) based on the notion that explicit incentives may degrade the coordination benefits of social norms (e.g., Bowles 2008; Frey and Stutzer 2007; Kreps 1997).”
BackgroundSattler, C., Trampnau, S., Schomers, S., Meyer, C., & Matzdorf, B. (2013) · Ecosystem Services · doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.09.007 · Cited by 123
How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments
Earp, B. D., McLoughlin, K. L., Monrad, J. T., Clark, M. S., & Crockett, M. J. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-26067-4 · Cited by 174
Travers, H., Clements, T., Keane, A. M., & Milner‐Gulland, E. J. (2011) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.08.020 · Cited by 136
Martin, A., Gross‐Camp, N. D., Kebede, B., & McGuire, S. (2014) · Global Environmental Change · doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.003 · Cited by 115
A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., & Gowdy, J. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.017 · Cited by 118
Bottazzi, P., Wiik, E., Crespo, D., & Jones, J. P. G. (2018) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.032 · Cited by 103
“there has been growing criticism that such market-mechanisms for conservation can result in unhelpful commodification of nature and can lead to crowding-out of existing motivations to conserve (Bowles, 2008; Rode et al., 2015).”
BackgroundExperimental evidence on payments for forest commons conservation
Andersson, K. P., Cook, N. J., Grillos, T., López, M. C., Salk, C. F., Wright, G. D., & Mwangi, E. (2018) · Nature Sustainability · doi:10.1038/s41893-018-0034-z · Cited by 116
Does incentive provision increase the quality of peer review? An experimental study
Squazzoni, F., Bravo, G., & Takács, K. (2013) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2012.04.014 · Cited by 93
Schmelz, K., & Bowles, S. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2104912118 · Cited by 98
“In total, the first (second) wave of the panel contained 201 (203) variables and median response time was 14 (18) min.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe nature of viral altruism and how to make it stick
van der Linden, S. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-016-0041 · Cited by 95
Reflections on “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation”
Elinor Ostrom, B. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.49 · Cited by 126
The counterintuitive effects of thank-you gifts on charitable giving
Newman, G. E., & Shen, Y. (2012) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.05.002 · Cited by 120
“…psychology and economics on the ‘‘overjustification’’ or ‘‘crowding out’’ effect suggests that external incentives (such as gifts) may often decrease behaviors that are intrinsically motivated (Bowles, 2008; Deci et al., 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Gneezy & Rustichni, 2000b; Lepper & Greene, 1980).”
BackgroundMotivational Crowding in Sustainable Development Interventions
Agrawal, A., Chhatre, A., & Gerber, E. R. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000209 · Cited by 129
Increasing the impact of collective incentives in payments for ecosystem services
Kaczan, D. J., Pfaff, A. S. P., Rodríguez, L. Á. C., & Shapiro‐Garza, E. (2017) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2017.06.007 · Cited by 110
“Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.06.007i intervention was to “crowd out” those critical intrinsic or non-monetary motivations (Bowles, 2008; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Rode et al., 2015).”
BackgroundInfluentialChervier, C., Velly, G. L., & Ezzine‐de‐Blas, D. (2017) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.018 · Cited by 125
How Laws Affect the Perception of Norms: Empirical Evidence from the Lockdown
Galbiati, R., Henry, E., Jacquemet, N., & Lobeck, M. (2020) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0256624 · Cited by 97
“Considering such interactions between laws and norms is key to understanding why policies designed to foster cooperation fail or succeed (see [2, 3] for recent reviews).”
Singh, N. M. (2015) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.06.011 · Cited by 107
Social Norms and Behavior in the Local Commons as Seen Through the Lens of Field Experiments
Cárdenas, J.-C. (2011) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-010-9452-8 · Cited by 119
Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement
Fuster, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.1081 · Cited by 103
“Bowles and Gintis (2005) refer to these two respective feelings as guilt and shame, and argue that these emotions play a significant role in increasing the contributions of free riders. Direct evidence for the possible importance of guilt and shame in a public good experiment is provided by Masclet et al. (2003), who…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialClements, T., RAINEY, H. J., An, D., Vann, R., Setha, T., Sokha, T., Sutherland, W. J., & Milner‐Gulland, E. J. (2012) · Biological Conservation · doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2012.07.020 · Cited by 86
“Although economic considerations certainly influence individuals’ decisions to engage in behaviours (Persky, 1995), additional factors including social norms (Bowles, 2008) and procedural and distributive fairness are known to impact individuals’ motivation (Fehr and Falk, 2002).”
BackgroundWhen Do Powerful Stakeholders Give Managers the Latitude to Balance All Stakeholders’ Interests?
Bridoux, F., & Vishwanathan, P. (2018) · Business & Society · doi:10.1177/0007650318775077 · Cited by 118
“complex interactions (Bowles, 2008; Frey & Jegen, 2001) that merit attention in”
BackgroundTheory and practice of water ecosystem services valuation: Where are we going?
Hackbart, V. C. D. S., de Lima, G. T. N. P., & dos Santos, R. F. (2017) · Ecosystem Services · doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2016.12.010 · Cited by 91
“…2002); sociocultural and economic valuation – valuing ES based on the attributes of different social and cultural groups observed under a cultural-social conservation perspective (Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Zander and Straton, 2010); and ethical valuation-valuing "moral sentiments" (Bowles, 2008).”
BackgroundWu, J., Zuidema, C., & Gugerell, K. (2018) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.04.123 · Cited by 84
“The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is quite relevant in the case of decentralization, as decreasing topdown pressure on local units will imply willingness to become increasingly dependent on intrinsic motivation (compare Bowles, 2008; Zuidema, 2016).”
BackgroundLourenço, S. M. (2015) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51148 · Cited by 109
Interactions between organizations and networks in common-pool resource governance
Agrawal, A., Brown, D. G., Rao, G., Riolo, R., Robinson, D. T., & Bommarito, M. J. (2012) · Environmental Science & Policy · doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2012.08.004 · Cited by 89
“This is consistent with the explanation for the effect of social mixing advanced above, i.e., a small number of long range connections enables information to propagate rapidly across a population.”
BackgroundResultBrown, H. L., Bos, D. G., Walsh, C. J., Fletcher, T. D., & RossRakesh, S. (2016) · Journal of Environmental Planning and Management · doi:10.1080/09640568.2014.984017 · Cited by 88
“The danger of such incentive-based programmes is that intrinsic motivation will be undermined over time, as self-interest, rather than moral responsibility, is rewarded (Bowles 2008).”
BackgroundCollective action for watershed management: field experiments in Colombia and Kenya
Cárdenas, J.-C., Rodríguez, L. Á. C., & Johnson, N. L. (2010) · Environment and Development Economics · doi:10.1017/s1355770x10000392 · Cited by 81
“Some explanations for this behavior, such as the crowding-out of cooperative behavior, have been explored in other works (Cardenas et al., 2000; Bowles, 2008).”
The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seekingPreprint
Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 124
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Siena (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Bowles, Samuel
- ORCID
- Bowles, Samuel
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2008-06-20
- Volume
- 320
- Issue
- 5883
- Pages
- 1605-1609
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W1998053404
- Cited by
- 833
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 74 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 48 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 70
- FWCI
- 19.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- moral sentiments, self-interest, economic incentives, altruism, intrinsic motivation, self-determination, organizational design, institutional design, Adam Smith, public policy, behavioral economics
- MeSH terms
- Economics, Games, Experimental, Humans, Morals, Motivation, Policy Making, Public Policy, Social Behavior, Personal Autonomy
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