The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
Abstract
Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data. We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, and also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification.
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Cites
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Cited by
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.45 · Cited by 713
Self-citationVC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Fournet, C., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 595
Self-citationMachine Learning Models that Remember Too Much
Song, C., Ristenpart, T., & Shmatikov, V. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134077 · Cited by 526
“Advances in data analytics frameworks based on trusted hardware such as SGX [7, 61, 66] and cryptographic protocols based on secure multi-party computation (see Section 8) may also serve as the basis for secure ML platforms.”
BackgroundKeystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D. (2020) · Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3342195.3387532 · Cited by 379
Twenty Security Considerations for Cloud-Supported Internet of Things
Singh, J., Pasquier, T., Bacon, J., Ko, H., & Eyers, D. (2016) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2015.2460333 · Cited by 335
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGX
Priebe, C., Vaswani, K., & Costa, M. (2018) · 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2018.00025 · Cited by 284
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies the Power of Cache Attacks
Moghimi, A., Irazoqui, G., & Eisenbarth, T. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66787-4_4 · Cited by 237
Eleos: ExitLess OS Services for SGX Enclaves
Orenbach, M., Lifshits, P., Minkin, M., & Silberstein, M. (2017) · Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3064176.3064219 · Cited by 186
A survey on the (in)security of trusted execution environments
Muñoz, A., Ríos, R., Román, R., & López, J. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103180 · Cited by 131
“…et al., 2019) Sierraware(SierraWare) TrustOPT(Sun et al., 2015a) Intel SGX(Intel, 2014) Solacia SecuriTEE(Solacia) SafeG(Takei et al., 2009) Haven(Baumann et al., 2015)* mTower(Drozdovskyi and Moliavko, 2019) VimoExpress(Oh et al., 2012) SCONE*(Arnautov et al., 2016) T6(TrustKernel) Kinibi…”
BackgroundA comparison study of intel SGX and AMD memory encryption technology
Mofrad, S., Zhang, F., Lu, S., & Shi, W. (2018) · Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/3214292.3214301 · Cited by 102
Regaining Lost Cycles with HotCalls: A Fast Interface for SGX Secure Enclaves
Weisse, O., Bertacco, V., & Austin, T. (2017) · ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News · doi:10.1145/3140659.3080208 · Cited by 47
Secure data processing for IoT middleware systems
Ayoade, G., El-Ghamry, A., Karande, V., Khan, L., Alrahmawy, M., & Rashad, M. Z. (2019) · The Journal of Supercomputing · doi:10.1007/s11227-018-2686-x · Cited by 26
Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems With Aurora
Liang, H., Li, M., Chen, Y., Jiang, L., Xie, Z., & Yang, T. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2019.2945621 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Baumann, A., Peinado, M., & Hunt, G.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
- Published
- 2015-08-31
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1-26
- ISSN
- 0734-2071 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7333
- OpenAlex
- W2061643296
- Cited by
- 463
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 50.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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