No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware
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Abstract
As modern 64-bit x86 processors no longer support the segmentation capabilities of their 32-bit predecessors, most research projects assume that strong in-process memory isolation is no longer an affordable option. Instead of strong, deterministic isolation, new defense systems therefore rely on the probabilistic pseudo-isolation provided by randomization to "hide" sensitive (or safe) regions. However, recent attacks have shown that such protection is insufficient; attackers can leak these safe regions in a variety of ways.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Koning, K., Chen, X., Bos, H., Giuffrida, C., & Athanasopoulos, E.
- Affiliations
- Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL)
- University of Cyprus (CY)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-04-23
- Pages
- 437-452
- OpenAlex
- W2605597658
- Cited by
- 116
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 6.24
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- research.vu.nl
- Locations
- European Conference on Computer Systems (publishedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission (H2020)
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (639.023.309, NWO 639.023.309)
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Real-Time Systems Scheduling
- Keywords
- safe zones, memory isolation, randomization
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