Cited by 458Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in Computing

Machine Learning with Membership Privacy using Adversarial Regularization

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Nasr, Milad, Shokri, Reza, Houmansadr, Amir·2018·Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Machine learning models leak significant amount of information about their training sets, through their predictions. This is a serious privacy concern for the users of machine learning as a service. To address this concern, in this paper, we focus on mitigating the risks of black-box inference attacks against machine learning models. We introduce a mechanism to train models with membership privacy, which ensures indistinguishability between the predictions of a model on its training data and other data points (from the same distribution). This requires minimizing the accuracy of the best black-box membership inference attack against the model. We formalize this as a min-max game, and design an adversarial training algorithm that minimizes the prediction loss of the model as well as the maximum gain of the inference attacks. This strategy, which can guarantee membership privacy (as prediction indistinguishability), acts also as a strong regularizer and helps generalizing the model. We evaluate the practical feasibility of our privacy mechanism on training deep neural networks using benchmark datasets. We show that the min-max strategy can mitigate the risks of membership inference attacks (near random guess), and can achieve this with a negligible drop in the model's prediction accuracy (less than 4%).

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  • Two solutions have been proposed to address privacy leakage in models: adding a regularization term in a loss function to avoid overfitting and improve robustness, and adding acceptable noise into model parameters to hinder privacy inference attacks.

    “To address the problem of privacy leakage in the models, two solutions have been proposed: (1) adding a regularization term in a loss function to avoid overfitting and improve robustness; for example, this method can be applied to defend against membership inference attacks, [37] and (2) adding acceptable noise into the model parameters to hinder privacy inference attacks.”
  • The Stackelberg game was adopted to model dynamic variation in end devices computation resources and stable connection between IoMT devices and central aggregator in hospital.

    “For instance, the Stackelberg game was adopted to model the dynamic variation in end devices computation resources and stable connection between IoMT devices and central aggregator in hospital [67].”
  • The Stackelberg game algorithm requires complete knowledge of federated learning devices and networks to deploy it fully.

    “The drawback with this algorithm is that one needs complete knowledge of FL devices and networks to deploy it fully.”
  • Based on local model updates from an IoMT device, an attacker can infer and recover local data using construction attacks and/or predict the existence of a data sample in the local training dataset via membership inference attacks.

    “For example, based on the local model updates from an IoMT device, the attacker can infer and recover the local data using the construction attacks [60] and/or predict the existence of a data sample in the local training dataset such as blood type, disease name, gender information, and any other private information, which can be done via membership inference attacks [61].”

    From Federated learning for smart healthcare: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [61]

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Haoyang Zeng. 2017. Training GANs with Optimism. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.00141 (2017). · arXiv
  2. Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. 2014. Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in neural information processing systems.
  3. Ninghui Li, Wahbeh Qardaji, Dong Su, Yi Wu, and Weining Yang. 2013. Member- ship privacy: a unifying framework for privacy definitions. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security. ACM.
  4. Apostolos Pyrgelis, Carmela Troncoso, and Emiliano De Cristofaro. 2017. Knock Knock, Who's There? Membership Inference on Aggregate Location Data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06145 (2017). · arXiv
  5. Tim Salimans, Ian Goodfellow, Wojciech Zaremba, Vicki Cheung, Alec Radford, and Xi Chen. 2016. Improved techniques for training gans. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 2234-2242.
  6. Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K Reiter, and Thomas Ristenpart. 2016. Stealing machine learning models via prediction apis. In USENIX Security.

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Authors
Nasr, M., Shokri, R., & Houmansadr, A.
Affiliations
  • University of Massachusetts Amherst (US)
  • National University of Singapore (SG)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2018-10-15
Pages
634-646
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2884943453
Cited by
458
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 24 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 71 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 77 · 2020: 53 · 2019: 35 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 1
FWCI
17.45
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • National University of Singapore (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
National Science Foundation (1525642)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
membership inference attacks, adversarial regularization, adversarial training, min-max game, privacy-preserving machine learning, deep neural network, privacy-utility trade-off

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