Cited by 323Spam and Phishing DetectionMisinformation and Its ImpactsHate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection

A decade of social bot detection

Open access
Cresci, Stefano·2020·Communications of the ACM

Abstract

Bots increasingly tamper with political elections and economic discussions. Tracing trends in detection strategies and key suggestions on how to win the fight.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This survey reviews the first decade (2010–2020) of research on social bot detection, documenting a paradigm shift from supervised, individual-account detectors to unsupervised, group-based detectors targeting coordinated behavior, and argues that adversarial machine learning is the emerging next direction. It concludes that detection must move away from binary labels toward multifaceted measures of inauthentic coordination.

Key findings

  • Bot prevalence is substantial: ~15% of all active Twitter accounts in 2017 and 11% of all Facebook accounts in 2019; in high-stakes contexts it rises sharply, with 71% of Twitter users mentioning trending US stocks likely being bots.
  • Bot evolution degrades detection: only 5% of newer bots are removed from platforms versus 60% of older ones, and crowdsourcing participants identified newer bots only 24% of the time versus 91% for older bots.
  • A longitudinal classification of 236 bot detectors published since 2010 shows group-based detectors first surpassed individual-account detectors in 2018; unsupervised approaches rose from 2013 and plateaued around 2017, coinciding with the rise of adversarial approaches (first papers in 2018–19).
  • The paper reports no consensus on bot impact: some studies find bots pivotal in spreading disinformation, polarization and hateful speech, while competing results claim bots play no significant role.

Methods

  • Longitudinal survey and manual classification of more than 230 papers proposing bot detection techniques, categorized along two orthogonal dimensions: (A) individual-account vs. group-based targets, and (B) high-level approach (heuristics, crowdsourcing, supervised ML, unsupervised ML, adversarial).
  • The paper also synthesizes prior empirical results on bot prevalence, bot evolution, and human annotation accuracy, and proposes a conceptual bi-dimensional generalizability space (bot type × time) and a GAN-based adversarial detection framework.
  • No new primary data collection or experiment is reported; the work is a review/survey.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the exact number of new bot detectors per type can vary if a different set of papers is analyzed, though it argues the overall trends are clear and reliable.
  • The paper states that adversarial bot detection is still in its infancy, lagging behind traditional approaches, and that challenges remain in generating diverse, realistic adversarial examples and in evaluating their novelty and diversity.
  • Evident from the text: the survey's classification relies on manual labeling by the author, and the paper notes the field lacks standard benchmarks, reference datasets, and agreed definitions of social bots, which limits comparability of the reviewed detectors.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3409116

Cites

30 of 30 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 54 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data
    § ACMReference Format: · p. 3

    Since 2014, the number of publications on the characterization, detection and impact estimation of social bots has skyrocketed.

    “Since 2014, the number of publications on the topic skyrocketed.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingcitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    The majority of existing works on social bot detection focused on detecting malicious bots rather than benign bots.

    “Regarding the detection of benign or malicious social bots, the majority of existing works focused on detecting the latter.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [30] [30] Stefan Stieglitz, Florian Brachten, Björn Ross, and Anna-Katharina Jung. 2017. Do social bots dream of electric sheep? A categorisation of social media bot accounts. In The 17th Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS'17) . -

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  • Findingown data
    § ACMReference Format: · p. 2

    The scientific literature has documented political manipulation by social bots in 39 countries.

    “World view of 39 countries for which scientific literature documented political manipulation by social bots.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingcitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Scholars still lack a widespread consensus on the impact of social bots.

    “In fact, scholars still lack a widespread consensus on the impact of social bots, with some studies reporting on their pivotal role for increasing disinformation's spread, polarization, and hateful speech [27, 29], and competing results claiming that bots do not play a significant role in these processes [32].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [27] [27] Chengcheng Shao, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Onur Varol, Kai-Cheng Yang, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2018. The spread of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature communications 9, 1 (2018), 4787. -

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    • cites [29] [29] Massimo Stella, Emilio Ferrara, and Manlio De Domenico. 2018. Bots increase exposure to negative and inflammatory content in online social systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, 49 (2018), 12435-12440. - source

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    • cites [32] [32] Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. 2018. The spread of true and false news online. Science 359, 6380 (2018), 1146-1151. - source

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  • Findingnone given
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Bots did not always have a real impact in political discussions about the countries highlighted in Figure 1.

    “Despite taking part in political discussions about all countries highlighted in figure, bots did not always have a real impact.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingnone given
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 9

    All techniques based on the analysis of the textual content of posted messages are supervised detectors that analyze individual accounts.

    “Contrarily, all techniques based on the analysis of the textual content of posted messages, such as those works that exclusively employ natural language processing techniques, are supervised detectors that analyze individual accounts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingcitation
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 9

    The number of new supervised detectors has been constantly increasing since 2012, despite their severe generalization issues.

    “Instead, the number of new supervised detectors has been constantly increasing since 2012, despite their severe generalization issues [11].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [11] [11] Juan Echeverrìa, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nicolas Kourtellis, Ilias Leontiadis, Gianluca Stringhini, and Shi Zhou. 2018. LOBO: Evaluation of generalization deficiencies in Twitter bot classifiers. In The 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'18) . ACM, 137-146. -

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    Findingnone given
    § THE DAWN OF SOCIAL BOT DETECTION · p. 5

    A real ground truth dataset for training supervised bot detectors is lacking in most cases, and labels are simply given by human operators that manually analyze the data.

    “In most cases, a real ground truth is lacking and the labels are simply given by human operators that manually analyze the data.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingown data
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 9

    The adoption of unsupervised machine learning started in 2013 with the rise of group approaches and now appears to be stationary.

    “The adoption of unsupervised machine learning started in 2013 with the rise of group approaches, and now appears to be stationary.”
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    Findingown data
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 4

    Nowadays, new studies on the characterization, detection and impact estimation of bots are published at an impressive rate.

    “Nowadays, new studies on the characterization, detection and impact estimation of bots are published at an impressive rate, as shown in Figure 2.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingnone given
    § THE DAWN OF SOCIAL BOT DETECTION · p. 4

    In the early days, the vast majority of attempts at bot detection were based on supervised machine learning and on the analysis of individual accounts.

    “In the early days, the vast majority of attempts at bot detection featured two distinctive characteristics: (i) they were based on supervised machine learning, and (ii) on the analysis of individual accounts.”
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    Findingnone given
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 10

    A shift took place from individual to group detectors in an effort to contrast social bot evolution.

    “So far, we highlighted that a shift took place from individual to group detectors in an effort to contrast social bot evolution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingreasoning
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    Among the most pressing challenges along this line of research is the problem of scalability of group-based detectors and the intrinsic fuzziness of 'inauthentic coordination'.

    “Among the most pressing challenges along this line of research is the problem of scalability of group-based detectors and the intrinsic fuzziness of 'inauthentic coordinaton'.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
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    Findingnone given
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    Computational means to discriminate between authentic and inauthentic coordination are yet to be proposed and evaluated.

    “Similarly, computational means to discriminate between authentic and inauthentic coordination are yet to be proposed and evaluated.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingcitation
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    The scalable and generalizable detection of coordination is still a largely open challenge, with only few contributions proposed so far.

    “In fact, the scalable and generalizable detection of coordination is still a largely open challenge, with only few contributions proposed so far [12, 25].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [12] [12] Mohd Fazil and Muhammad Abulaish. 2020. A socialbots analysis-driven graph-based approach for identifying coordinated campaigns in Twitter. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems 38 (2020), 2961-2977. Issue 3. - source

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    • cites [25] [25] Diogo Pacheco, Pik-Mai Hui, Christopher Torres-Lugo, Bao Tran Truong, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2020. Uncovering Coordinated Networks on Social Media. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05658 (2020). -

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    Findingreasoning
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 10

    Scientific communities tend to favor and stick to a specific approach to bot detection.

    “At the same time, some scientific communities tend to favor and stick to a specific approach.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
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    Findingnone given
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    Unsupervised detectors emerged in 2012-13 and shifted the target to groups of misbehaving accounts.

    “Unsupervised detectors emerged in 2012-13 and shifted the target to groups of misbehaving accounts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingreasoning
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 13

    These challenges currently stand as largely unsolved.

    “These challenges currently stand as largely unsolved, and call for the highest effort of our scientific community.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingnone given
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 13

    Challenges for creating reference datasets include the limited availability of data itself, missing or ambiguous ground truth, and the obsolescence of existing datasets that hardly cope with the rapid evolution of malicious accounts.

    “Here, challenges include the limited availability of data itself, missing or ambiguous ground truth and the obsolescence of existing datasets that hardly cope with the rapid evolution of malicious accounts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingcitation
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    A GAN trained in [33] for creating adversarial examples of social bots improved the training of downstream detectors.

    “A notable example of this kind is represented by the GAN trained in [33] for creating adversarial examples of social bots that improved the training of downstream detectors.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [33] [33] Bin Wu, Le Liu, Yanqing Yang, Kangfeng Zheng, and Xiujuan Wang. 2020. Using Improved Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks to Detect Social Bots on Twitter. IEEE Access 8 (2020), 36664-36680. - source

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    Findingreasoning
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 10

    Works published within the natural language processing community focus on textual content, resulting in a multitude of supervised classifiers that analyze accounts individually and yield binary labels.

    “For instance, works published within the natural language processing community, quite naturally focus on textual content, thus resulting in a multitude of supervised classifiers that analyze accounts individually and that yield binary labels.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Findingcitation
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    Initial efforts towards adversarial bot detection were driven by the creativity of some researchers and only covered few cases with limited applicability.

    “The previous analysis highlights that initial efforts towards adversarial bot detection were driven by the creativity of some researchers and only covered few cases with limited applicability [9, 17].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [9] [9] Stefano Cresci, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Stefano Tognazzi. 2019. Better Safe Than Sorry: An Adversarial Approach to Improve Social Bot Detection. In The 11th International Conference on Web Science (WebSci'19) . ACM. - source

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    • cites [17] [17] Christian Grimme, Dennis Assenmacher, and Lena Adam. 2018. Changing perspectives: Is it sufficient to detect social bots?. In The 10th International Conference on Social Computing and Social Media (SCSM'18) . - source

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    Adversarial bot detection research is still in its infancy and is still lagging behind more traditional approaches.

    “Despite the high hopes placed on adversarial approaches for detecting deception and automation, this research direction is still in its infancy and, probably due to its recency, is still lagging behind more traditional approaches.”
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    Findingcitation
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    This paradigm has never been applied to the task of social bot detection, but it was tested with promising results for related tasks, such as fake news generation/detection.

    “This paradigm has never been applied to the task of social bot detection, but it was tested with promising results for related tasks, such as that of fake news generation/detection [39].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [39] [39] Rowan Zellers, Ari Holtzman, Hannah Rashkin, Yonatan Bisk, Ali Farhadi, Franziska Roesner, and Yejin Choi. 2019. Defending against neural fake news. In The 33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS'19) . 9051-9062. -

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    Findingnone given
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 13

    One aspect that is often overlooked when evaluating bot detectors is their generalizability - that is, their capacity of achieving good detection results also for types of bots that have not been originally considered.

    “One aspect that is often overlooked when evaluating bot detectors is their generalizability - that is, their capacity of achieving good detection results also for types of bots that have not been originally considered.”
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    Findingnone given
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 10

    The complex networks community favors graph-based approaches.

    “In contrast, the complex networks community favors graph-based approaches.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Premisecitation
    § ACMReference Format: · p. 1

    A minority of social bots played a central role in spreading divisive messages and disinformation, possibly contributing to Trump's victory in the 2016 US Presidential elections.

    “Today, we know that a minority of social bots - automated social media accounts mimicking humans - played a central role in spreading divisive messages and disinformation, possibly contributing to Trump's victory [16, 19].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [16] [16] Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Tho Pham, and Oleksandr Talavera. 2018. Social Media, Sentiment and Public Opinions: Evidence from #Brexit and #USElection . Working Paper 24631. National Bureau of Economic Research. -

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    • cites [19] [19] Nir Grinberg, Kenneth Joseph, Lisa Friedland, Briony Swire-Thompson, and David Lazer. 2019. Fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election. Science 363, 6425 (2019), 374-378. - source

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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    The average presence of bots was estimated to be around 11% of all Facebook accounts in 2019.

    “and 11% of all Facebook accounts in 2019 [38]”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [38] [38] Mattia Zago, Pantaleone Nespoli, Dimitrios Papamartzivanos, Manuel Gil Perez, Felix Gomez Marmol, Georgios Kambourakis, and Gregorio Martinez Perez. 2019. Screening Out Social Bots Interference: Are There Any Silver Bullets? IEEE Communications Magazine 57, 8 (2019), 98-104. - source

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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    The average presence of bots was estimated to be around 15% of all active Twitter accounts in 2017.

    “The average presence of bots was estimated to be in the region of 15% of all active Twitter accounts in 2017 [31]”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [31] [31] Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Clayton A Davis, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. 2017. Online human-bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and characterization. In The 11th International Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM'17) . AAAI. -

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § ACMReference Format: · p. 3

    From 2021 there will be more than one new paper published per day on social bots.

    “We forecast that from 2021 there will be more than 1 new paper published per day on social bots, which poses a heavy burden on those trying to keep pace with the evolution of this thriving field.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The skyrocketing publication trend on social bots will continue.
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    Premisereasoning
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    The field still lacks a precise and well-agreed definition of what a social bot is.

    “Yet, we still lack a precise and well-agreed definition of what a social bot is.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Social bots are actively used for both beneficial and nefarious purposes.

    “Social bots are actively used for both beneficial and nefarious purposes [13].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [13] [13] Emilio Ferrara, Onur Varol, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. 2016. The rise of social bots. Commun. ACM 59, 7 (2016), 96-104. - source

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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Bots played a role in strategic information operations orchestrated ahead of numerous worldwide events.

    “Other studies specifically focused on political activity, concluding that bots played a role in strategic information operations orchestrated ahead of numerous worldwide events, as shown in Figure 1.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Bots are present in online cryptocurrency discussions and in the infodemics about the COVID-19 pandemic.

    “Similar results were obtained about the presence of bots in online cryptocurrency discussions [24] and as part of the 'infodemics' about the COVID-19 pandemic [14].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [24] [24] Leonardo Nizzoli, Serena Tardelli, Marco Avvenuti, Stefano Cresci, Maurizio Tesconi, and Emilio Ferrara. 2020. Charting the landscape of online cryptocurrency manipulation. IEEE Access (2020). https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003370 - source

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    • cites [14] [14] Riccardo Gallotti, Francesco Valle, Nicola Castaldo, Pierluigi Sacco, and Manlio De Domenico. 2020. Assessing the risks of 'infodemics' in response to COVID-19 epidemics. arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.03997 (2020). - source

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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    A 2019 study reported that 71% of Twitter users mentioning trending US stocks are likely to be bots.

    “A 2019 study reported that 71% of Twitter users mentioning trending US stocks, are likely to be bots [8].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [8] [8] Stefano Cresci, Fabrizio Lillo, Daniele Regoli, Serena Tardelli, and Maurizio Tesconi. 2019. Cashtag piggybacking: Uncovering spam and bot activity in stock microblogs on Twitter. ACM Transactions on the Web (TWEB) 13, 2 (2019), 11. - source

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 7

    Cyborgs exist and operate halfway between traditional concepts of bots and humans, resulting in weakened distinctions and overlapping behaviors between the two.

    “These cyborgs exist and operate halfway between the traditional concepts of bots and humans, resulting in weakened distinctions and overlapping behaviors between the two.”
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    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    By 2018, scholars found more than 40,000 public bot repositories.

    “In fact, by 2018, scholars found more than 40,000 public bot repositories [1].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [1] [1] Dennis Assenmacher, Lena Adam, Lena Frischlich, Heike Trautmann, and Christian Grimme. 2019. Openbots. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06691 (2019). -

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    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    By 2016, there were more than 4,000 GitHub repositories containing code for deploying Twitter bots.

    “Bence Kollanyi reported an exponential growth that led in 2016 to more than 4,000 GitHub repositories containing code for deploying Twitter bots [22].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [22] [22] Bence Kollanyi. 2016. Where Do Bots Come From? An Analysis of Bot Codes Shared on GitHub. International Journal of Communication 10 (2016), 20. -

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    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Social bots are among the weapons of choice for deceiving and manipulating crowds.

    “The looming picture is one where social bots are among the weapons of choice for deceiving and manipulating crowds.”
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    Premisecitation
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 7

    Hundreds of tech-savvy social media users were able to tell apart newer bots from legitimate users only 24% of the times, but could spot older bots 91% of the times.

    “Moreover, hundreds of tech-savvy social media users that participated in a crowdsourcing experiment were able to tell apart newer bots from legitimate users only 24% of the times. The same users were instead able of spotting older bots 91% of the times [5].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [5] [5] Stefano Cresci, Roberto Di Pietro, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Maurizio Tesconi. 2017. The paradigm-shift of social spambots: Evidence, theories, and tools for the arms race. In The 26th International World Wide Web Conference Companion (WWW'17 Companion) . IW3C2. - source

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    Interpretationnone given
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 9

    The plateau hit by unsupervised approaches co-occurred with the rise of adversarial ones, which might take their place in the coming years.

    “Interestingly, the plateau hit by unsupervised approaches co-occurred with the rise of adversarial ones, which might take their place in the coming years.”
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    Premisecitation
    § THE DAWN OF SOCIAL BOT DETECTION · p. 4

    Cresci et al. developed supervised machine learning classifiers for detecting fake followers.

    “For example, Cresci et al. developed a set of supervised machine learning classifiers for detecting so-called fake followers, a type of automated accounts commonly used to artificially boost the popularity of the public characters that buy them [4].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [4] [4] Stefano Cresci, Roberto Di Pietro, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Maurizio Tesconi. 2015. Fame for sale: Efficient detection of fake Twitter followers. Decision Support Systems 80 (2015), 56-71. - source

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    § THE DAWN OF SOCIAL BOT DETECTION · p. 4

    Fake followers can be bought for as low as 12$ per 1,000 followers in the surface Web.

    “Fake followers can be bought for as low as 12$ per 1,000 followers in the surface Web.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [5] [5] Stefano Cresci, Roberto Di Pietro, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Maurizio Tesconi. 2017. The paradigm-shift of social spambots: Evidence, theories, and tools for the arms race. In The 26th International World Wide Web Conference Companion (WWW'17 Companion) . IW3C2. - source

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    Interpretationcitation
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 7

    Malicious accounts can leverage deepfake texts, profile pictures, and videos, which is worrying and worthy of increased attention.

    “Indeed, the possibility for malicious accounts to leverage deepfake texts, profile pictures, and videos is worrying, and worthy of increased attention [10].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [10] [10] Giovanni Da San Martino, Stefano Cresci, Alberto Barrón-Cedeño, Seunghak Yu, Roberto Di Pietro, and Preslav Nakov. 2020. A survey on computational propaganda detection. In The 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'20) . -

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    § THE DAWN OF SOCIAL BOT DETECTION · p. 5

    Botometer evaluates possible bots using more than 1,200 features of an account.

    “By leveraging more than 1,200 features of an account, Botometer evaluates possible bots based on their profile characteristics, social network structure, the content they produce, their sentiment expressions, and the timings of their actions [35].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [35] [35] Kai-Cheng Yang, Onur Varol, Clayton A Davis, Emilio Ferrara, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2019. Arming the public with artificial intelligence to counter social bots. Human Behavior and Emerging Technologies 1, 1 (2019), 48-61. - source

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    Premisecitation
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 6

    The social bots studied by Chao Yang et al. appeared as more popular and credible, given the relatively large number of their social connections, and were no longer spamming the same messages over and over again.

    “Conversely, the social bots studied by Chao Yang et al. appeared as more popular and credible, given the relatively large number of their social connections. In addition, they were no longer spamming the same messages over and over again.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [34] [34] Chao Yang, Robert Harkreader, and Guofei Gu. 2013. Empirical evaluation and new design for fighting evolving twitter spammers. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 8, 8 (2013), 1280-1293. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE DAWN OF SOCIAL BOT DETECTION · p. 6

    Early bot detection approaches typically output binary classifications, which cannot account for malicious accounts that feature a mixture of automated and human-driven behaviors.

    “Furthermore, these approaches typically output binary classifications. In many cases however, malicious accounts feature a mixture of automated and human-driven behaviors that cannot be accounted for with simple binary labels.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 7

    By analyzing large groups of accounts, detectors also have access to more data for fueling powerful AI algorithms.

    “In addition, by analyzing large groups of accounts, detectors also have access to more data for fueling powerful - yet data-hungry - AI algorithms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 6

    Initial success at social bot detection forced bot developers to put in place sophisticated countermeasures, leading to newer bots that are harder to detect.

    “Initial success at social bot detection forced bot developers to put in place sophisticated countermeasures. Because of this, newer bots often feature advanced characteristics that make them way harder to detect with respect to older ones.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 7

    Dichotomous classifications such as human vs bot, fake vs real, coordinated vs not coordinated might represent oversimplifications, unable to grasp the complexity of these phenomena and unlikely to yield accurate and actionable results.

    “Within this global picture, dichotomous classifications - such as human vs bot, fake vs real, coordinated vs not coordinated - might represent oversimplifications, unable to grasp the complexity of these phenomena and unlikely to yield accurate and actionable results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 6

    The first wave of social bots that populated OSNs until around 2011 was made of rather simplistic bots with few social connections and posted messages and clear signs of automation.

    “The first wave of social bots that populated OSNs until around 2011 was made of rather simplistic bots. Accounts with very low reputation due to few social connections and posted messages, and featuring clear signs of automation as shown in panel A of Figure 4.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [34] [34] Chao Yang, Robert Harkreader, and Guofei Gu. 2013. Empirical evaluation and new design for fighting evolving twitter spammers. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 8, 8 (2013), 1280-1293. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 9

    The paper surveyed more than 230 papers that proposed a bot detection technique and manually classified each detector along two orthogonal dimensions.

    “We surveyed more than 230 papers that proposed a bot detection technique and we manually classified each detector along two orthogonal dimensions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 7

    The social bot pandemic gradually became much more difficult to stop.

    “The social bot pandemic gradually became much more difficult to stop.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC · p. 3

    Facebook, Twitter and Reddit banned tens of thousands of accounts involved in coordinated activities since 2016.

    “These results are backed by the same platforms where information operations took place - namely, Facebook 2 , Twitter 3 and Reddit 4 - that banned tens of thousands accounts involved in coordinated activities since 2016.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [2] [2] Nikan Chavoshi, Hossein Hamooni, and Abdullah Mueen. 2016. DeBot: Twitter bot detection via warped correlation. In The 16th International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM'16) . IEEE, 817-822. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [3] [3] Zi Chu, Steven Gianvecchio, Haining Wang, and Sushil Jajodia. 2012. Detecting automation of Twitter accounts: Are you a human, bot, or cyborg? IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 9, 6 (2012), 811-824. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites [4] [4] Stefano Cresci, Roberto Di Pietro, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Maurizio Tesconi. 2015. Fame for sale: Efficient detection of fake Twitter followers. Decision Support Systems 80 (2015), 56-71. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE ISSUE OF BOT EVOLUTION · p. 7

    Only 5% of newer bots are removed from social platforms, whereas older ones are removed 60% of the times.

    “Results showed that only 5% of newer bots are removed from social platforms, whereas older ones are removed 60% of the times [5].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [5] [5] Stefano Cresci, Roberto Di Pietro, Marinella Petrocchi, Angelo Spognardi, and Maurizio Tesconi. 2017. The paradigm-shift of social spambots: Evidence, theories, and tools for the arms race. In The 26th International World Wide Web Conference Companion (WWW'17 Companion) . IW3C2. - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § THE RISE OF GROUP APPROACHES · p. 7

    The existence of botnets does not necessarily imply that accounts are explicitly connected in the social network, but rather that they are maneuvered by a single entity and that they share common goals.

    “The existence of botnets does not necessarily imply that accounts are explicitly connected in the social network, but rather that they are maneuvered by a single entity and that time they share common goals.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    The adversarial framework sketched in Figure 6 is general enough to be applied to a wide set of deception detection tasks, comprising the detection of social bots, cyborgs, trolls and mis/disinformation.

    “The adversarial framework sketched in Figure 6 is general enough to be applied to a wide set of deception detection tasks, comprising the detection of social bots, cyborgs, trolls and mis/disinformation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    Efforts at adversarial detection can only be successful if the scientific community decides to rise to the many open challenges.

    “As such, efforts at adversarial detection can only be successful if the scientific community decides to rise to the many open challenges.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a powerful machine learning framework where two competing deep learning networks are jointly trained in a game-theoretic setting.

    “Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a powerful machine learning framework where two competing deep learning networks are jointly trained in a game-theoretic setting [15].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [15] [15] Ian Goodfellow, Patrick McDaniel, and Nicolas Papernot. 2018. Making machine learning robust against adversarial inputs. Commun. ACM 61, 7 (2018). - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 11

    The adversarial paradigm accounts for adversaries by design, thus providing higher guarantees for deception detection, which violates the stationarity and neutrality assumptions.

    “In addition, this paradigm accounts for adversaries by design , thus providing higher guarantees for deception detection, which violates the stationarity and neutrality assumptions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    Inauthentic coordination is an important piece of the deception puzzle, since it is exploited by bad actors for obtaining visibility and impact.

    “Inauthentic coordination is an important piece of the deception puzzle, since it is exploited by bad actors for obtaining visibility and impact.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 11

    All tasks related to the detection of online deception, manipulation and automation are intrinsically adversarial.

    “All tasks related to the detection of online deception, manipulation and automation are intrinsically adversarial .”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 11

    Finding good adversarial examples can help scholars understand the weaknesses of existing bot detection systems.

    “Finding good adversarial examples can help scholars understand the weaknesses of existing bot detection systems.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 11

    Adversarial machine learning is a paradigm specifically devised for application in scenarios presenting adversaries motivated in fooling learned models.

    “Adversarial machine learning is a paradigm specifically devised for application in those scenarios presenting adversaries motivated in fooling learned models [15].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [15] [15] Ian Goodfellow, Patrick McDaniel, and Nicolas Papernot. 2018. Making machine learning robust against adversarial inputs. Commun. ACM 61, 7 (2018). - source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 12

    In contrast with existing adversarial approaches for bot detection, the GAN-based framework is grounded on an established and successful machine learning framework, rather than on ad-hoc solutions lacking broad applicability.

    “Furthermore, in contrast with existing adversarial approaches for bot detection, it is grounded on an established and successful machine learning framework, rather than on ad-hoc solutions lacking broad applicability.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 13

    Combining the two evaluation dimensions (generalization across bot types and across bot versions) would allow a much more reliable assessment of the detection capabilities of present and future techniques, thus avoiding overestimates of detection performance.

    “Combining these two evaluation dimensions, thus extensively exploring the generalizability space, would allow a much more reliable assessment of the detection capabilities of present and future techniques, thus avoiding overestimates of detection performance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 11

    Bot hunters need not wait anymore for new bot mischiefs in order to adapt their techniques, but instead they can proactively test them, in an effort that could quickly make them more robust.

    “As a result, bot hunters need not wait anymore for new bot mischiefs in order to adapt their techniques, but instead they can proactively (instead of reactively) test them, in an effort that could quickly make them more robust.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 11

    Early detection of vulnerabilities can contribute to the development of more robust detection systems.

    “Early detection of vulnerabilities can in turn contribute to the development of more robust detection systems.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    Thanks to the rise of AI-enabled deception techniques such as deepfakes, the most sophisticated malicious actors are bound to become indistinguishable from one another, and likely also from legitimate accounts.

    “Now, thanks to the rise of AI-enabled deception techniques such as deepfakes , the most sophisticated of these malicious actors are bound to become indistinguishable from one another, and likely also from legitimate accounts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 14

    The same analysis that anticipated worldwide interest in inauthentic coordination now suggests that adversarial approaches might give an edge in the fight against online deception.

    “Interestingly, the same analysis that anticipated worldwide interest in inauthentic coordination, is now suggesting that adversarial approaches might give us an edge in the long-lasting fight against online deception.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationown data
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 12

    The exponentially growing body of work on social bot detection suggests that much effort is bound to be devoted in the coming years to the fight of this crucial issue.

    “The exponentially growing body of work on social bot detection shown in Figure 2, somehow reassures us that much effort is bound to be devoted in the coming years to the fight of this crucial issue.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF DECEPTION DETECTION · p. 10

    The task of social bot detection is neither stationary nor neutral.

    “Notably, the task of social bot detection is neither stationary nor neutral .”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § OPEN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD · p. 13

    The foreseen increase in publications inevitably implies that more bot detectors will be proposed.

    “Secondly, the foreseen increase in publications inevitably implies that more bot detectors will be proposed.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
68 of 68
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The list of papers documenting political manipulation by social bots in Figure 1 is illustrative and not exhaustive.

    “Although the list of papers is illustrative and not exhaustive, it nonetheless allows to map the worldwide spread of the social bot pandemic.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The skyrocketing publication trend on social bots will continue.

    “Should this skyrocketing trend continue, by 2021 there will be more than one new paper published per day”
2 of 2

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Automated accounts (bots) have been widely used on Twitter to efficiently spread disinformation.

    “To efficiently spread disinformation, automated accounts, known as bots, have been widely used on Twitter [10,17].”

    From Unsupervised detection of coordinated fake-follower campaigns on social media (2024) · cites this paper as [10]

    THE SOCIAL BOT PANDEMIC (p. 3) describes substantial bot presence on Twitter and their use in strategic information operations, including studies reporting increased disinformation spread. It also says bots did not always have a real impact and that studies disagree about their effect, so the claim’s unqualified implication that they efficiently spread disinformation overstates the source. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • These kinds of sophisticated deception can only be detected through observations at the group level.

    “These kinds of sophisticated deception can only be detected through observations at the group level [16].”

    From A language framework for modeling social media account behavior (2023) · cites this paper as [16]

    The Rise of Group Approaches (p. 7) says analyzing coordinated groups is likely to detect sophisticated bots better than analyzing individual accounts. Figure 3’s caption (p. 4) likewise says large coordinated groups are more likely to be detected than sophisticated individual bots. Neither passage says group-level observation is the only way to detect such deception, so the claim’s exclusivity is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • As some bots evolve to mimic human profiles and behaviors better, their activities can only be detected during orchestrated operations.

    “As some bots evolve to mimic human profiles and behaviors better, their activities can only be detected during orchestrated operations (Cresci, 2020).”

    From Anatomy of an AI-powered malicious social botnet (2024) · cites this paper as Cresci, 2020

    The Issue of Bot Evolution (p. 7) says sophisticated bots are hard to distinguish from legitimate accounts when analyzed individually. The Rise of Group Approaches (p. 7) says coordinated behavior leaves more detectable traces, but describes group analysis as likely to work better—not as the only way to detect these bots. The claim’s “can only be detected” overstates the source. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • A group of inauthentic accounts can be coordinated by a single entity, whether human-controlled or automated.

    “A group of inauthentic accounts can be coordinated by a single entity, whether their behavior are human-controlled or automated.”
  • Automated accounts exhibit distinctive temporal, linguistic, and network signatures.

    “A decade of research on social bot detection 13-15 has established that automated accounts exhibit distinctive temporal, linguistic, and network signatures 14,31 .”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Assenmacher D., 2020, SAGE
  2. Da San Martino G., 2020, Proceedings of the 29th Intern. Joint Conf. Artificial Intelligence
  3. Echeverrìa J., Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conf. ACM, 137--146
  4. Gorodnichenko Y., 2018, National Bureau of Economic Research
  5. Kollanyi B, 2016, Where do bots come from? An analysis of bot codes shared on GitHub, Intern. J. Communication, 10, 20
  6. Shao C., 2018, The spread of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature commun. 9, 1
  7. Stieglitz S., 2017, Proceedings of the 17th Australasian Conf. Information Systems
  8. Varol O., 2017, Proceedings of the 11th Intern. Conf. Web and Social Media. AAAI
  9. Yardi S, 2010, Detecting spam in a Twitter network, First Monday, 15, 1
  10. 10.5555/3454287.3455099 · DOI
  11. Zhang J., 2016, The rise of social botnets: Attacks and countermeasures, IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Computing, 15, 6

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Cresci, S.
Affiliations
National Research Council (IT)
Corresponding author
Cresci, Stefano
Venue
Communications of the ACM
Published
2020-09-23
Volume
63
Issue
10
Pages
72-83
ISSN
  • 0001-0782 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7317
OpenAlex
W3041367927
Cited by
323
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 52 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 8
FWCI
38.08
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Communications of the ACM (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • CINECA IRIS Institutial research information system (University of Pisa) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
Keywords
social bot detection, bots, political disinformation, election interference, misinformation, detection methods

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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