Security Vulnerabilities of SGX and Countermeasures: A Survey
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been widely used in many security-critical applications. The popularity of TEEs derives from its high security and trustworthiness supported by secure hardware. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is one of the most representative TEEs that creates an isolated environment on an untrusted operating system, thus providing run-time protection for the execution of security-critical code and data. However, Intel SGX is far from the acme of perfection. It has become a target of various attacks due to its security vulnerabilities. Researchers and practitioners have paid attention to the security vulnerabilities of SGX and investigated optimization solutions in real applications. Unfortunately, existing literature lacks a thorough review of security vulnerabilities of SGX and their countermeasures. In this article, we fill this gap. Specifically, we propose two sets of criteria for estimating security risks of existing attacks and evaluating defense effects brought by attack countermeasures. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy of SGX security vulnerabilities and shed light on corresponding attack vectors. After that, we review published attacks and existing countermeasures, as well as evaluate them by employing our proposed criteria. At last, on the strength of our survey, we propose some open challenges and future directions in the research of SGX security.
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In the citing paper
“Confidential computing fundamentally ensures trustworthy code execution through the strategic isolation of enclaves, or Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), from untrusted environments [25].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
In the citing paper
“It enables the owner to authenticate the hardware, validate the trusted state of a distant TEE, and determine whether the intended program is operating securely within the TEE.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
In the citing paper
“Remote attestation [25,29] enables the user (a.k.a.confidential workload owner) to ascertain the level of trust/integrity of a remote TEE prior to transmitting sensitive data/code.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fei, S., Yan, Z., Ding, W., & Xie, H.
- Affiliations
- Xidian University (CN)
- Venue
- ACM Computing Surveys
- Published
- 2021-07-13
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1-36
- ISSN
- 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7341
- OpenAlex
- W3180257170
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 3
- FWCI
- 6.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- ACM Computing Surveys (publishedVersion)
- Aaltodoc (Aalto University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- the National Postdoctoral Program for Innovative Talents (BX20180238)
- the Academy of Finland (308087, 335262)
- the 111 Project (B16037)
- the Project funded by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2018M633461)
- the Shaanxi Innovation Team Project (2018TD-007)
- the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62072351, 61802293)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Keywords
- Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, security vulnerabilities, attack countermeasures, attack vectors, secure hardware
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.