Cited by 172Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)Ethics and Social Impacts of AIHuman-Automation Interaction and Safety

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 83 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Explainable AI is Dead, Long Live Explainable AI!: Hypothesis-driven Decision Support using Evaluative AI

Open access
Miller, Tim·2023·2023 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency

Abstract

In this paper, we argue for a paradigm shift from the current model of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), which may be counter-productive to better human decision making. In early decision support systems, we assumed that we could give people recommendations and that they would consider them, and then follow them when required. However, research found that people often ignore recommendations because they do not trust them; or perhaps even worse, people follow them blindly, even when the recommendations are wrong. Explainable artificial intelligence mitigates this by helping people to understand how and why models give certain recommendations. However, recent research shows that people do not always engage with explainability tools enough to help improve decision making. The assumption that people will engage with recommendations and explanations has proven to be unfounded. We argue this is because we have failed to account for two things. First, recommendations (and their explanations) take control from human decision makers, limiting their agency. Second, giving recommendations and explanations does not align with the cognitive processes employed by people making decisions. This position paper proposes a new conceptual framework called Evaluative AI for explainable decision support. This is a machine-in-the-loop paradigm in which decision support tools provide evidence for and against decisions made by people, rather than provide recommendations to accept or reject. We argue that this mitigates issues of over- and under-reliance on decision support tools, and better leverages human expertise in decision making.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This position paper argues that recommendation-driven explainable AI ("recommend and defend") is counterproductive for decision support because it removes user agency and mismatches human cognitive processes, and proposes instead a conceptual framework called Evaluative AI, in which tools provide evidence for and against the decision maker's own hypotheses rather than recommendations. The authors frame this as a machine-in-the-loop, hypothesis-driven paradigm that retains explainable AI's tools while shifting control to the human.

Key findings

  • The paper's central claim is that current XAI decision support fails because (1) recommendations and their explanations take control from decision makers, limiting agency, and (2) they do not align with the cognitive processes people actually use when deciding.
  • An informal survey conducted by the author during a talk found "just three out of over 100 people preferred Bluster" (the recommendation-giving friend), with the remaining 100+ preferring Prudence (who gives evidence for and against the user's own proposals).
  • The authors report that experimental studies indicate most participants do not cognitively engage with explainability tools, and that those who do may become over-confident, even when explanations contain no useful information; they also cite Buçinca et al. and Gajos and Mamykina showing explainability did not mitigate over-reliance and in some cases increased it.
  • Evaluative AI is claimed to support options, judgement, understanding, and trade-offs (per Table 4), whereas recommendation, XAI, and interpretability paradigms provide only partial or no support for options and trade-offs; cognitive forcing is described as an improvement but still a "recommend and defend" approach.

Methods

  • Design: a position/conceptual paper presenting a new framework (Evaluative AI) rather than an empirical study; it reviews related work on cognitive decision making, abductive reasoning, the Data/Frame theory of sensemaking, and four dominant decision-support paradigms (recommendations; recommendations with explanations; interpretable models; cognitive forcing).
  • Data/sample: no primary dataset; the only original data reported is an informal audience survey (3 of 100+ preferring the recommendation-giving "Bluster"), plus a referenced but unpublished observational study of expert board gamers using an AI recommendation system.
  • Analysis: conceptual comparison of the five paradigms against six criteria for good decision support derived from Yates and Potworowski's 10 "cardinal decision issues," summarized in Tables 2 and 4, plus an illustrative skin-cancer diagnosis example (ISIC 2018, seven disease categories).

Limitations

  • Stated by the paper: if people dismiss recommendations and explainability information, they may equally fail to engage with evidence-based support; the framework makes the same assumption that people care what a machine says.
  • Stated by the paper: evaluative AI will likely increase cognitive load and force more engagement, which decision makers may prefer less (citing Buçinca et al.), and balancing information reduction against engagement is a challenge.
  • Evident from the text: the framework is conceptual and unevaluated — no empirical test of Evaluative AI is reported, the supporting survey is informal and non-peer-reviewed, and one cited observational study is described as "currently unpublished."

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3593013.3594001

Cites

40 of 40 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

52 Own interpretation · 43 Not checked yet · 3 Own result · 3 No basis given

Verify all 83 references — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 36
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 34
54 of 54
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The initial assumption of AI-assisted decision aids was that people would follow recommendations when required, leading to better decisions.

    “The initial assumption of AI-assisted DAs was that people would follow recommendations when required, leading to better decisions.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    For situations in which decision aids can handle many more factors simultaneously, they can provide insight when the assumptions of the underlying modelling theory hold.

    “The assumption here is that for situations in which DAs can handle many more factors simultaneously, it can provide insight when the assumptions of the underlying modelling theory hold.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Decision makers will carefully consider recommendations.

    “This assumes that decision makers will carefully consider recommendations.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Because an interpretable model is interpretable, it contains most of the explanatory information that is required.

    “The assumption is that because the model is interpretable, it contains most of the explanatory information that is required.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Forcing people to engage with the decision cognitively can mitigate over-reliance.

    “The assumption of cognitive forcing is that forcing people to engage with the decision cognitively can mitigate over-reliance.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Current AI decision aids are designed to tell the user what the authors think the best answer is and explain why that is considered the best answer.

    “AI decision aids are designed to tell the user what they think the best answer is (e.g. a recommendation), and explain why that is considered the best answer.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    People care at all about what a machine has to say.

    “The evaluative AI framework makes the same assumptions as earlier work: that people care at all about what a machine has to say.”
7 of 7

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Robert R Hoffman. 2017. A taxonomy of emergent trusting in the human–machine relationship. Cognitive systems engineering: The future for a changing world (2017), 137–164.
  2. Robert R Hoffman, Tim Miller, and William J Clancey. 2022. Psychology and AI at a Crossroads: How Might Complex Systems Explain Themselves?The American journal of psychology 135, 4 (2022), 365–378.
  3. Daniel Kahneman. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. Penguin UK.
  4. Harmanpreet Kaur, Eytan Adar, Eric Gilbert, and Cliff Lampe. 2022. Sensible AI: Re-imagining Interpretability and Explainability using Sensemaking Theory. (May 2022). arxiv:2205.05057 [cs.HC] http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.05057 · arXiv
  5. Gary Klein, Jennifer K Phillips, Erica L Rall, and Deborah A Peluso. 2007. A data–frame theory of sensemaking. In Expertise out of context. Psychology Press, 118–160.
  6. 10.31219/osf.io · DOI
  7. David Alvarez Melis, Harmanpreet Kaur, Hal Daumé, III, Hanna Wallach, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 2021. From Human Explanation to Model Interpretability: A Framework Based on Weight of Evidence. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing. 35–47. https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/HCOMP/article/view/18938
  8. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. 2017. The Enigma of Reason. Harvard University Press.
  9. Tim Miller. 2019. Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences. Artificial intelligence (2019). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370218305988
  10. J W Rudolph. 2003. Into the big muddy and out again: Error persistence and crisis management in the operating room. Ph. D. Dissertation.

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Metadata

Authors
Miller, T.
Affiliations
The University of Melbourne (AU)
Corresponding author
Miller, Tim
Venue
2023 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency
Publisher
ACM
Published
2023-06-12
Pages
333-342
OpenAlex
W4380366109
Cited by
172
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 55 · 2025: 64 · 2024: 47 · 2023: 6
FWCI
30.53
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion)
  • Minerva Access (University of Melbourne) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Australian Research Council (DP190103414)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Human Factors and Ergonomics › Human-Automation Interaction and Safety
Keywords
explainable AI, decision support system, human decision-making, recommendation trust, human agency, cognitive processes in decision making, overreliance on AI, human expertise

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