Cited by 728Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)Human-Automation Interaction and SafetyEthics and Social Impacts of AI

Manipulating and Measuring Model Interpretability

Open access
Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Forough, Goldstein, Daniel G, Hofman, Jake M, Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman, Wallach, Hanna·2021·Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems

Abstract

With machine learning models being increasingly used to aid decision making even in high-stakes domains, there has been a growing interest in developing interpretable models. Although many supposedly interpretable models have been proposed, there have been relatively few experimental studies investigating whether these models achieve their intended effects, such as making people more closely follow a model’s predictions when it is beneficial for them to do so or enabling them to detect when a model has made a mistake. We present a sequence of pre-registered experiments (N = 3, 800) in which we showed participants functionally identical models that varied only in two factors commonly thought to make machine learning models more or less interpretable: the number of features and the transparency of the model (i.e., whether the model internals are clear or black box). Predictably, participants who saw a clear model with few features could better simulate the model’s predictions. However, we did not find that participants more closely followed its predictions. Furthermore, showing participants a clear model meant that they were less able to detect and correct for the model’s sizable mistakes, seemingly due to information overload. These counterintuitive findings emphasize the importance of testing over intuition when developing interpretable models.

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Crossref · 10.1145/3411764.3445315

Cites

114 of 114 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Trust is measured in different ways: some researchers measure subjective trust using questionnaires, while others measure objective trust-related behavior such as reliance.

    “Some researchers measure subjective trust using questionnaires, while others measure objective trust related behavior such as reliance.”

    From Exploring the effects of human-centered AI explanations on trust and reliance (2023) · cites this paper as Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al., 2021

    Section 3.2 (page not available) contrasts participants’ stated confidence in a model’s predictions with their observed behavior in following those predictions. This supports the distinction between subjective reports and reliance behavior, but the paper does not identify the confidence ratings as trust questionnaires or establish the broader claim about how different researchers measure trust. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • WOA has been used in past by researchers in XAI as an alternative trust measurement, but never explicitly referred to as reliance and clearly differentiated from trust.

    “While WOA has been used in the past by researchers in XAI as an alternative trust measurement (Logg et al., 2019; Mucha et al., 2021; Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al., 2021), it has never been explicitly referred to as reliance and thus clearly differentiated from trust to the best of our knowledge.”

    From Exploring the effects of human-centered AI explanations on trust and reliance (2023) · cites this paper as Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al., 2021

    In §5, Experiment 3: Weight of Advice (page unavailable), the paper uses weight of advice as an alternative measure of how closely participants follow model predictions. It describes the measure as advice-taking, not explicitly as a trust measurement. The sentence’s claim that prior researchers did not distinguish reliance from trust is framed as the citing authors’ own conclusion, rather than a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Prior empirical studies have not found consistent evidence that AI explanations improve human-AI decision-making, and some suggest explanations can increase overreliance when the AI is wrong.

    “However, across many domains, empirical studies of explanations have produced mixed results [4,11,49,53,58,68,82,87], with some suggesting that explanations increase decisionmakers' tendency to rely on AI predictions even when the AI system is wrong [4,68,82,87]-a phenomenon often referred to as overreliance [10,78].”

    From Understanding the Role of Human Intuition on Reliance in Human-AI Decision-Making with Explanations (2023) · cites this paper as [68]

    The Overview of experiments and Experiment 3.2 Findings report that participants shown a clear model were less able than those shown a black-box model to detect and correct sizable erroneous predictions. This supports the concern about reliance when the model is wrong, but the study manipulated model transparency and number of features, not explanations as such; its third experiment did not reproduce the difference. The paper therefore supports part of the cited sentence, not its broader characterization of explanation studies. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Several studies found that showing feature-based explanations increases people's tendency to over-rely on the model when it is wrong, compared to showing only the AI predictions.

    “On the contrary, several studies found that showing feature-based explanations increases people's tendency to over-rely on the model when it is wrong, compared to showing only the AI predictions [4,68,82,87].”

    From Understanding the Role of Human Intuition on Reliance in Human-AI Decision-Making with Explanations (2023) · cites this paper as [68]

    The Overview of experiments (§1.2; page not available) reports that participants shown a clear model were less able to correct sizable mistakes on unusual apartments than participants shown a black-box model. But this paper compares access to model internals, not a distinct feature-based explanation alongside an otherwise identical prediction-only display; §5.2 also reports that the effect did not appear in the third experiment. The claim therefore captures a finding but describes the intervention and consistency more broadly than the source supports. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Increased transparency can hamper users' ability to detect sizable model errors and correct for them, seemingly due to information overload.

    “Work in the human–computer interaction community has identified that increased transparency can hamper users’ ability to detect sizable model errors and correct for them, “seemingly due to information overload””

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Cites

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2 of the 116 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. [44]44. Fred Hohman, Andrew Head, Rich Caruana, Robert DeLine, and Steven M Drucker. 2019. Gamut: A design probe to understand how data scientists understand machine learning models. In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI conference on human factors in computing systems. 1-13.
  2. [47]47. Philip Johnson-Laird. 1983. Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
  3. [48]48. Jongbin Jung, Connor Concannon, Ravi Shroff, Sharad Goel, and Daniel G Goldstein. 2020. Simple rules to guide expert classifications. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) (2020).
  4. [82]82. Don A. Norman. 1987. Some Observations on Mental Models. In Human-Computer Interaction: A Multidisciplinary Approach, R. M. Baecker and W. A. S. Buxton (Eds.). Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 241-244.

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Authors
Poursabzi-Sangdeh, F., Goldstein, D. G., Hofman, J. M., Wortman Vaughan, J. W., & Wallach, H.
Affiliations
  • Microsoft (United States) (US)
  • Microsoft Research, United States
Venue
Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Publisher
ACM
Published
2021-05-06
Pages
1-52
OpenAlex
W2788362053
Cited by
728
References
116
Citations by year
2026: 94 · 2025: 97 · 2024: 118 · 2023: 106 · 2022: 111 · 2021: 90 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 9
FWCI
48.67
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Human-Automation Interaction and Safety
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
model interpretability, explainable AI, black-box models, model transparency, feature count, error detection, information overload, trust in machine learning, pre-registered experiment

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