Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
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In the citing paper
“Bebchuk et al. (2009), Derwall et al. (2004), Gompers et al. (2003), In et al. (2019), and Pastor et al. (2022) document a positive relationship between a firm's ESG profile and its equity returns, whileAswani et al. (2023) find no significant relationship.”
From A review on ESG investing: Investors' expectations, beliefs and perceptions (2024) · cites this paper as Gompers et al. (2003)
In the citing paper
“Prior research has identified a relationship between the IRRC provisions in the aggregate and firm value.”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
In the citing paper
“We find that the entrenching provisions were correlated with a reduction in firms' stock returns both during the 1990-1999 period that Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) studied, and during the longer 1990-2003 period that we were able to study using the data we had.”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
In the citing paper
“In an influential article, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) found that a broad index based on these 24 provisions, giving each IRRC provision equal weight, was negatively correlated with firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q, as well as stockholder returns during the decade of the 1990s.”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
In the citing paper
“(Using only the controls used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) produces similar results throughout.)”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-02-01
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 107-156
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W4233420185
- Cited by
- 6,120
- References
- 52
- Citations by year
- 2026: 222 · 2025: 320 · 2024: 281 · 2023: 284 · 2022: 330 · 2021: 287 · 2020: 333 · 2019: 319 · 2018: 318 · 2017: 337 · 2016: 306 · 2015: 309 · 2014: 341 · 2013: 299 · 2012: 321
- FWCI
- 362.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate governance, shareholder rights, stock prices, governance indicators, abnormal returns, firm value, corporate acquisition, capital expenditure, sales growth
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