The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State
Abstract
This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modem welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population share adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices: one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers; and one political, how large the transfer should be. The size of the transfer and the intensity of the social norm are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
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Cites
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Threshold models of collective behavior
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Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
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Moffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
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A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Akerlof, G. A. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885667 · Cited by 1,648
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Voting over income tax schedules
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Cited by
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
Social norms and human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007 · Cited by 1,615
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00027 · Cited by 1,061
Metadata
- Authors
- Lindbeck, A., Nyberg, S., & Weibull, J. W.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-02-01
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-35
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W1972379256
- Cited by
- 788
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 151.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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