CoChat

The Default Network Distinguishes Construals of Proximal versus Distal Events

Tamir, Diana I., Mitchell, Jason P. · 2011 · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Cited by 93

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Humans enjoy a singular capacity to imagine events that differ from the “here-and-now.” Recent cognitive neuroscience research has linked such simulation processes to the brain's “default network.” However, extant cognitive theories suggest that perceivers reliably simulate only relatively proximal experiences—those that seem nearby, soon, likely to happen, or relevant to a close other. Here, we test these claims by examining spontaneous engagement of the default network while perceivers consider experiencing events from proximal and distal perspectives. Across manipulations of perspective in four dimensions, two regions of the default network—medial prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex—were more active for proximal than distal events, supporting cognitive accounts that perceivers only richly simulate experiences that seem immediate and that perceivers represent different dimensions of distance similarly. Moreover, stable individual differences in default activity when thinking about distal events correlated with individual variability in an implicit measure of psychological distance, suggesting that perceivers naturally vary in their tendency to simulate far-off or unlikely experiences.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/jocn_a_00009

Cites

26 of 26 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 93

Metadata

Authors
Tamir, D. I., & Mitchell, J. P.
Venue
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Published
2011-10-01
Volume
23
Issue
10
Pages
2945-2955
ISSN
  • 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-8898
OpenAlex
W2149343474
Cited by
93
References
26
FWCI
2.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.