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Cited by 1,764

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*

Gabaix, Xavier, Landier, Augustin·2008·Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49
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Abstract

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay depends on both the size of his firm and the aggregate firm size. The model determines the level of CEO pay across firms and over time, offering a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance. We find a very small dispersion in CEO talent, which nonetheless justifies large pay differences. In recent decades at least, the size of large firms explains many of the patterns in CEO pay, across firms, over time, and between countries. In particular, in the baseline specification of the model's parameters, the sixfold increase of U.S. CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the sixfold increase in market capitalization of large companies during that period.

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 71

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A.
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2008-02
Volume
123
Issue
1
Pages
49-100
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49
OpenAlex
W2154288561
Cited by
1,764
References
5
FWCI
319.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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