Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities*
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Are cities as politically polarized as states and countries? “No” is the answer from our regression discontinuity design analysis, which shows that whether the mayor is a Democrat or a Republican does not affect the size of city government, the allocation of local public spending, or crime rates. However, there is a substantial incumbent effect for mayors. We investigate three mechanisms that could account for the striking lack of partisan impact at the local level, and find the most support for Tiebout competition among localities within metropolitan areas.
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Citations
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Cited by
Regression discontinuity designs in economics
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The Value of School Facility Investments: Evidence from a Dynamic Regression Discontinuity Design*
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ferreira, F., & Gyourko, J.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 124
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 399-422
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2135146089
- Cited by
- 428
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 138.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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