The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market
Abstract
This paper analyzes the pricing behavior of electricity generating firms in the restructured California market from its inception in April 1998 until its collapse in late 2000. Using detailed firm-level data, I find that conduct is fairly consistent with a Cournot pricing game for much of the sample. In summer and fall 2000, the market was slightly less competitive, yet the dramatic rise in prices was more driven by changes in costs and demand than by changes in firm conduct. The five large nonutility generators raised prices slightly above unilateral market-power levels in 2000, but fell far short of colluding on the joint monopoly price.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.i · Cited by 4,443
Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry
Nevo, A. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00194 · Cited by 2,064
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
Klemperer, P. D., & Meyer, M. A. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913707 · Cited by 1,382
Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
Green, R. J., & Newbery, D. M. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261846 · Cited by 1,336
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms
Rotemberg, J. J., & Saloner, G. (1986) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,186
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Klemperer, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027166 · Cited by 977
Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B., & Wolak, F. A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024557 · Cited by 941
(2024) · Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.56347/jle · Cited by 919
Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market
Wolfram, C. D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.805 · Cited by 743
Wilson, R. B. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00334 · Cited by 580
Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency
Allaz, B., & Vila, J.-L. (1993) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1993.1001 · Cited by 571
An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry
Borenstein, S., & Bushnell, J. (1999) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00102 · Cited by 502
Joskow, P. L., & Kahn, E. P. (2002) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol23-no4-1 · Cited by 451
A study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886
Porter, R. H. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.024 · Cited by 424
Wolfram, C. D. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556090 · Cited by 399
Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market
Newbery, D. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556091 · Cited by 395
Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914
Genesove, D., & Mullin, W. P. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555893 · Cited by 393
Wolak, F. A. (2000) · International Economic Journal · doi:10.1080/10168730000000017 · Cited by 387
Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power
Corts, K. S. (1999) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(98)00028-1 · Cited by 376
California's Electricity Crisis
Joskow, P. L. (2001) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/17.3.365 · Cited by 263
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications
Krugman, P., Helpman, E., Myerson, R. B., Sutton, J., Dekel, E., Gül, F., Hey, J. D., Crawford, V. P., Kandori, M., & Marimon, R. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139052009 · Cited by 256
Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998–2000
Wolak, F. A. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321947461 · Cited by 254
E conometric A nalysisof C ollusive B ehaviorin a S oft‐D rink M arket
Gasmi, F., Laffont, J. J., & Vuong, Q. (1992) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00277.x · Cited by 249
Wolak, F., & Patrick, R. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8248 · Cited by 221
Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market
Fabra, N., & de Madrid, U. C. I. (2002) · Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) · Cited by 186
Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty
Staiger, R. W., & Wolak, F. A. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555984 · Cited by 171
Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995–2000
Sweeting, A. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02045.x · Cited by 166
Wolak, F. A. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521818737.005 · Cited by 96
Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial OrganizationPreprint
Reiss, P., & Wolak, F. A. (2003) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 72
Trading Inefficiencies in California's Electricity Markets
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J., Knittel, C. R., & Wolfram, C. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8620 · Cited by 53
Cited by
Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B., & Wolak, F. A. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024557 · Cited by 941
Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing
Ito, K. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.2.537 · Cited by 820
The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster
Borenstein, S. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027175 · Cited by 558
Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets
Fabra, N., & Reguant, M. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.9.2872 · Cited by 491
Bushnell, J. B., Mansur, E. T., & Saravia, C. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.237 · Cited by 443
Metadata
- Authors
- Puller, S. L.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2007-02
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 75-87
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2147978173
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 13.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.