Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences
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Abstract
This paper compares economic outcomes across areas in India that were under direct British colonial rule with areas that were under indirect colonial rule. Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period. I find evidence that the quality of governance in the colonial period has a significant and persistent effect on postcolonial outcomes.
Overview
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TL;DR
Using district-level data and an IV based on Lord Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse, Iyer finds that areas under direct British rule had lower postcolonial public-good provision and worse poverty and infant mortality than indirectly ruled native-state areas, despite OLS showing agricultural advantages. The paper argues that colonial governance quality had persistent effects, with selective annexation explaining the OLS-IV gap.
Key findings
- IV estimates indicate direct British rule is associated with 37% fewer villages with middle schools, 70% fewer villages with primary health subcenters, and 46% fewer villages with good roads in 1981 and 1991; directly ruled areas also have nearly 40% higher poverty rates and 33% higher infant mortality rates in the early 1990s.
- OLS estimates show British areas had higher agricultural investments and productivity (e.g., irrigation, fertilizer use, high-yielding varieties, yields), but IV estimates show no significant agricultural advantages; the difference suggests British annexation selected areas with higher agricultural potential.
- Native states raised more revenue per capita than British India: 3.42 vs. 2.47 rupees in the 1890s (3.20 vs. 2.69 after tribute), and controlling for tax revenue did not change the direct-rule coefficient.
- In 1911, overall literacy was 5.2%, and British areas had a literacy rate 3 percentage points lower; postcolonial literacy differences were not significant.
Methods
- District-level analysis across British India and native-state areas, using 1991 districts in seventeen major states; the main independent variable is a British dummy equal to 1 if the district was formerly part of British India. Outcomes include public goods, agricultural investment/productivity, health and education, poverty, and inequality.
- OLS regressions control for geography and cluster standard errors at the native-state level. The IV strategy uses the Doctrine of Lapse: Lapse equals 1 if a native state was not annexed before 1848 and its ruler died without a natural heir during 1848–1856; the post-1847 sample excludes areas annexed earlier. First-stage results show Lapse strongly predicts British annexation (coefficient 0.682*).
- Robustness checks include falsification using ruler deaths without heirs in 1858–1884, controls for ruler-death timing, state fixed effects, randomization inference, and propensity score matching.
Limitations
- The paper states it cannot answer what outcomes would have been in the complete absence of colonial rule, only the effects of different degrees of colonial rule. It also notes district-level data lack per capita income, consumption, or net domestic product, so proxies are used.
- The paper states the small sample is not well suited for propensity score matching, and standard errors may suffer small-sample bias; randomization inference is used to address this. Missing data affect several states and outcomes (e.g., Kerala, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh; various public goods).
- Evident from the text: IV validity depends on the assumption that Lapse is uncorrelated with postcolonial outcomes except through British annexation; the paper tests this with falsification and controls but cannot fully prove exogeneity. OLS selection bias is explicitly acknowledged.
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0 Valid · 3 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 156 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“There are no significant differences in other geographic characteristics such as latitude, altitude, or major soil types.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > B. OLS Estimates of the Impact of Direct Colonial Rule
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > Abstract
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Second, local institutions, such as the prevalent land tenure system, matter for long-term outcomes only in the British areas and not in indirectly ruled areas.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I find that the directly ruled British areas have significantly lower availability of public goods such as schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period and are not significantly better off in terms of agricultural investments and productivity.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The differences in human capital outcomes, such as literacy, were present in the colonial period itself.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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Citations
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“In addition, in a study theorizing the creation of industrial hubs, Krugman (1991) emphasizes the role of transportation costs in the location decision of manufacturing firms in order to explain the coexistence of an âindustrialized coreâ and a âagricultural peripheryâ within a country.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe long-term welfare effects of colonial institutions: Evidence from Central India
Colleoni, M. (2023) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103170 · Cited by 12
Decollectivization, Collective Legacy, and Uneven Agricultural Development in China
Xu, Z. (2017) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.04.037 · Cited by 11
Smith, S. D., & Förster, M. (2018) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050718000220 · Cited by 2
Constitutions and Economic Development: Evidence from the American Indian NationsPreprint
Akee, R., Jorgensen, M., & Sunde, U. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2157896 · Cited by 11
“Our investigation complements earlier studies on the effects of institutions on development, including studies by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Iyer (2011), or Acemoglu et al. (2012).”
ResultJin, S., Deininger, K., & Yadav, V. (2012) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-6293 · Cited by 9
“Different types of land institutions affected economic and social outcomes over the long term in India (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Iyer 2010), Central America (Nugent and Robinson 2010), Brazil (Naritomi, Soarez, and Assuncao 2009), and the US (Libecap and Lueck 2011).”
BackgroundDasgupta, A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2931182 · Cited by 8
Dahi, O. S., & Demir, F. (2017) · Journal of Economic Surveys · Cited by 7
Jha, P., & Talathi, K. (2023) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/725058 · Cited by 14
“The effect of this colonial institution was first studied by Iyer (2010).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialThe legacy of colonial rule: On the impact of the railway zones in modern China
Li, N., & Dong, B. (2022) · Asia‐Pacific Economic History Review · doi:10.1111/aehr.12239 · Cited by 7
Causal Inference and Knowledge Accumulation in Historical Political Economy
Callis, A., Dunning, T., & Tuñón, G. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.4 · Cited by 10
Generational effects of culture and digital media in former Soviet Republics
Horne, B. D., Rice, N. M., Luther, C. A., Ruck, D. J., Borycz, J., Allard, S. L., Fitzgerald, M., Манаев, О. Т., Prins, B., Taylor, M., et al. (2023) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-023-01670-6 · Cited by 10
Choosing Ungoverned Space: Pakistan’s Frontier Crimes Regulation
Callen, M. J., Gulzar, S., Rezaee, A., & Shapiro, J. N. (2015) · Cited by 9
Tkalec, M. (2020) · Public Sector Economics · doi:10.3326/pse.44.1.4 · Cited by 9
Ncube, M. Z. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687114.013.26 · Cited by 8
Subject and citizen: the ‘Sikkim Subject’ in Indian democracy
Pradhan, S. (2020) · Asian Ethnicity · doi:10.1080/14631369.2020.1771171 · Cited by 6
Calamity, Conflict, and Cash Transfers: How Violence Affects Access to Aid in Pakistan
Ghorpade, Y. (2018) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/702165 · Cited by 9
Does Sharecropping Affect Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms
Deininger, K., Jin, S., & Yadav, V. (2013) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137343819_3 · Cited by 6
The Growth Contribution of Colonial Indian Railways in Comparative PerspectivePreprint
Bogart, D., Chaudhary, L., & Herranz‐Loncán, A. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2576892 · Cited by 6
“In recent papers, scholars have studied the historical roots of the service sector (Broadberry and Gupta 2010), and the long-run adverse impact of direct colonial rule (Iyer 2010).”
BackgroundRoy, S., & Tam, E. H. F. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4633928 · Cited by 10
Abraham, S. S., Lanzara, G., Lazzaroni, S., Masella, P., & Squicciarini, M. P. (2023) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2023.103613 · Cited by 8
The Long-Run Consequences of The Opium Concessions for Out-Group Animosity on Java
Kuipers, N. (2022) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887122000041 · Cited by 7
Geographic Neighbourhood and Cluster Formation: Evidence from Indian Agriculture
Chatterjee, T., & Ganesh‐Kumar, A. (2016) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388.2016.1166211 · Cited by 5
“Following Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Iyer (2010), we also considered colonial inheritance through historical land system as an explanatory factor in our models.”
BackgroundImperial colonialism and shadow banking: Evidence from northeastern China, 1898–1911
Fu, T., & Li, Y. (2021) · Finance research letters · doi:10.1016/j.frl.2021.102001 · Cited by 5
Can colonial institutions explain differences in labour returns? Evidence from rural colonial India
Caum‐Julio, J. (2023) · The Economic History Review · doi:10.1111/ehr.13273 · Cited by 6
The Rise and Fall of Indian Economic History 1920–2013
Roy, T. (2014) · Economic History of Developing Regions · doi:10.1080/20780389.2014.922843 · Cited by 8
“…papers explore the reasons, and emphasize institutions, local autonomy, and fiscal resources (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, 2013; Kapur and Kim 2006; Iyer 2010; Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 2011; Iversen, Palmer-Jones, and Sen 2013; Chaudhary 2010; see also an innovative exercise on measurement…”
BackgroundBhattacharya, A., Kar, A., & Nandi, A. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2940724 · Cited by 7
Chaudhary, L., Musacchio, A., Nafziger, S., & Yan, S. (2012) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17852 · Cited by 9
Conflict and the Roots of Gender Norms in IndiaPreprint
Dincecco, M., Fenske, J. E., Gupta, B., & Menon, A. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4751560 · Cited by 9
A sign of backwardness? Where dynastic leaders are elected in India
Jensenius, F. R. (2015) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316402221.004 · Cited by 6
Feng, C., Shi, B., & Xu, M. (2020) · Cliometrica · doi:10.1007/s11698-020-00203-4 · Cited by 4
“…with other studies that use cross-country data, we use the various strategies and county-level micro-data to avoid the interference of confounding factors and account for the spillover effect of political institutions among different counties (Iyer 2010), which leads to more accurate results.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialMoving Beyond a W.E.I.R.D Psychology: A Multicultural Perspective on the Evolution of Ideology
Reyna, C., Vazquez, M. A., Vazquez, K. J., & Harris, K. (2023) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2023.2192647 · Cited by 6
“…of one-party rule ignores how these cultures have been forcibly shaped by European and American colonization, resource exploitation, and political interference that created long-term economic and political destabilization (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005; Iyer, 2010; Oto-Peral ıas & Romero- Avila, 2016).”
BackgroundThe Political Legacy of Nazi Annexation
Cannella, M., Makarin, A., & Piqué, R. (2021) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1093/ej/ueae009 · Cited by 12
Are elections in autocracies a curse for incumbents? Evidence from Chinese villages
Han, L. (2012) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-012-0004-3 · Cited by 4
“This methodology is similar to that of Iyer (2010), who instrumented the endogenous conversion from native rulers to direct British rule in some Indian areas with the passage of a new succession rule and the death of a ruler without a natural heir.”
MethodColonial legacy, private property, and rural development: Evidence from Namibian countryside
Chlouba, V., & He, J. (2021) · Economic History of Developing Regions · doi:10.1080/20780389.2020.1858049 · Cited by 6
Historical Origins of Underdevelopment and a Captured Democracy: An Analytical Narrative of Bihar
Minato, K. (2011) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230304956_9 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Iyer, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Iyer, Lakshmi
- ORCID
- Iyer, Lakshmi
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2010-11
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 693-713
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2169516098
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 43.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Colonial History and Postcolonial Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Keywords
- British colonial rule in India, access to schools, road infrastructure, governance quality
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