Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Abstract
This paper compares economic outcomes across areas in India that were under direct British colonial rule with areas that were under indirect colonial rule. Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period. I find evidence that the quality of governance in the colonial period has a significant and persistent effect on postcolonial outcomes.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Using district-level data and an IV based on Lord Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse, Iyer finds that areas under direct British rule had lower postcolonial public-good provision and worse poverty and infant mortality than indirectly ruled native-state areas, despite OLS showing agricultural advantages. The paper argues that colonial governance quality had persistent effects, with selective annexation explaining the OLS-IV gap.
Key findings
- IV estimates indicate direct British rule is associated with 37% fewer villages with middle schools, 70% fewer villages with primary health subcenters, and 46% fewer villages with good roads in 1981 and 1991; directly ruled areas also have nearly 40% higher poverty rates and 33% higher infant mortality rates in the early 1990s.
- OLS estimates show British areas had higher agricultural investments and productivity (e.g., irrigation, fertilizer use, high-yielding varieties, yields), but IV estimates show no significant agricultural advantages; the difference suggests British annexation selected areas with higher agricultural potential.
- Native states raised more revenue per capita than British India: 3.42 vs. 2.47 rupees in the 1890s (3.20 vs. 2.69 after tribute), and controlling for tax revenue did not change the direct-rule coefficient.
- In 1911, overall literacy was 5.2%, and British areas had a literacy rate 3 percentage points lower; postcolonial literacy differences were not significant.
Methods
- District-level analysis across British India and native-state areas, using 1991 districts in seventeen major states; the main independent variable is a British dummy equal to 1 if the district was formerly part of British India. Outcomes include public goods, agricultural investment/productivity, health and education, poverty, and inequality.
- OLS regressions control for geography and cluster standard errors at the native-state level. The IV strategy uses the Doctrine of Lapse: Lapse equals 1 if a native state was not annexed before 1848 and its ruler died without a natural heir during 1848–1856; the post-1847 sample excludes areas annexed earlier. First-stage results show Lapse strongly predicts British annexation (coefficient 0.682*).
- Robustness checks include falsification using ruler deaths without heirs in 1858–1884, controls for ruler-death timing, state fixed effects, randomization inference, and propensity score matching.
Limitations
- The paper states it cannot answer what outcomes would have been in the complete absence of colonial rule, only the effects of different degrees of colonial rule. It also notes district-level data lack per capita income, consumption, or net domestic product, so proxies are used.
- The paper states the small sample is not well suited for propensity score matching, and standard errors may suffer small-sample bias; randomization inference is used to address this. Missing data affect several states and outcomes (e.g., Kerala, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh; various public goods).
- Evident from the text: IV validity depends on the assumption that Lapse is uncorrelated with postcolonial outcomes except through British annexation; the paper tests this with falsification and controls but cannot fully prove exogeneity. OLS selection bias is explicitly acknowledged.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 3 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 156 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“There are no significant differences in other geographic characteristics such as latitude, altitude, or major soil types.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > B. OLS Estimates of the Impact of Direct Colonial Rule
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > Abstract
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Second, local institutions, such as the prevalent land tenure system, matter for long-term outcomes only in the British areas and not in indirectly ruled areas.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I find that the directly ruled British areas have significantly lower availability of public goods such as schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period and are not significantly better off in terms of agricultural investments and productivity.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The differences in human capital outcomes, such as literacy, were present in the colonial period itself.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
93 more claims
Create a free account to see all 169 claims and every source verdict.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 15
- It may state two separate claims as one. 59
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025 · cited 1×
“…distribution of historical property rights (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005; Banerjee & Iyer, 2005), the legal systems put in place by colonial powers (La Porta et al., 1998a, 1998b; Berkowitz & Clay, 2004), the systems of tax collection (Berger, 2008), the extent of slavery (Nunn, 2008), and colonial…”
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.6.3077 · Cited by 6,047 · cited 4×
“Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that colonies where settlement was deterred by the disease environment have poorer indicators of property rights protection, and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) find that Pacific islands that were colonized during the era of Enlightenment have better outcomes in the long run.”
InfluentialLa Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)03004-7 · Cited by 1,628
States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control
Gerhart, G. M., & Herbst, J. (2001) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20050157 · Cited by 1,527
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7771 · Cited by 1,442
History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825574 · Cited by 1,268
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- 24. Lal, Deepak, In Defense of Empires (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2004).
- 28. Mukherjee, Tapan, "Theory of Economic Drain: Impact of British Rule on the Indian Economy, 1840-1900," in Kenneth Boulding and Tapan Mukherjee (Eds.), Economic Imperialism: A Book of Readings (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972).
- 30. Potter, David C., India's Political Administrators: From ICS to the IAS (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- 33. Richter, William, "Electoral Patterns in Post-Princely India," in Myron Weiner and John Osgood Field (Eds.), Electoral Politics in the Indian States: Three Disadvantaged Sectors (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975).
Cited by
History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825574 · Cited by 1,268
Self-citationPre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta9613 · Cited by 953
Hodler, R., & Raschky, P. A. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju004 · Cited by 709
National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa *
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt029 · Cited by 581
Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone
Acemoglu, D., Reed, T., & Robinson, J. A. (2014) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/674988 · Cited by 523
“Our paper is also related to a small literature on economic consequences of indirect rule, including Lange ð2009Þ and Iyer ð2010Þ.”
BackgroundInstitutions, Human Capital, and Development*
Acemoglu, D., Gallego, F. A., & Robinson, J. A. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041119 · Cited by 502
“Some prominent examples include Banerjee & Iyer (2005) and Iyer (2010) for India, Acemoglu et al. (2008a, 2012a, 2013 Importantly, all of these papers find strong evidence of the effect of institutions on long-run economic development at the within-country level.”
Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach
Dunning, T. (2012) · Thammasat University Digital Collections · Cited by 466
Guldi, J., & Armitage, D. (2014) · doi:10.1017/9781139923880 · Cited by 464
The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131311 · Cited by 424
The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development
Alsan, M. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130604 · Cited by 355
An Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule
Gerring, J., Ziblatt, D., Van Gorp, J., & Arévalo, J. (2011) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887111000104 · Cited by 293
The Mission: Human Capital Transmission, Economic Persistence, and Culture in South America*
Valencia Caicedo, F. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjy024 · Cited by 259
Cities in Bad Shape: Urban Geometry in India
Harari, M. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20171673 · Cited by 254
“The British direct rule dummy identifies cities in districts that were formerly part of British India, based on Iyer (2010).”
BackgroundInstitutions, Human Capital and Development
Acemoglu, D., Gallego, F., & Robinson, J. (2014) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w19933 · Cited by 236
Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2012) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w18224 · Cited by 230
“Our micro approach enables us to overcome problems inherent to the cross-country framework, adding to a vibrant body of research that examines the within-country impact of various historical institutional arrangements (e.g. Banerjee and Iyer (2005); Iyer (2010); Dell (2010)).”
BackgroundHistorical Legacies and African Development
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2020) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181447 · Cited by 181
“…on lumi- 2For works on historical legacies outside Africa, see Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Becker and Woessmann (2009), Iyer (2010), Tabellini (2010), Dell (2010), Nunn and Qian (2011), Acemoglu, Hassan, and Robinson (2011), Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson…”
BackgroundWell-Being Dynamics and Poverty Traps
Barrett, C. B., Garg, T., & McBride, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Resource Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-resource-100815-095235 · Cited by 167
“…on phenomena such as ethnic fractionalization, weak property rights, public goods provision, and other institutions thought essential to promoting investment and development (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Banerjee & Iyer 2005, Dell 2010, Easterly & Levine 1997, Iyer 2010, Nunn 2007, 2009; Tan 2010).”
BackgroundThe Importance of History for Economic Development
Nunn, N. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14899 · Cited by 163
Borders That Divide: Education and Religion in Ghana and Togo Since Colonial Times
Cogneau, D., & Moradi, A. (2014) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050714000576 · Cited by 192
What Drives the Global “Land Rush”?
Arezki, R., Deininger, K., & Selod, H. (2013) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lht034 · Cited by 202
Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? The Human Capital Legacy in Postcolonial Democratic Development
Lankina, T. V., & Getachew, L. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00550.x · Cited by 155
Nunn, N. (2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00007-1 · Cited by 179
The fiscal cost of weak governance: Evidence from teacher absence in India
Muralidharan, K., Das, J., Holla, A., & Mohpal, A. (2016) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.005 · Cited by 180
“On a similar note, while primary education policy is typically made at the state level, there is often important variation across districts within a state based on historical as well as geographical factors (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010).”
Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India
Bhavnani, R. R., & Lee, A. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/694101 · Cited by 164
Natural Experiments in Macroeconomics
Fuchs‐Schündeln, N., & Hassan, T. A. (2015) · Handbook of macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.03.008 · Cited by 150
Regional Growth and Regional Decline
Breinlich, H., Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Temple, J. R. W. (2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53540-5.00004-5 · Cited by 151
The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java
Dell, M., & Olken, B. (2017) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w24009 · Cited by 123
The Development of Property Rights on Frontiers: Endowments, Norms, and Politics
Alston, L. J., Harris, E., & Mueller, B. (2012) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050712000356 · Cited by 121
What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?
Arezki, R., Deininger, K., & Selod, H. (2011) · The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (World Bank) · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-5864 · Cited by 132
Colonial Legacy, State-building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa
Ali, M., Fjeldstad, O., Jiang, B., & Shifa, A. B. (2018) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12595 · Cited by 135
“Iyer (2010) studies the legacy of direct versus indirect rule in India, and finds that the indirect rule is associated with higher provision.”
BackgroundDeininger, K., Hilhorst, T., & Songwe, V. (2014) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.03.003 · Cited by 103
Bentzen, J., Kaarsen, N., & Wingender, A. M. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12173 · Cited by 102
Kwacha Gonna Do? Experimental Evidence about Labor Supply in Rural Malawi
Goldberg, J. (2015) · American Economic Journal Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20130369 · Cited by 112
Hearts and mines: A district-level analysis of the Maoist conflict in India
Hoelscher, K., Miklian, J., & Vadlamannati, K. C. (2012) · International Area Studies Review · doi:10.1177/2233865912447022 · Cited by 103
“Essentially, where British-created landlord institutions have persisted (Iyer, 2010), collective action is weakened, enabling unfairly compensated land claims by public and private interest groups.”
BackgroundChaudhary, L., Musacchio, A., Nafziger, S., & Yan, S. (2011) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2012.02.001 · Cited by 112
The standard errors of persistence
Conley, T. G., & Kelly, M. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.104027 · Cited by 120
The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers
Labonne, J. (2013) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.04.006 · Cited by 101
Land, State Capacity, and Colonialism: Evidence From India
Lee, A. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018758759 · Cited by 94
“The limited work on this topic has found mixed effects: higher levels of service provision and better development outcomes than directly ruled areas (Iyer, 2010; Lee & Schultz, 2012), higher levels of conflict (Mukherjee, 2018), different types of conflicts (Verghese, 2016), and higher levels of authoritarianism and u…”
BackgroundInfluentialOto‐Peralías, D., & Romero‐Ávila, D. (2016) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-016-9132-9 · Cited by 91
“…and Iyer (2005), Angeles (2007), Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), Baten and van Zanden (2008), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Angeles and Neanidis (2009), Iyer (2010), Dell (2010), Gallego (2010), Naritomi et al. (2012), Bruhn and Gallego (2012), Easterly and Levine (2003, 2014), Ashraf and Galor…”
BackgroundColonial Institutions, Trade Shocks, and the Diffusion of Elementary Education in Brazil, 1889–1930
Musacchio, A., Fritscher, A. M., & Viarengo, M. G. (2014) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050714000588 · Cited by 93
Higher Education and Prosperity: From Catholic Missionaries to Luminosity in India
Castelló‐Climent, A., Chaudhary, L., & Mukhopadhyay, A. (2017) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12551 · Cited by 92
“Other scholars have used agricultural investment, agricultural productivity and the stock of health and education infrastructure as proxies for economic prosperity (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council
Dreher, A., Gould, M., Rablen, M. D., & Vreeland, J. R. (2012) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4 · Cited by 75
The wealth of subnations: Geography, institutions, and within-country development
Mitton, T. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.002 · Cited by 88
Liou, R., & Rao‐Nicholson, R. (2017) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.04.010 · Cited by 79
Kluppel, L. M., Pierce, L., & Snyder, J. A. (2018) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2017.1173 · Cited by 73
“Banerjee et al. (2005) and Iyer (2010) link both colonialism and religious minorities to decreased access to public goods.”
BackgroundIdentity-Based Policies and Identity Manipulation: Evidence from Colonial Punjab
Cassan, G. (2015) · American Economic Journal Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20130290 · Cited by 71
Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective
Acemoğlu, D., Chaves, I. N., Osafo-Kwaako, P., & Robinson, J. W. (2014) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w20092 · Cited by 96
“None of the analytical work on state weakness has focused on the idea that indirect rule creates weak states, though both Lange (2004, 2009) and Iyer (2010) present empirical evidence of the impact of indirect rule.”
National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2012) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w18275 · Cited by 71
Obydenkova, A., & Libman, A. (2014) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2014.931683 · Cited by 76
“For example, while studying colonial legacies, the literature points out the importance of property rights institutions (Banerjee and Iyer 2005), direct versus indirect rule (Iyer 2010), human capital (Lankina and Getachew 2012, 2013), or the spread of the slave trade (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011).”
BackgroundLong-term effects of access to health care: Medical missions in colonial India
Calvi, R., & Mantovanelli, F. G. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.07.009 · Cited by 93
Wietzke, F. (2014) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.010 · Cited by 73
From mine to coast: Transport infrastructure and the direction of trade in developing countries
Bonfatti, R., & Poelhekke, S. (2017) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.03.004 · Cited by 86
Continuity or Change? (In)direct Rule in British and French Colonial Africa
Müller‐Crepon, C. (2020) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000211 · Cited by 98
“Bruhn and Gallego 2012; Iyer 2010; Lange 2009; Lankina and Getachew 2012; Mamdani 1996.”
BackgroundLankina, T. V., & Getachew, L. (2012) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123412000178 · Cited by 72
Labor scarcity, land tenure, and historical legacy: Evidence from Mexico
Sellars, E. A., & Alix‐Garcia, J. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.07.014 · Cited by 60
From Colonialism to International Aid: External Actors and Social Protection in the Global South
Schmitt, C. (2020) · Global dynamics of social policy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-38200-1 · Cited by 96
Things fall apart? Missions, institutions, and interpersonal trust
Okoye, D. (2020) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102568 · Cited by 68
Economic growth, convergence, and agricultural economics
Martin, W. J. (2019) · Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/agec.12528 · Cited by 71
“Iyer (2010) points to local rulers having better information than colonists and a perceived lower likelihood of imposing extractive institutions that create uncertainty about property rights.”
BackgroundWhat Were the Consequences of Decolonization?
Lee, A., & Paine, J. (2019) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqy064 · Cited by 65
On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Political Institutions: Elites and Civil Society
Bisin, A., & Verdier, T. (2023) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/727711 · Cited by 70
Indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity
McNamee, L. (2019) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.05.017 · Cited by 50
Fenske, J. E., Kala, N., & Wei, J. (2022) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.103038 · Cited by 63
“Our measure of malaria is that originally created by Kiszewski et al. (2004).(9) We have used altitude data that are originally taken from the CGIAR’s SRTM30 dataset.”
BackgroundMethodThe Transatlantic Slave Trade and the Evolution of Political Authority in West Africa
Whatley, W. C. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139644594.020 · Cited by 54
“Iyer (2010), for example, shows how in British India colonial authorities indirectly ruled the poorer regions and directly ruled the richer ones.”
BackgroundDASGUPTA, A. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541800031x · Cited by 46
“Panel A displays the absence of a relationship between aquifer coverage and the Congress 7 District-level data on direct colonial rule and colonial-era land tenure come from Iyer (2010).”
BackgroundColonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Historical Institutions and Civil War
Mukherjee, S. (2017) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002717727818 · Cited by 55
Applying the Black Radical Tradition: Class, Race, and a New Foundation for Studies of Development
Edwards, Z. (2020) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/s0198-871920200000037008 · Cited by 50
Historical Frontiers and the Rise of Inequality: The Case of the Frontier of Granada
Oto‐Peralías, D., & Romero‐Ávila, D. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvw004 · Cited by 52
The Origins of Patronage Politics: State Building, Centrifugalism, and Decolonization
Kenny, P. D. (2013) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s000712341300015x · Cited by 73
“132 In a similar vein, see Iyer 2010. over municipal and state-level patronage resources has had a persistent effect on efforts at administrative reform.”
BackgroundCommon Tongue: The Impact of Language on Educational Outcomes
Jain, T. (2017) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050717000481 · Cited by 49
“Lakshmi Iyer (2010) shows that the British were selective about the regions annexed for direct rule.7 Therefore, a key concern regions administered directly was correlated with linguistic characteristics of those areas.”
InfluentialColonial Institutions, Trade Shocks, and the Diffusion of Elementary Education in Brazil, 1889-1930Preprint
Musacchio, A., Fritscher, A. M., & Viarengo, M. G. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1566887 · Cited by 45
THE CAUSAL HISTORY OF AFRICA: A RESPONSE TO HOPKINS
Fenske, J. E. (2010) · Economic History of Developing Regions · doi:10.1080/20780389.2010.527693 · Cited by 56
Why Ethnic Subaltern-Led Parties Crowd Out Armed Organizations: Explaining Maoist Violence in India
Chandra, K., & García‐Ponce, O. (2019) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s004388711800028x · Cited by 42
“72 acemoglu, Johnson, and robinson 2001; Jha 2013; banerjee and iyer 2005; iyer 2010; Verghese 2016; Verghese and teitelbaum Forthcoming; mukherjee 2017.”
BackgroundColonial Legacies and State Institutions in China: Evidence From a Natural Experiment
Mattingly, D. C. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015600465 · Cited by 57
“For example, indirect rule by the British has been credited with leaving a relatively positive legacy in South Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Iyer, 2010; Lee & Schultz, 2012; Mahoney, 2010).”
Religious Identity and the Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States
Chaudhary, L., & Rubin, J. (2013) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2016.05.001 · Cited by 46
Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone
Acemoğlu, D., Reed, T., & Robinson, J. M. (2013) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w18691 · Cited by 45
How history matters for student performance. lessons from the Partitions of Poland
Bukowski, P. (2018) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2018.10.007 · Cited by 45
“In the case of education, historical investments in public goods and property rights have been shown to affect students’ current education attainment, the provision of schools and literacy levels (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Huillery, 2009; Iyer, 2010).”
BackgroundChiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra LeonePreprint
Acemoğlu, D., Reed, T. F., & Robinson, J. A. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2211295 · Cited by 41
“Chiefs raise taxes, control the judicial system, and allocate land, the most important resource in rural areas.1 Despite their central role in the politics of Africa, however, relatively little is known about how chiefs exercise their political and economic power, how (and whether) they are…”
BackgroundPre-Colonial Warfare and Long-Run Development in India
Dincecco, M., Fenske, J. E., Menon, A., & Mukherjee, S. (2020) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1093/ej/ueab089 · Cited by 61
British colonialism and democracy: Divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies
Lee, A., & Paine, J. (2019) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2019.02.001 · Cited by 48
“…with support for the importance of colonizer identity (La Porta et al., 1998; Grier, 1999; Fails and Krieckhaus, 2010; Lee and Schultz, 2012) countered by arguments that other aspects of colonial rule were more important (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Kohli, 2004; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2011; Iyer, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies: An Introduction
Juan, A. D., & Pierskalla, J. H. (2017) · Politics & Society · doi:10.1177/0032329217704434 · Cited by 65
Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and their Long-Term Legacies
Vogler, J. P. (2019) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s004388711900008x · Cited by 50
The Fiscal Cost of Weak Governance: Evidence from Teacher Absence in India
Muralidharan, K., Das, J., Holla, A., & Mohpal, A. (2016) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-7579 · Cited by 40
The origins of policing institutions
Eck, K. (2018) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343317747955 · Cited by 34
Lechler, M., & McNamee, L. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018758760 · Cited by 36
“…the importance of forms of colonialism for contemporary political and economic outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002; Hariri, 2012; Iyer, 2010; Lange, 2009), this article argues that indirect and direct colonial rule are important factors in shaping contemporary support for…”
BackgroundMukherjee, S. (2018) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.06.013 · Cited by 35
Culture and colonial legacy: Evidence from public goods games
Chaudhary, L., Rubin, J., Iyer, S., & Shrivastava, A. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.005 · Cited by 40
Archibong, B. (2019) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.04.014 · Cited by 42
Akee, R., Jorgensen, M., & Sunde, U. (2015) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2015.08.004 · Cited by 38
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided? Evidence from Africa
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17184 · Cited by 56
Natural Experiments in Macroeconomics
Fuchs-Schuendeln, N., & Hassan, T. A. (2015) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w21228 · Cited by 60
Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building: Evidence from FrancePreprint
Johnson, N. D. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2593331 · Cited by 37
“…literature which uses within country variation to measure the effect of institutions on economic development (e.g. Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Iyer (2010), Le Bris (2015), and Dell (2010)).4 In particular, we build on work by those such as Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Dincecco…”
BackgroundDisplacement and development: Long term impacts of population transfer in India
Bharadwaj, P., & Ali Mirza, R. (2019) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2019.05.001 · Cited by 29
“This paper contributes to the economics literature on the long term impacts of historical events in general (see Nunn (2009) for a review), and also to the literature more focussed on the impacts of history and colonization in India (Jha, 2013; Chaudhary and Rubin, 2011; Donaldson, 2010; Iyer, 2010).”
BackgroundThe Historical Roots of Corruption: Mass Education, Economic Inequality, and State Capacity
Uslaner, E. M. (2017) · Cited by 29
Historical natural experiments: bridging economics and economic history
Cantoni, D., & Yuchtman, N. (2021) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-815874-6.00016-2 · Cited by 52
Xu, G. (2021) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_01060 · Cited by 36
“The remaining parts of India – about 40% – were under indirect rule by the Princely States (Iyer, 2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialGlobal land investments in the bio‐economy: evidence and policy implications
Deininger, K. (2013) · Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/agec.12056 · Cited by 32
Colonial Investments and Long-Term Development in Africa: Evidence from Ghanaian Railroads
Jedwab, R., & Moradi, A. (2012) · Cited by 42
Indigenous Origins of Colonial Institutions
Arias, L. M., & Girod, D. M. (2014) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00013135 · Cited by 33
How Africans Shaped British Colonial Institutions: Evidence from Local Taxation
Bolt, J., & Gardner, L. A. (2020) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050720000455 · Cited by 53
“In her study of indirect rule in India, Iyer (2010) argues similarly that the fact that rulers could be removed “in cases of ‘misrule’” appears to play quite an important role.”
BackgroundHuman Resource Management in India: Performance and Complementarity
Darwish, T. K., Wood, G., Singh, S., & Singh, R. K. (2019) · European Management Review · doi:10.1111/emre.12367 · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Iyer, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Iyer, Lakshmi
- ORCID
- Iyer, Lakshmi
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2010-11
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 693-713
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2169516098
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 43.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Colonial History and Postcolonial Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Keywords
- British colonial rule in India, access to schools, road infrastructure, governance quality
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.