Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences
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Abstract
This paper compares economic outcomes across areas in India that were under direct British colonial rule with areas that were under indirect colonial rule. Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period. I find evidence that the quality of governance in the colonial period has a significant and persistent effect on postcolonial outcomes.
Overview
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TL;DR
Using district-level data and an IV based on Lord Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse, Iyer finds that areas under direct British rule had lower postcolonial public-good provision and worse poverty and infant mortality than indirectly ruled native-state areas, despite OLS showing agricultural advantages. The paper argues that colonial governance quality had persistent effects, with selective annexation explaining the OLS-IV gap.
Key findings
- IV estimates indicate direct British rule is associated with 37% fewer villages with middle schools, 70% fewer villages with primary health subcenters, and 46% fewer villages with good roads in 1981 and 1991; directly ruled areas also have nearly 40% higher poverty rates and 33% higher infant mortality rates in the early 1990s.
- OLS estimates show British areas had higher agricultural investments and productivity (e.g., irrigation, fertilizer use, high-yielding varieties, yields), but IV estimates show no significant agricultural advantages; the difference suggests British annexation selected areas with higher agricultural potential.
- Native states raised more revenue per capita than British India: 3.42 vs. 2.47 rupees in the 1890s (3.20 vs. 2.69 after tribute), and controlling for tax revenue did not change the direct-rule coefficient.
- In 1911, overall literacy was 5.2%, and British areas had a literacy rate 3 percentage points lower; postcolonial literacy differences were not significant.
Methods
- District-level analysis across British India and native-state areas, using 1991 districts in seventeen major states; the main independent variable is a British dummy equal to 1 if the district was formerly part of British India. Outcomes include public goods, agricultural investment/productivity, health and education, poverty, and inequality.
- OLS regressions control for geography and cluster standard errors at the native-state level. The IV strategy uses the Doctrine of Lapse: Lapse equals 1 if a native state was not annexed before 1848 and its ruler died without a natural heir during 1848–1856; the post-1847 sample excludes areas annexed earlier. First-stage results show Lapse strongly predicts British annexation (coefficient 0.682*).
- Robustness checks include falsification using ruler deaths without heirs in 1858–1884, controls for ruler-death timing, state fixed effects, randomization inference, and propensity score matching.
Limitations
- The paper states it cannot answer what outcomes would have been in the complete absence of colonial rule, only the effects of different degrees of colonial rule. It also notes district-level data lack per capita income, consumption, or net domestic product, so proxies are used.
- The paper states the small sample is not well suited for propensity score matching, and standard errors may suffer small-sample bias; randomization inference is used to address this. Missing data affect several states and outcomes (e.g., Kerala, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh; various public goods).
- Evident from the text: IV validity depends on the assumption that Lapse is uncorrelated with postcolonial outcomes except through British annexation; the paper tests this with falsification and controls but cannot fully prove exogeneity. OLS selection bias is explicitly acknowledged.
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In the paper
“There are no significant differences in other geographic characteristics such as latitude, altitude, or major soil types.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > B. OLS Estimates of the Impact of Direct Colonial Rule
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > Abstract
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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In the paper
“Second, local institutions, such as the prevalent land tenure system, matter for long-term outcomes only in the British areas and not in indirectly ruled areas.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I find that the directly ruled British areas have significantly lower availability of public goods such as schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period and are not significantly better off in terms of agricultural investments and productivity.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The differences in human capital outcomes, such as literacy, were present in the colonial period itself.”
§ DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT COLONIAL RULE IN INDIA: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES > I. Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
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Cited by
History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
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“Our paper is also related to a small literature on economic consequences of indirect rule, including Lange ð2009Þ and Iyer ð2010Þ.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Iyer, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Iyer, Lakshmi
- ORCID
- Iyer, Lakshmi
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2010-11
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 693-713
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2169516098
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 43.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Colonial History and Postcolonial Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Keywords
- British colonial rule in India, access to schools, road infrastructure, governance quality
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