Bargaining and the Nature of War
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, A., & Stam, A. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2004-12
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 783-813
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2137091439
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 15.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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