Cited by 598Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationSocial Power and Status Dynamics

Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review

Balliet, Daniel·2010·Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

Among the most researched solutions to social dilemmas is communication. Since the late 1950s, it has been well known that communication enhances cooperation in social dilemmas. This article reports a meta-analysis of this literature (forty-five effect sizes) and finds a large positive effect of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas ( d = 1.01). This effect is moderated by the type of communication, with a stronger effect of face-to-face discussion ( d = 1.21) compared to written messages ( d = 0.46). The communication-cooperation relationship is also stronger in larger, compared to smaller, group social dilemmas. Whether communication occurred before or during iterated dilemmas did not statistically affect the communication-cooperation effect size. Results are discussed according to theory and research on communication in social dilemmas.

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Crossref · 10.1177/0022002709352443

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  • Communication is known to substantially increase cooperation in social dilemma games such as the trust game.

    “The following two conditions thus needed to be fulfilled: (i) the social contact took place before participants knew they would play the trust game so that they could not communicate about it, as communication is known to substantially increase cooperation in social dilemma games (such as the trust game) 24 .”

    From A registered replication study on oxytocin and trust (2020) · cites this paper as [24]

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Authors
Balliet, D.
Affiliations
Singapore Management University (SG)
Corresponding author
Balliet, Daniel
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
2009-12-03
Volume
54
Issue
1
Pages
39-57
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W2163748434
Cited by
598
References
75
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 37 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 81 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 18
FWCI
36.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
  • Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
social dilemmas, cooperation, communication, face-to-face discussion, written messages, group size, public goods

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