The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Self-Serving Justifications: Doing Wrong and Feeling Moral
Open accessAbstract
Unethical behavior by “ordinary” people poses significant societal and personal challenges. We present a novel framework centered on the role of self-serving justification to build upon and advance the rapidly expanding research on intentional unethical behavior of people who value their morality highly. We propose that self-serving justifications emerging before and after people engage in intentional ethical violations mitigate the threat to the moral self, enabling them to do wrong while feeling moral. Pre-violation justifications lessen the anticipated threat to the moral self by redefining questionable behaviors as excusable. Post-violation justifications alleviate the experienced threat to the moral self through compensations that balance or lessen violations. We highlight the psychological mechanisms that prompt people to do wrong and feel moral, and suggest future research directions regarding the temporal dimension of self-serving justifications of ethical misconduct.
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1 retracted
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Self-citationVollberg, M. C., & Gross, J. (2026) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-026-02585-3
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shalvi, S., Gino, F., Barkan, R., & Ayal, S.
- Affiliations
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Harvard Business School, Harvard University
- Reichman University (IL)
- Venue
- Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-04
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 125-130
- ISSN
- 0963-7214 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8721
- OpenAlex
- W2097587915
- Cited by
- 422
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 50 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 40 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 15
- FWCI
- 70.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Current Directions in Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission (2007–2013, FP7 2007-2013, FP7/2007, 333745)
- Research Executive Agency (FP7/2007-2013)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Keywords
- moral self, moral dissonance, moral licensing, moral compensation, moral self-presentation, ethical violations
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