Modularity and the Social Mind: Are Psychologists Too Self-ish?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A modular view of the mind implies that there is no unitary “self” and that the mind consists of a set of informationally encapsulated systems, many of which have functions associated with navigating an inherently ambiguous and competitive social world. It is proposed that there are a set of cognitive mechanisms—a social cognitive interface (SCI)—designed for strategic manipulation of others' representations of one's traits, abilities, and prospects. Although constrained by plausibility, these mechanisms are not necessarily designed to maximize accuracy or to maintain consistency with other encapsulated representational systems. The modular view provides a useful framework for talking about multiple phenomena previously discussed under the rubric of the self.
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Background
Cited by
Renovating the Pyramid of Needs: Contemporary Extensions Built Upon Ancient Foundations
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The evolution and psychology of self-deception
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Human threat management systems: Self-protection and disease avoidance
Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., & Schaller, M. (2011) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.08.011 · Cited by 526
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kurzban, R., & Athena Aktipis, C.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-05
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 131-149
- ISSN
- 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7957
- OpenAlex
- W2168034547
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 21.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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