This Isn’t the Free Will Worth Looking For: General Free Will Beliefs Do Not Influence Moral Judgments, Agent-Specific Choice Ascriptions Do
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will beliefs but found strong effects when manipulating the perceived choice capacity of the judged agent. Study 4 used pretested narratives that varied agents’ apparent free will and found that perceived choice capacity mediated the relationship between free will and blame. These results suggest that people’s general beliefs about whether free will exists have no impact on moral judgments but specific judgments about the agent’s choice capacity do.
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Citations
Cites
Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science
Open Science Collaboration (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aac4716 · Cited by 8,515
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Self-citationInnocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity☆
Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.03.020 · Cited by 249 · cited 1×
“…is consistent with previous research on judgments of blame and punishment (Cushman, 2008; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Martin & Cushman, 2016; Woolfolk et al., 2006; Young & Saxe, 2009) and highlights the psychological, rather than an abstract metaphysical, nature of people’s concept of free will.”
ResultThe free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility
Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Ross, L. T. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.006 · Cited by 219 · cited 3×
“In contrast to Study 1, the free will manipulation had no significant effects on the Free Will (t ¼ .23, p ¼ .82) or the Determinism subscales (t ¼ .30, p ¼ .77) of the Free Will Inventory.”
MethodInfluentialMonroe, A. E., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.011 · Cited by 125 · cited 2×
“Once free will is deconstructed into its psychological components (with choice at the core), the components predict moral judgments (Monroe et al., 2014).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
People are averse to machines making moral decisions.
Bigman, Y. E., & Gray, K. (2018) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003 · Cited by 738
Belief in free will affects causal attributions when judging others’ behavior
Genschow, O., Rigoni, D., & Brass, M. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1701916114 · Cited by 82
Deconstructing moral character judgments
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., & Gray, K. (2022) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008 · Cited by 41
Metadata
- Authors
- Monroe, A. E., Brady, G. L., & Malle, B. F.
- Venue
- Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2016-09-21
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 191-199
- ISSN
- 1948-5506 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-5514
- OpenAlex
- W2521007857
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 4.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Monroe, A. E., Brady, G. L., & Malle, B. F. (2017). This Isn’t the Free Will Worth Looking For: General Free Will Beliefs Do Not Influence Moral Judgments, Agent-Specific Choice Ascriptions Do. Social Psychological and Personality Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616667616
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