Democratic backsliding disrupted: The role of digitalized resistance in Myanmar
Open accessAbstract
More than one year since its coup, the Myanmar military has neither established effective control of the territory nor crushed online dissent. What factors have enabled the resistance forces to deny the consolidation of military rule? We address this question by building a novel theoretical framework that incorporates the role of long-standing digitalized pro-democracy activism and by conducting a mixed methods analysis that includes an original, largely representative sample of public Facebook posts in post-coup Myanmar. We find that the development of online and hybrid pro-democracy activism against digital abuse and other illiberal policies under previous quasi-civilian governments enabled anti-coup resistance forces to thwart the military's attempt at authoritarian revival in 2021. Our research findings deepen understanding of Myanmar's post-coup contestation dynamics as well as other cases of unpopular autocratization in the digital age.
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0 of 16 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
There are no significant changes in countermobilization tactics over time.
“As Figures 10 and 11 demonstrate, we do not detect any significant changes in countermobilization tactics over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Military-affiliated pages (25%) and pro-military groups (30.6%) are more likely to have been taken down than NUG-affiliated pages (6.7%) and pro-resistance groups (13.5%).
“Likewise, military-affiliated pages (25%) and pro-military groups (30.6%) are more likely to have been taken down than NUG-affiliated pages (6.7%) and pro-resistance groups (13.5%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Resistance actors' more proactive use of Facebook to coordinate physical and digital events and strategies compared to SAC supporters.
“Our next set of findings shows resistance actors' more proactive use of Facebook to coordinate physical and digital events and strategies compared to SAC supporters (Figure 8).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There is a greater evolution in resistance tactics on Facebook compared to the military's countermobilization tactics.
“Moreover, our following regression and qualitative content analysis clearly show a greater evolution in resistance tactics on Facebook compared to the military's countermobilization tactics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A deeper qualitative analysis of pro-military tactics highlights the lack of robustness and innovation in the military's digital repertoire on Facebook.
“A deeper qualitative analysis of pro-military tactics further highlights the lack of robustness and innovation in the military's digital repertoire on Facebook.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingown data
In contrast to SAC's stagnant strategies, there is dynamic evolution in both quantities and substantive foci of online resistance tactics over time.
“In contrast to SAC's stagnant strategies, we find dynamic evolution in both quantities and substantive foci of online resistance tactics over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Among subcategories of online resistance tactics, there was a strategic temporal variation to grow the broad-based struggle on the ground.
“a closer examination among subcategories of online resistance tactics reveals a strategic temporal variation to grow the broad-based struggle on the ground.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
As the military ramped up its repression, posts in May focused on evoking public sympathy with the arrested or killed by promoting their images as dutiful sons, husbands, or parents.
“Later on, as the military ramped up its repression, posts in May focused on evoking public sympathy with the arrested or killed by promoting their images as dutiful sons, husbands, or parents (Figure 16).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
A large number of Facebook groups with anti-military posts, 70 out of 694 groups, became private one year after the coup.
“In addition, a large number of Facebook groups with anti-military posts, 70 out of 694 groups, became private one year after the coup.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The rate of anti-military groups going private (10%) is significantly higher than the rate of groups without any anti-military content going private (5.2%).
“This rate of 10% is significantly higher than the rate of groups without any anti-military content going private: 5.2%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Another pro-military discrediting narrative framed the NLD and resistance forces as having pro-Bengali and pro-Western positions that pose an existential threat to the Bamar Buddhist nation.
“Another discrediting narrative framed the NLD and resistance forces as having pro-Bengali and pro-Western positions that pose an existential threat to the Bamar Buddhist nation (Figure 13).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The proportion of Facebook posts serving resistance purposes gradually decreased in order to circumvent SAC's monitoring.
“While the proportion of Facebook posts serving resistance purposes gradually decreased in order to circumvent SAC's monitoring (Figure 10)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Posts that mainly seek to coordinate resistance activities tend to be more generic at the beginning and become increasingly specific later on.
“In the same vein, posts that mainly seek to coordinate resistance activities tend to be more generic at the beginning and become increasingly specific later on.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The most prevalent type of resistance tactic, discrediting and denouncing the military administration, exhibits dynamic evolution over time.
“First, the most prevalent type of resistance tactic, discrediting and denouncing the military administration, exhibits dynamic evolution over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
After the coup, these activists and journalists applied similar digital security practices and knowledge to the resistance, such as using VPNs and migrating to safer and more private platforms, to maintain privacy and evade both repression and surveillance.
“After the coup, these activists and journalists applied similar digital security practices and knowledge to the resistance, such as using VPNs and migrating to safer and more private platforms, to maintain privacy and evade both repression and surveillance (Mette-Starke, 2021;Chandran, 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Mette-Starke, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Chandran, 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation
After the coup, such experience in online activism would spread to other pockets of dissent across the country through either direct learning or indirect mirroring.
“After the coup, such experience in online activism would spread to other pockets of dissent across the country through either direct learning or indirect mirroring, as theorized in existing literature on protest diffusion (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bunce and Wolchik, 2011 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Military coups are increasingly difficult to succeed when digitally savvy resistance forces are determined to maintain their democratic institutions and freedoms.
“Our findings suggest that military coups are increasingly difficult to succeed when digitally savvy resistance forces are determined to maintain their democratic institutions and freedoms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
Digital rights activists provided training about digital security to other groups of pro-democracy activists and independent journalists prior to the coup.
“Second, digital rights activists provided training about digital security to other groups of pro-democracy activists and independent journalists prior to the coup.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
In contexts of targeted repression such as Myanmar, digitalized activism can deny complete autocratization by traditionally powerful political actors.
“In contrast, in contexts of targeted repression such as Myanmar, our research demonstrates the possibility of digitalized activism in denying a complete autocratization by traditionally powerful political actors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Pre-coup efforts by the digital rights community to help Facebook better detect violating content allowed Facebook to effectively remove official military pages and a large proportion of pro-military content shortly after the coup.
“First, pre-coup efforts by the digital rights community to help Facebook better detect violating content allowed Facebook to effectively remove official military pages and a large proportion of pro-military content shortly after the coup.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Facebook was more active at removing pro-military content.
“However, the opposite evidence corroborates our argument that Facebook was more active at removing pro-military content.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The third mechanism links the pre-coup expertise in online and hybrid campaigns among different circles of pro-democracy activists with the dispersion and innovations of anti-coup resistance tactics.
“The third mechanism links the pre-coup expertise in online and hybrid campaigns among different circles of pro-democracy activists with the dispersion and innovations of anti-coup resistance tactics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The development of online and hybrid pro-democracy activism against digital abuse and other illiberal policies under previous quasi-civilian governments enabled anti-coup resistance forces to thwart the military's attempt of authoritarian revival in 2021.
“We find that the development of online and hybrid pro-democracy activism against digital abuse and other illiberal policies under previous quasi-civilian governments enabled anti-coup resistance forces to thwart the military's attempt of authoritarian revival in 2021.”
- Also stated in: § Theoretical propositions: · boosted
“Hence, based on these three mechanisms, the pre-coup development of digitalized prodemocracy activism played a crucial role in enabling a disruptive and resilient grassroots resistance against a revival of military rule.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
“Overall, learning by doing before the coup is crucial for these pro-democracy activists to sharpen their digitalized repertoire, which they repurposed later on to promote anti-coup resistance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: More than one year since the coup, SAC has neither established effective control of the territory nor crushed online dissent.
- Also stated in: § Theoretical propositions: · boosted
- Premisecitation
In response, mass protest campaigns broke out across these countries' urban centers.
“In response, mass protest campaigns broke out across these countries' urban centers (Dunai, 2021;Human Rights Watch, 2019;Al Jazeera, 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Dunai, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Human Rights Watch, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Al Jazeera, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The proliferation and wide geographic scope of digital and hybrid resistance initiatives enabled the scale-up of anti-SAC campaigns across Myanmar, despite increasing military repression.
“The very proliferation and wide geographic scope of digital and hybrid resistance initiatives further enabled the scale-up of anti-SAC campaigns across Myanmar, despite increasing military repression.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Without the proliferation and innovation of digitalized resistance strategies, the anti-coup efforts in the early post-coup period would not have been as widespread and destabilizing.
“Without the proliferation and innovation of digitalized resistance strategies as described above, the anti-coup efforts in the early post-coup period would not have been as widespread and destabilizing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the early days after the coup, anti-coup activists needed to put much more effort into encouraging and coordinating activities.
“Anti-coup activists needed to put much more effort into encouraging and coordinating activities in the early days after the coup”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductown data
Our data only covers the early post-coup period.
“While one could argue these tactics continue to drive the current resilience of the resistance forces, our data only covers the early post-coup period.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In cases like Myanmar, dissidents' development of digitalized capacity against targeted repression allows them to impede major attempts at democratic backsliding or autocratization later on, by refocusing and tailoring their well-tested digitalized repertoires.
“In these cases, we propose that dissidents' development of digitalized capacity against such repression allows them to impede major attempts at democratic backsliding or autocratization later on, by refocusing and tailoring their well-tested digitalized repertoires.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductnone given
The study uses an original, largely representative sample of public Facebook posts in the context of Myanmar's 2021 military coup.
“We employ an innovative research design, combining secondary analysis of authoritative sources with mixed-method analysis of an original, largely representative sample of public Facebook posts in the context of Myanmar's 2021 military coup.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
By facilitating coordination among like-minded groups, broadcasting the military's abuses to an international audience, and enhancing the spread and resilience of anti-coup campaigns beyond a level Myanmar has ever experienced before, digitalized activism has played an essential role in obstructing SAC's complete autocratization of Myanmar.
“However, by facilitating coordination among like-minded groups, broadcasting the military's abuses to an international audience, and enhancing the spread and resilience of anti-coup campaigns beyond a level Myanmar has ever experienced before, digitalized activism has played an essential role in obstructing SAC's complete autocratization of Myanmar.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Given autocrats' lack of broad-based digital repression, pro-democracy activists' experience with online and hybrid activism, platform advocacy, and digital security practices before democratic backsliding promotes a more wide-ranging and resilient resistance that impedes a complete democratic breakdown.
“We find that, given autocrats' lack of broad-based digital repression, pro-democracy activists' experience with online and hybrid activism, platform advocacy, and digital security practices before democratic backsliding promotes a more wide-ranging and resilient resistance that impedes a complete democratic breakdown.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Autocrats lack broad-based digital repression.
- Rests on an assumption: Pro-democracy activists in Myanmar had pre-existing digitalized capacity (online and hybrid activism, platform advocacy, digital security practices) before democratic backsliding.
- Interpretationreasoning
As a result, the resistance forces were still able to communicate with a relatively broad audience for anti-coup mobilization.
“As a result, the resistance forces were still able to communicate with a relatively broad audience for anti-coup mobilization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 26
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 13
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataMany pro-resistance posts simultaneously serve three or four different purposes, while countermobilization posts rarely attempt to achieve more than two goals at once.
“While many pro-resistance posts simultaneously serve three or four different purposes, such as encouraging people to protest while praising protest participants and making fun of SAC, countermobilization posts rarely attempt to achieve more than two goals at once (Figure 9).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataPro-resistance content (37.9%) is less likely to be removed than pro-military content (62.5%), but similarly as likely as neutral coup-related content (31.3%) to be removed.
“Moreover, we find that pro-resistance content (37.9%) is less likely to be removed than pro-military content (62.5%), but similarly as likely as neutral coup-related content (31.3%) to be removed (Figure 7).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAmong coup-related posts, 70.1% are anti-military and only 2.7% are pro-military.
“Among the coup-related posts, 70.1% are anti-military and only 2.7% are pro-military.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataLater posts either encouraged people to confidently defy SAC by characterizing its forces as small in number, or commended examples of protest groups in various places who continue rallying despite ongoing crackdowns.
“These later posts either encouraged people to confidently defy SAC by characterizing its forces as small in number, or commended examples of protest groups in various places who continue rallying despite ongoing crackdowns (Figure 15).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataMost pro-resistance posts in March merely exposed specific cases of killing or arrests against children, teenagers, and unarmed civilians across localities, while April posts explicitly sought to turn the rising casualties and losses into motivations for a broad-based anti-coup campaign.
“Mirroring one another, while most pro-resistance posts in March merely exposed specific cases of killing or arrests against children, teenagers, and unarmed civilians across localities, April posts explicitly sought to turn the rising casualties and losses into motivations for a broad-based anti-coup campaign.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenOne April post implied that the NLD's signing of the UN Global Migration Pact risks Myanmar's national sovereignty because the pact is led by the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) with the intention to facilitate Muslim migration.
“For instance, one April post implied that the NLD's signing of the UN Global Migration Pact risks Myanmar's national sovereignty because the pact is led by the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) with the intention to facilitate Muslim migration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOur qualitative content analysis demonstrates the resistance's substantive adaptations in rhetoric to strategically discredit SAC as well as inspire and direct anti-coup campaigns on the ground.
“Furthermore, our qualitative content analysis demonstrates the resistance's substantive adaptations in rhetoric to strategically discredit SAC as well as inspire and direct anti-coup campaigns on the ground.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataSAC's and its supporters' strategies converged around two main types: discrediting the resistance and praising the military.
“SAC's and its supporters' strategies converged around two main types: discrediting the resistance and praising the military.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenA large number of praises end with similar motivational hashtags to sustain the resistance momentum, e.g. 'We must win every battle' and 'We must all win together.'
“A large number of these praises also end with similar motivational hashtags to sustain the resistance momentum, e.g.“We must win every battle” and “We must all win together.””
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenOther posts spread disinformation about the NLD's favoritism of Muslims over Buddhists, claiming the NLD banned Buddhist festivals and closed pagodas during the COVID-19 pandemic while allowing Muslims to gather in mosques.
“Other posts spread disinformation about the NLD's favoritism of Muslims over Buddhists, claiming the NLD banned Buddhist festivals and closed pagodas during the COVID-19 pandemic while allowing Muslims to gather in mosques.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOne common pro-military narrative framed the resistance forces as violent and destructive, depicting them as 'terrorists' and 'rioters,' highlighting their attacks-bus burnings, lootings and bombings-and focusing on seizures of military-grade weapons from them.
“One common narrative framed the resistance forces as violent and destructive, depicting them as “terrorists” and “rioters,” highlighting their attacks-bus burnings, lootings and bombings-and focusing on seizures of military-grade weapons from them (Figure 12).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAs encouragement and coordination of physical events declined, praises for resistance forces and use of coded language increased.
“As encouragement and coordination of physical events declined, praises for resistance forces and use of coded language increased (Figure 14).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe narratives the military used to discredit the resistance were tired and static.
“Even the narratives the military used to discredit the resistance were tired and static.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningTo counter SAC's surveillance, Facebook users persistently circulated digital security advice and increasingly masked their pro-resistance content with similar styles of discreet expressions.
“Moreover, to counter SAC's surveillance, these Facebook users persistently circulated digital security advice and increasingly masked their pro-resistance content with similar styles of discreet expressions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationSAC's limited financial, human and technological resources required resorting to the 'bluntest of censorship instruments to stifle opposition,' ordering night-time Internet outages, banning prominent social media sites, and enacting a draconian cybersecurity law.
“Yet despite now having the incentive to impose broad-based censorship similar to China's”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites International Crisis Group 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThese platforms do not have the same reach and impact as Facebook among the Myanmar population as they only gained popularity in 2019 and 2020, years after Myanmar telecom operators already offered Facebook's Free Basics service.
“However, these platforms do not have the same reach and impact as Facebook among the Myanmar population as they only gained popularity in 2019 and 2020, years after Myanmar telecom operators already offered Facebook's Free Basics service (Guest et al., 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Guest et al., 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe lack of prevalence or sharing of pro-military content on Facebook highlights the platform's marked improvement in content moderation since 2017 and its potential effectiveness.
“Although we cannot precisely assess the timeliness and impact of such removal, the lack of prevalence or sharing of pro-military content on Facebook highlights the platform's marked improvement in content moderation since 2017 and its potential effectiveness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn a country where authorities have the capacity to engage in more broad-based digital repression, prior experience in digital activism may lead to some victories, but the scale of the regime's censorship would make regime-destabilizing contention highly unlikely.
“Consequently, in a country where authorities have the capacity to engage in more broad-based digital repression, prior experience in digital activism may lead to some victories, but the scale of the regime's censorship would make regime-destabilizing contention highly unlikely.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe resistance forces dominate social media narratives in terms of both the volume of content and the number of views or interactions.
“Together, these results support our proposition that the resistance forces dominate social media narratives in terms of both the volume of content and the number of views or interactions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningMilitary supporters' decreased level of activity on Facebook due to the platform's stricter content moderation might explain the stagnation of countermobilization tactics.
“Such stagnation might reflect military supporters' decreased level of activity on Facebook due to the platform's stricter content moderation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Many military supporters have migrated to other platforms - TikTok, Telegram, and VK - where there were more permissive digital environments for authoritarian propaganda and coordination.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSuccess depends not only on access to the Internet, but also on the activists' prior organizational capacity to counter digital repression.
“Hence, success depends not only on access to the Internet, but also on the activists' prior organizational capacity to counter digital repression.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe availability of free VPNs allowed dissidents to circumvent the ban, and the dependence of the Myanmar population on Facebook as a mode of communication before the coup incentivized broad VPN usage.
“Despite the military's post-coup ban on Facebook, the availability of free VPNs allowed dissidents to circumvent the ban, and the dependence of the Myanmar population on Facebook as a mode of communication before the coup incentivized broad VPN usage.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Migliano, 2022
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe state had neither the resources nor the political incentives to replicate the draconian model of China's 'Great Firewall'.
“However, the state had neither the resources nor the political incentives to replicate the draconian model of China's”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites International Crisis Group, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenDevelopment of digital and hybrid tactics can neither resolve the massive resource disparity between the resistance forces and SAC nor ease the historical inter-ethnic tensions that threaten unity among the anti-coup forces.
“Indeed, development of digital and hybrid tactics can neither resolve the massive resource disparity between the resistance forces and SAC nor ease the historical inter-ethnic tensions that threaten unity among the anti-coup forces.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenResistance forces are more able to effectively and safely employ social media to mobilize and coordinate activism on a nationwide scale over an extended period of time.
“On the other hand, resistance forces are more able to effectively and safely employ social media to mobilize and coordinate activism on a nationwide scale over an extended period of time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFrom Hong Kong to Tunisia to Hungary, as governments seek to centralize power and crack down against dissidents, authoritarianism is gaining grounds with imposition of illiberal laws and violations of international human rights standards.
“From Hong Kong to Tunisia to Hungary, as governments seek to centralize power and crack down against dissidents, authoritarianism is gaining grounds with imposition of illiberal laws and violations of international human rights standards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Dunai, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Human Rights Watch, 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Al Jazeera, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSuch resistance facilitated the CDM movements' denial of essential labor to SAC, military defections, development of a parallel government in exile, creation of local PDFs, and international support for coordinated sanctions.
“Such resistance facilitated the CDM movements' denial of essential labor to SAC, military defections, development of a parallel government in exile, creation of local PDFs, and international support for coordinated sanctions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningOnce resistance initiatives flourished across Myanmar, it became more crucial for movement entrepreneurs to recognize and commend these operations in order to sustain resistance momentum.
“however, once resistance initiatives flourished across Myanmar, it became more crucial for movement entrepreneurs to recognize and commend these operations in order to sustain resistance momentum.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe disparity in going-private rates substantiates resistance forces' mutual learning on digital security and affirms the political cause behind their decisions to limit visibility: to either evade SAC's persecution or ensure strategic secrecy of resistance activities.
“Such marked disparity not only substantiates our expectations of resistance forces' mutual learning on digital security but also affirms the political cause behind their decisions to limit the visibility of their members' discussions: to either evade SAC's persecution or ensure the strategic secrecy of their resistance activities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAutocrats are less able to either completely throttle online civic space or counter-mobilize online.
“On the one hand, autocrats are less able to either completely throttle online civic space or counter-mobilize online.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenDigitalized pro-democracy activism predominantly adopts digitally secure repertoires (either online or hybrid) and includes a new substantive issue: resisting digital authoritarian abuse.
“Compared to activism before the digital age, we argue that digitalized pro-democracy activism (a) predominantly adopts digitally secure repertoires (either online or hybrid) and (b) includes a new substantive issue: resisting digital authoritarian abuse (Table 2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPolitical elites in these countries employ both online and offline tools to spread disinformation and crush dissent while unable to impose broad-based Internet control, so antigovernment protests there tend to encounter a similar environment as in Myanmar.
“As their political elites are among an expanding group of state leaders who employ both online and offline tools to spread disinformation and crush dissent while unable to impose broad-based Internet control, antigovernment protests there also tend to encounter a similar environment as in Myanmar (Freedom House, 2021a, 2021b;Mozur, 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Freedom House, 2021a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Freedom House, 2021b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Mozur, 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe pre-existing digitalized experience of pro-democracy activists in these countries should play the same role in impeding the more recent attempts of autocratization.
“Hence, the pre-existing digitalized experience of pro-democracy activists in these countries should play the same role in impeding the more recent attempts of autocratization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningPortraying resistance forces as violent terrorists and questioning their commitment to Buddhism and Myanmar national sovereignty are only likely to resonate with a small group of core military supporters.
“Hence, portraying resistance forces as violent terrorists and questioning their commitment to Buddhism and Myanmar national sovereignty are only likely to resonate with a small group of core military supporters.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The military's discrediting narratives in the post-coup period are regurgitated from historical moments of political crisis (1962-2010, 2012-2020).
The paper relies on this without support.
More than one year since the coup, SAC has neither established effective control of the territory nor crushed online dissent.
“More than one year since its coup, the Myanmar military has neither established effective control of the territory nor crushed online dissent.”
“Nonetheless, more than one year since the coup, SAC has neither established effective control of the territory nor crushed online dissent.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The military coup in February 2021 threatens to reverse years of political liberalization.
“A military coup in February 2021 against Myanmar's popularly elected NLD-led government threatens to reverse years of political liberalization.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Pro-democracy activists in Myanmar's post-coup context had more space to organize online prior to the military coup than Arab Spring activists.
“Although pro-democracy activists in Myanmar's post-coup context had more space to organize online prior to the military coup than Arab Spring activists, they faced autocrats who have learned from the past and have updated their capacity to respond to digital resistance.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Autocrats have learned from the past and have updated their capacity to respond to digital resistance.
“Although pro-democracy activists in Myanmar's post-coup context had more space to organize online prior to the military coup than Arab Spring activists, they faced autocrats who have learned from the past and have updated their capacity to respond to digital resistance.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many military supporters have migrated to other platforms - TikTok, Telegram, and VK - where there were more permissive digital environments for authoritarian propaganda and coordination.
“Indeed, many military supporters have migrated to other platforms -TikTok, Telegram, and VK -where there were more permissive digital environments for authoritarian propaganda and coordination.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The military's discrediting narratives in the post-coup period are regurgitated from historical moments of political crisis (1962-2010, 2012-2020).
“These are regurgitated narratives that the military has used historically in moments of political crisis and contention, such as against waves of pro-democracy protests between 1962-2010 and against the NLD during electoral seasons in 2012-2020.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Autocrats lack broad-based digital repression.
“given autocrats' lack of broad-based digital repression”
The paper relies on this without support.
Pro-democracy activists in Myanmar had pre-existing digitalized capacity (online and hybrid activism, platform advocacy, digital security practices) before democratic backsliding.
“taking into account the under-analyzed role of pro-democracy activists' pre-existing digitalized capacity”
“pro-democracy activists' experience with online and hybrid activism, platform advocacy, and digital security practices before democratic backsliding”
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Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations From Tahrir Square
Tüfekçi, Z., & Wilson, C. (2012) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01629.x · Cited by 1,540 · see citing works
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000144 · Cited by 1,028 · see citing works
Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding
Waldner, D., & Lust, E. (2018) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628 · Cited by 889 · see citing works
Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring
Hussain, M., & Howard, P. (2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936953.001.0001 · Cited by 724 · see citing works
Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries
Bunce, V. J., & Wolchik, S. L. (2011) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977404 · Cited by 567 · see citing works
Political Turbulence:How Social Media Shape Collective Action
Margetts, H. Z., John, P. C., Hale, S. A., & Yasseri, T. (2015) · Cited by 339 · see citing works
Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation
Svolik, M. W. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000550 · Cited by 265 · see citing works
Earl, J. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abl8198 · Cited by 250 · see citing works
Political Turbulence: How Social Media Shape Collective Action
MARGETTS, H., JOHN, P., HALE, S., & YASSERI, T. (2015) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvc773c7 · Cited by 238 · see citing works
Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the Arab Spring
Steinert-Threlkeld, Z. C. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000769 · Cited by 229 · see citing works
Communication Technology and Protest
Little, A. T. (2016) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/683187 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
Roberts, M. E. (2018) · Princeton University Press · doi:10.23943/9781400890057 · Cited by 159 · see citing works
The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies
Weidmann, N. B., & Rød, E. G. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190918309.001.0001 · Cited by 157 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Early research on the Internet and protests argues that “ activists can utilize Internet technology to interact with other like-minded people online ” in order to “ spread information about planned events widely without relying on an existing organizational structure ” (Weidmann and Rod, 2019: 22).”
BackgroundFrom the web to the streets: internet and protests under authoritarian regimes
Ruijgrok, K. (2016) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2016.1223630 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Poison If You Don’t Know How to Use It: Facebook, Democracy, and Human Rights in Myanmar
Whitten-Woodring, J., Kleinberg, M. S., Thawnghmung, A., & Thitsar, M. T. (2020) · The International Journal of Press/Politics · doi:10.1177/1940161220919666 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
Deibert, R. J., & Rohozinski, R. (2010) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8551.003.0007 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Myanmar Media in Transition: Legacies, Challenges and Change
Taylor, R. H. (2019) · Asian Affairs · doi:10.1080/03068374.2019.1663066 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
How Generation Z Galvanized a Revolutionary Movement against Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup
Jordt, I., Than, T., & Ye Lin, S. (2021) · How Generation Z Galvanized a Revolutionary Movement against Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup · doi:10.1355/9789814951746-003 · Cited by 6
Prasse‐Freeman, E. (2023) · Public Culture · doi:10.1215/08992363-10202416 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
18. The Tea Shop Meets the 8 O’clock News: Facebook, Convergence and Online Public Spaces
(2019) · Myanmar Media in Transition · doi:10.1355/9789814843409-020 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Digital Rights Activism after the Arab Spring
Hussain, M. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859329.003.0009 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2017) · Harvard Dataverse · doi:10.7910/dvn/qszmpd · Cited by 1 · see citing works
19. From Blogging to Digital Rights: Telecommunications Reform in Myanmar
Aung, H. H., & Htut, W. M. (2019) · ISEAS Publishing eBooks · doi:10.1355/9789814843409-021
Replication Data for: Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the Arab Spring
STEINERT-THRELKELD, Z. (2016) · Harvard Dataverse · doi:10.7910/dvn/2igrv9
Bunce, V. J., & Wolchik, S. L. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977404.012
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Nachemson A, 2021, Frontier Myanmar
- Oak YN, 2019, Myanmar Media in Transition: Legacies, Challenges and Change, 327
- Ruijgrok K, 2017, Democratization, 24, 498
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Introduction: Revolution and Solidarity in Myanmar
Chambers, J., & Cheesman, N. (2024) · Journal of Contemporary Asia · doi:10.1080/00472336.2024.2371976 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Agents of resistance: resolve and repertoires against autocratization in Asia
Truong, N., Ong, E., & Shum, M. (2024) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2024.2318384 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia
Lim, M. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108750745 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Viral Justice: TikTok Activism, Misinformation, and the Fight for Social Change in Southeast Asia
Jalli, N. (2025) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051251318122 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“Living With” Revolution: The Everyday Experiences of Myanmar’s Generation Z Revolutionaries
Chambers, J., & Da, S. N. D. (2024) · Journal of Contemporary Asia · doi:10.1080/00472336.2024.2359373 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“…digital and social media also allowed for the diffusion of new and more global forms of contentious collective action, both documenting #whatshappeninginMyanmar and declaring the people’s collective desire for a “Federal Democracy” and “Self-Determination” (see Egreteau 2022; Ryan and Tran 2024).”
Keyboard Fighters: The Use of ICTs by Activists in Times of Military Coup in Myanmar
Guntrum, L. G. (2024) · Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3613904.3642279 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Strange Bedfellows or Trusted Comrades? Digital Solidarity Building among Myanmar’s Revolutionaries
Ryan, M., Tran, M. V., & Htut, S. Y. (2024) · Journal of Contemporary Asia · doi:10.1080/00472336.2024.2330933 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“In post-coup Myanmar, long-standing digitalised pro-democracy activism was crucial in facilitating a safer digital environment for anti-coup resistance (see Ryan and Tran 2022).”
Self-citationStokke, K., & Kyaw, N. N. (2023) · Political Geography · doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.103011 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Organic online politics: Farmers, Facebook, and Myanmar's military coup
Faxon, H. O., Kintzi, K., Tran, V., Wine, K. Z., & Htut, S. Y. (2023) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/20539517231168101 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Anti-coup forces used social media to discredit and denounce the SAC and mobilize resistance campaigns on the ground by encouraging and coordinating protests, CDM, and armed attacks (Ryan and Tran, 2022).”
BackgroundSelf-citationVrieze, P. (2024) · Political Geography · doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2024.103165 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Examining Crisis Communication in Geopolitical Conflicts: The Micro-Influencer Impact Model
Taher, A., Kolaly, H. E., & Tarek, N. (2025) · Journalism and Media · doi:10.3390/journalmedia6030116 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Pro-democracy platform advocacy: Resisting Big Tech-mediated authoritarianism in Southeast Asia
Tran, M. V., Phattharathanasut, T., Nyunt, H. S., Ekapong, N., & Young, L. (2025) · Open Research Europe · doi:10.12688/openreseurope.18820.1 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Self-citationTran, M. V. (2023) · Journal of Contemporary Asia · doi:10.1080/00472336.2023.2219683 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Although the military has less ability to control mass media compared to before 2010, the SAC ’ s strategies harken back to this earlier period of military rule between 1962 and 2010 where Burmese dictators similarly encountered waves of urban pro-democracy protest (Ryan and Tran 2022, 8 – 9).”
BackgroundSelf-citationVester, A., Thaler, K. M., & Htut, R. (2026) · Civil Wars · doi:10.1080/13698249.2026.2717963 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Zreık, M. (2025) · Global Change Peace & Security · doi:10.1080/14781158.2025.2517610 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Internet shutdowns, the blocking of social media platforms, and the surveillance of online activities are common strategies used by the military junta to control information and stifle dissent (Ryan and Tran 2024; Tähtinen 2024).”
InfluentialPong, B., & Prasse‐Freeman, E. (2025) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/20539517251320007 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…technologies to fi ght back – for instance, through sharing and amplifying their acts of resistance through internet posts and live-streamed videos (Ryan and Tran, 2022); using VPNs to circumvent social media blocks; and developing apps like Way Way Nay, which helps consumers identify their…”
Emotional resistance and identity formation in youth in post-coup Myanmar revolutionary landscape
Htwe, T. M. (2026) · International Review of Sociology · doi:10.1080/03906701.2026.2710606
Kyed, H. M., Chambers, J., Aye, S. S., & Kaw, N. K. (2026) · Environment and Planning E Nature and Space · doi:10.1177/25148486261449030
Political Camouflage: Hidden and Public Dissent under Democratic BackslidingPreprint
Frey, B. S., & Schnellmann, V. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6408360
Pro-democracy platform advocacy: Resisting Big Tech-mediated authoritarianism in Southeast Asia
Tran, M. V., Phattharathanasut, T., Nyunt, H. S., Ekapong, N., & Young, L. (2025) · Open Research Europe · doi:10.12688/openreseurope.18820.2
“…hiring more staff familiar with local languages and contexts to actively moderate, engaging in cross-platform collaborations to tackle violent extremism, or establishing a mechanism for independent oversight of human-rights based content moderation (Meyer et al. , 2020; Ryan & Tran, 2024).”
InfluentialSelf-citationThe Role of Social Media and Disruptive Technologies in Post-Coup Democracy Activism
Jaydn, Skidmore, M., & Medail, C. (2023) · ANU Press eBooks · doi:10.22459/ac.2023.03
Thawnghmung, A. M., Whitten-Woodring, J., Lynn, T. T., & Abou-Khalil, C. (2026) · International Journal of Communication · doi:10.65476/8csffs51
“…focused on how activists use digital platforms to organize resistance against democratic erosion or build solidarity within and across different cultural and religious groups (Laebens & Lührmann, 2021; Ridout et al., 2020; Ryan & Tran, 2024; Ryan et al., 2024; Stokke & Kyaw, 2024; Thinh, 2024).”
- Authors
- Ryan, M., & Tran, M. V.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Ryan, Megan
- Venue
- Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2022-10-03
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 133-158
- ISSN
- 2057-8911 (ISSN-L)
- 2057-892X
- OpenAlex
- W4300865341
- Cited by
- 21
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 4
- FWCI
- 13.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Asian Journal of Comparative Politics (publishedVersion)
- Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Canada's International Development Research Centre
- Suntory Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Bangladesh Politics, Society, and Development
- Keywords
- democratic backsliding, Myanmar military coup 2021, online dissent, Facebook posts, authoritarian consolidation, online abuse, autocratization, Myanmar
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