Common Sense, Intuition, and Theory in Personality and Social Psychology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Theoretical work in personality and social psychology benefits from a well-developed understanding of the prior empirical and theoretical work on a problem and from informed intuitions. Intuitions develop about a subject matter through years of study, investigation, and problem solving, just as chess masters develop a sophisticated set of cognitive structures that change the very appearance of the chess board. In part because the subject matter is so personal, students new to personality and social psychology arrive with many intuitions, prior beliefs, and naive theories about social processes and behavior based on unsystematic experiences and observations. These intuitions can hinder or foster theoretical progress. The role of mentors, critiques, and empirical tests in minimizing the deleterious effects of these entry biases is discussed. Refined scientific intuitions are also subject to error, however, so means of minimizing these errors are also discussed.
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In the citing paper
“Furthermore, theories give individual facts a meaningful context and contribute towards building an integrated body of knowledge, whereas common sense is more likely to produce isolated facts [145,146].”
From Making sense of implementation theories, models and frameworks (2015) · cites this paper as [146]
In the citing paper
“Theories are more consistent with existing facts than common sense, which typically means that a hypothesis based on an established theory is a more educated guess than one based on common sense.”
From Making sense of implementation theories, models and frameworks (2015) · cites this paper as [146]
In the citing paper
“Furthermore, theories give individual facts a meaningful context and contribute towards building an integrated body of knowledge, whereas common sense is more likely to produce isolated facts [145,146].”
From Making sense of implementation theories, models and frameworks (2015) · cites this paper as [146]
Citations
Cites
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Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317 · cited 1×
“Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) classic critique of theory and methods in personality and social psychology was made possible in part by selected failures in the field to distinguish between social psychological theories that model naive theories and social psychological theories that model underlying mechanisms.”
BackgroundMeasuring individual differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 · Cited by 9,210
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4964-1 · Cited by 5,219
Self-citationPlatt, J. R. (1964) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.146.3642.347 · Cited by 2,907 · cited 2×
“…read for leisure) the history and philosophy of science-materials that by their abstract nature can help shed light on some of the implicit assumptions, biases, or boundary conditions that characterize one's scientific endeavors (e.g., Boyd, Gasper, & Trout, 1997; Eddington, 1939; Platt, 1964).”
BackgroundWilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.1.101 · Cited by 2,112
Relation of cue to consequence in avoidance learning
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Self-citationGergen, K. J. (1973) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0034436 · Cited by 1,845 · cited 1×
“The accumulation of contrary empirical evidence contributed to an epistemological crisis in social psychology (e.g., Elms, 1975; Gergen, 1973; Schlenker, 1974).3 Parsimony is desirable, ceteris paribus; but as long as a formulation is falsifiable, scope and generativeness should trump parsimony, or…”
BackgroundJournal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Katz, D. (1965) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0021466 · Cited by 1,385
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Allport, G. W., 1954, The nature of prejudice
- Boyd, R., 1997, The philosophy of science
- 10.1037/0097-7403.22.1.76 · doi:10.1037/0097-7403.22.1.76 · Paper page
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Cited by
Making sense of implementation theories, models and frameworks
Nilsen, P. (2015) · Implementation Science · doi:10.1186/s13012-015-0242-0 · Cited by 4,447
Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation
Phelps, E. A., O'Connor, K. J., Cunningham, W. A., Funayama, E. S., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., & Banaji, M. R. (2000) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/089892900562552 · Cited by 1,001
Making Sense of Implementation Theories, Models, and Frameworks
Nilsen, P. (2020) · Implementation Science 3.0 · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03874-8_3 · Cited by 322
The Neuroscience of Stigma and Stereotype Threat
Derks, B., Inzlicht, M., & Kang, S. (2008) · Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · doi:10.1177/1368430207088036 · Cited by 74
“Only by extending our theories and fi ndings to other social and biological levels of analysis, can we ensure convergence of data and explanation (Cacioppo, 2004).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Cacioppo, J. T.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cacioppo, John T.
- ORCID
- Cacioppo, John T.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 114-122
- ISSN
- 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7957
- OpenAlex
- W2000126589
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 2.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Personality and Social Psychology Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Psychology Research and Bibliometrics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- scientific intuition, naive theories, prior beliefs, mentoring, peer critique, theory development, common sense, cognitive structure
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Humans, Personality, Psychological Theory, Psychology, Social, Intuition
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Common Sense, Intuition, and Theory in Personality and Social Psychology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1207/s15327957pspr0802_4
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- Cacioppo, J. T. (2004). Common Sense, Intuition, and Theory in Personality and Social Psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0802_4
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.