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Common Sense, Intuition, and Theory in Personality and Social Psychology

Cacioppo, John T. · 2004 · Personality and Social Psychology Review

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Theoretical work in personality and social psychology benefits from a well-developed understanding of the prior empirical and theoretical work on a problem and from informed intuitions. Intuitions develop about a subject matter through years of study, investigation, and problem solving, just as chess masters develop a sophisticated set of cognitive structures that change the very appearance of the chess board. In part because the subject matter is so personal, students new to personality and social psychology arrive with many intuitions, prior beliefs, and naive theories about social processes and behavior based on unsystematic experiences and observations. These intuitions can hinder or foster theoretical progress. The role of mentors, critiques, and empirical tests in minimizing the deleterious effects of these entry biases is discussed. Refined scientific intuitions are also subject to error, however, so means of minimizing these errors are also discussed.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1207/s15327957pspr0802_4

Cites

29 of 29 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Verification

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Allport, G. W., 1954, The nature of prejudice
  2. Boyd, R., 1997, The philosophy of science
  3. 10.1037/0097-7403.22.1.76 · doi:10.1037/0097-7403.22.1.76 · Paper page
  4. 10.1037/0033-2909.115.3.401 · DOI · Paper page
  5. 10.1037/0003-066X.30.10.967 · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.30.10.967 · Paper page
  6. McGuire, W. J., 1968, The handbook of social psychology, 136
  7. van Fraassen, B. C., 2002, The empirical stance

Cited by

See all 31

Metadata

Authors
Cacioppo, J. T.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Cacioppo, John T.
Venue
Personality and Social Psychology Review
Published
2004-05
Volume
8
Issue
2
Pages
114-122
ISSN
  • 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-7957
OpenAlex
W2000126589
Cited by
31
References
29
Citations by year
2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1
FWCI
2.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
  • Personality and Social Psychology Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Psychology Research and Bibliometrics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
scientific intuition, naive theories, prior beliefs, mentoring, peer critique, theory development, common sense, cognitive structure
MeSH terms
Cognition, Humans, Personality, Psychological Theory, Psychology, Social, Intuition

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.