Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper extends the standard principal–agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. Moreover, discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance, suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination. Finally, the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal, hence neither “efficiency wages” nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians
Goldin, C., & Rouse, C. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.715 · Cited by 1,754
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
Subjectivity and the Weighting of Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard
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Contracts as Reference Points*
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Jacob, B. A., & Lefgren, L. (2008) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/522974 · Cited by 494
Metadata
- Authors
- Macleod, W. B.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-02-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 216-240
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124269332
- Cited by
- 424
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 15.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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