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Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
Open accessAbstract
A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.
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From Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond (2021) · cites this paper as [151]
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“ment Politicians can reward their own ethnic groups due to altruistic preferences (Pande, 2003),(Nye et al., 2014) or engage in patronage to reward their political supporters with public sector jobs (Robinson and Verdier, 2013).”
BackgroundEstevan, F., Gall, T., & Morin, L. (2018) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12578 · Cited by 46
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Manion, M. (2015) · Cited by 44
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“has been shown to increase political and economic representation for members of marginalized groups (Pande, 2003; Olken, 2010; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Fujiwara, 2015).”
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“Pande 2003 suggests that the quotas increase targeted benefits to Scheduled castes (sc) and Scheduled tribes (st).”
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“Prior work suggests that quota effects are largest where the targeted minority group constitutes a large share of the population (Chin and Prakash 2011; Das, Mukho-padhyay, and Saroy 2017; Jensenius 2015; Pande 2003).”
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Azam, M. (2010) · Journal of International Development · doi:10.1002/jid.1706 · Cited by 40
“Pande (2003) finds an increase in transfers targeted towards the disadvantaged groups due to political reservation mandated towards them.”
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“We see two reasons for questioning the growing optimism about the remedial and transformative potential of the democratic process, whether on its own or aided by political reservations ðe.g., Pande 2003Þ.”
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Larcinese, V. (2011) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · Cited by 38
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Prakash, N. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.017 · Cited by 35
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Bjarnegård, E., & Zetterberg, P. (2014) · Representation · doi:10.1080/00344893.2014.951171 · Cited by 34
“…Htun and Ossa 2013; Hughes 2011; Krook and O’Brien 2010); most research on electoral quota adoption concerns either quotas for women (e.g., Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Meier 2004; Murray et al. 2012) or quotas for minorities (e.g., Bird 2014; Lublin and Wright 2013; Pande 2003; Reynolds 2005, 2011).”
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“…the downstream effects of quotas for SCs, this paper dvances a substantial literature on the efficacy of a common electoral institution—electoral quotas—for ethnic groups and for SCs, in particular (Chin and Prakash 2011; Dunning 2010; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Jensenius 2015; Pande 2003).”
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Bhalotra, S. R., Clots‐Figueras, I., & Iyer, L. S. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2350805 · Cited by 30
“Political quotas exist at that state and national levels for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; Pande (2003) and Krishnan (2007) examine the policy impact of these quotas. parliament, but it has not yet been voted on in the lower house, making the analysis in this paper highly…”
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Marcesse, T. (2017) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.024 · Cited by 29
“…provisions (Bohlken, 2016), decentralization has translated both into enhanced capacity at the local level (Chattopadhyay & Dufflo, 2004; Pande, 2003) and a democratic deepening, particularly with the promotion of local democracy and the enforcement of quotas for traditionally…”
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André, P., & Mesplé‐Somps, S. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 29
Xu, G. (2021) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_01060 · Cited by 28
“While existing work has focused on the role of political representation (Besley & Burgess, 2002; Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004), there is limited work on the role of bureaucratic representation.”
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Self-citationThe Political Class and Redistributive Policies
Corvalán, A., Querubín, P., & Vicente, S. (2018) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvy040 · Cited by 29
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“Specifically, researchers have focused on differences in political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Pande, 2003), labor market regulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy, 2007; Dougherty, Robles, and Krishna, 2011), land reform (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee and…”
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“Pande (2003) has shown that reserved seats in local government in India contribute to the increase in spending on minority employment and welfare programmes.”
BackgroundGani, A., & Al-Abri, A. S. (2013) · International Review of Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/02692171.2012.760066 · Cited by 27
“For example, Pande (2003) observes that ‘a basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making.’”
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“Using state-level variation in India over four decades, Pande (2003) identifies how the mandated reservations of legislative positions for minority groups increased the redistribution of resources towards these groups, demonstrating enhanced policy influence.”
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“For example, characteristics such as party (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), race (Canon 1999; Whitby 1997), caste (Pande 2003), gender (Barnes 2016; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 2002), education (Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2011; Diaz-Serrano and Pérez 2013; Efobi 2015; Yu and…”
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The Role of Rules in Representation: Group Membership and Electoral Incentives
Crisp, B. F., Demirkaya, B., Schwindt‐Bayer, L. A., & Millian, C. (2016) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000691 · Cited by 25
“9 Pande 2003.”
Country or Leader? Political Change and UN General Assembly VotingPreprint
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1362456 · Cited by 25
Kale, S. S., & Mazaheri, N. (2014) · Studies in comparative international development · doi:10.1007/s12116-014-9162-2 · Cited by 1
“19 Although opponents of reservations argue that they have little impact on policy, there is a growing empirical record that demonstrates the opposite (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Pande 2003).”
BackgroundConstitutional rules as determinants of social infrastructure
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Gajwani, K., & Zhang, X. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 24
Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China
Mu, R., & Zhang, X. (2013) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.009 · Cited by 23
FDI, Poverty, and the Politics of Potable Water Access
Rudra, N., Alkon, M., & Joshi, S. (2018) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/ecpo.12112 · Cited by 23
Mobilization and Conflict in Multiethnic States
Vogt, M. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190065874.001.0001 · Cited by 24
Identities and public policies: Unexpected effects of political reservations for women in India
Cassan, G., & Vandewalle, L. (2021) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105408 · Cited by 47
“The citizen candidate models (Osborne & Slivinski, 1996; Besley & Coate, 1997) and their empirical applications (Levitt, 1996; Besley & Case, 2000; Pande, 2003; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004) emphasize how the identity of the elected representative may affect policy implementation.”
Female policymakers and educational expenditures: cross-country evidence
Chen, L. (2020) · European Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1007/s10657-020-09673-3 · Cited by 23
“This line of models has been applied empirically (see, e.g. Pande 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Svaleryd 2009; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014).”
MethodWomen’s Political Reservation, Early Childhood Development, and Learning in India
Pathak, Y., & Macours, K. (2017) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/692114 · Cited by 23
Is it Worth it? On the Returns to Holding Political OfficePreprint
Lundqvist, H. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2341119 · Cited by 21
“…politicians’ types and characteristics matter for their voting decisions (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Washington, 2008), resulting policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Pande, 2003; Svaleryd, 2009) and, ultimately, for economic outcomes such as growth (Besley et al., 2011; Jones and Olken, 2005).”
Poverty traps, convergence, and the dynamics of household income
Arunachalam, R., & Shenoy, A. (2017) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.02.001 · Cited by 22
“For example, Pande (2003) and Besley et al. (2004) show that politicians of high castes are less likely to support policies that help low castes.”
BackgroundMeasuring Good Governance Using Time Series Data: Fiji Islands
Gani, A., & Duncan, R. (2007) · Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy · doi:10.1080/13547860701405979 · Cited by 22
“Pande (2003) observes that ‘a basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making.”
BackgroundNetworks, Commitment, and Competence: Caste in Indian Local Politics
Munshi, K. D., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (2013) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w19197 · Cited by 22
Exploring the Impact of Reserved Seat Design on the Quality of Minority Representation
Kroeber, C. (2015) · Ethnopolitics · doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1051326 · Cited by 21
“Some evidence suggests that group membership is most efficient in ensuring substantive representation (Pande, 2003; Summersby, 2009).”
BackgroundYoung versus old politicians and public spending priorities
Baskaran, T., Hessami, Z., & Schirner, S. (2024) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.07.002 · Cited by 21
Does Participatory Budgeting Improve Decentralized Public Service Delivery?
Beuermann, D., & Amelina, M. (2014) · doi:10.18235/0011662 · Cited by 12
“…quotas for minority groups in order to ensure that their interests are reflected in policy making (Besley et al. 2004; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Pande 2003); the introduction of service report cards (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009); the direct involvement of community members in school and health…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Pande, R.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Pande, Rohini
- ORCID
- Pande, Rohini
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-08-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1132-1151
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2024464435
- Cited by
- 658
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 25.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender Politics and Representation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- political reservation, policy influence, policy commitment, representative democracy, affirmative action, social transfers, Indian states
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