The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
Open accessAbstract
A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.
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“We recruited respondents via a combination of reaching out directly and personal contacts, using purposeful sampling [151]-i.e., identifying and selecting experts with relevant experience-iterative until saturation.”
From Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond (2021) · cites this paper as [151]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pande, R.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Pande, Rohini
- ORCID
- Pande, Rohini
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-08-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1132-1151
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2024464435
- Cited by
- 658
- References
- 33
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 25.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender Politics and Representation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- political reservation, policy influence, policy commitment, representative democracy, affirmative action, social transfers, Indian states
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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