Politically Connected Firms
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Faccio, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2006-02-01
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 369-386
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121235470
- Cited by
- 4,059
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 210.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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