The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Abstract
No man during, either the whole of his life, or that of any considerable part of it, ever trod steadily and uniformly in the path … of justice, … whose conduct was not principally directed by a regard to the sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. – Adam Smith (1759) p. 357. This paper evaluates numerous positive and normative theories of justice in positive terms, i.e., in terms of how accurately they describe the impartial fairness preferences of real people. In addition, the paper proposes and defends an integrated justice theory based on preferences over four distinct and sometimes conflicting forces. These forces frame the analysis of the individual theories and inspire four corresponding theoretical classes: equality and need, utilitarianism and welfare economics, equity and desert, and context. This synthesis enables one to treat justice rigorously and to reconcile results that often appear contradictory or at odds with alternative theories.
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Cited by
McDermott, M., Mahanty, S., & Schreckenberg, K. (2013) · Environmental Science & Policy · doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2012.10.006 · Cited by 645
What Goes Around Comes Around: The Evolutionary Roots of the Belief in Immanent Justice
Baumard, N., & Chevallier, C. (2012) · Journal of Cognition and Culture · doi:10.1163/156853712x633938 · Cited by 46
Metadata
- Authors
- Konow, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-11-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1188-1239
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2133695684
- Cited by
- 852
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 180.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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