The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection
Open accessAbstract
How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed “randomly ” and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multiperson prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which “group selection ”sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity and punishment-based group norms.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
(1976) · Cited by 10,423
A treatise of human nature (1739-40)
Hume, D. (1996) · The Sublime · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511620409.040 · Cited by 9,842
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
Wright, S. (1943) · Genetics · doi:10.1093/genetics/28.2.114 · Cited by 5,479
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought
Williams, G. C. (2008) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · doi:10.1515/9781400820108 · Cited by 2,762
In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.73 · Cited by 2,614
Cosmides, L. (1989) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1 · Cited by 2,471
Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour
(1962) · Ibis · doi:10.1111/j.1474-919x.1962.tb08690.x · Cited by 2,060
Group Selection and Kin Selection
SMITH, J. M. (1964) · Nature · doi:10.1038/2011145a0 · Cited by 2,020
Kimura, M., & Weiss, G. H. (1964) · Genetics · doi:10.1093/genetics/49.4.561 · Cited by 1,709
Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A quantitative approach
Ballonoff, P. (1985) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(85)90017-4 · Cited by 1,691
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Haldane, J. B. S. (1966) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,299
Wilson, D. S. (1975) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.72.1.143 · Cited by 1,259
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Culture Of Honor: The Psychology Of Violence In The South
Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (2019) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,000
Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Mezzetti, C., & Young, H. P. (1999) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061165 · Cited by 851
(2001) · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · Cited by 803
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
SYSTEMS OF MATING. I. THE BIOMETRIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PARENT AND OFFSPRING
Wright, S. (1921) · Genetics · doi:10.1093/genetics/6.2.111 · Cited by 720
Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, part II
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1989) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(89)90013-7 · Cited by 664
A dynamic model of social network formation
Skyrms, B., & Pemantle, R. (2000) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.97.16.9340 · Cited by 553
Game theory and the social contract
(1994) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(94)90020-5 · Cited by 552
Henrich, J. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.973 · Cited by 536
Schmitz, M. (2004) · Philosophen · doi:10.1007/978-3-476-02949-2_48 · Cited by 504
If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? Reply
Frank, R. H. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 472
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
BOYD, R., & RICHERSON, P. J. (2002) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515 · Cited by 455
Can Group-Functional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection?: An Empirical Test
Soltis, J., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1995) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/204381 · Cited by 371
Tempo and Mode in Evolution: A Critical Review
Wright, S. (1945) · Ecology · doi:10.2307/1931666 · Cited by 336
Group selection among alternative evolutionarily stable strategies
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1990) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80113-4 · Cited by 310
Binmore, K. (1991) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 290
“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties
Nachbar, J. H. (1990) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753708 · Cited by 272
Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction ModelPreprint
Eshel, I., Samuelson, L., & Shaked, A. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 265
Skyrms, B. (2001) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.2307/3218711 · Cited by 214
On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for SiblingsPreprint
Bergstrom, T. C. (1995) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 202
Self-citationOn the neighbor effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
Eshel, I. (1972) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/0040-5809(72)90003-2 · Cited by 200
The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bergstrom, T. C. (2003) · International Game Theory Review · doi:10.1142/s0219198903001021 · Cited by 190
Self-citationBoorman, S. A., & Levitt, P. R. (1980) · Cited by 187
Structured Demes and Trait-Group Variation
Wilson, D. S. (1979) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/283417 · Cited by 154
On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
Cohen, D., & Eshel, I. (1976) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/0040-5809(76)90020-4 · Cited by 147
INTERDEMIC SELECTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF ALTRUISM: A COMPUTER SIMULATION STUDY
Levin, B. R., & Kilmer, W. L. (1974) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.1974.tb00787.x · Cited by 146
Parasitism and Nest Predation in Parasitic Cuckoos
Zahavi, A. A. (1979) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/283374 · Cited by 122
The Population Problem: A Study in Human Evolution
Field, J. A., & Carr-Saunders, A. M. (1923) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2965671 · Cited by 119
Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns, and Homerica
Hesiod, & White, H. G. E. (2007) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 96
The population problem; a study in human evolution
Carr-Saunders, A. M. (1922) · Clarendon Press eBooks · doi:10.5962/bhl.title.25171 · Cited by 92
The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals
Eshel, I., Sansone, E., & Shaked, A. (1999) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s001820050119 · Cited by 66
What can we learn from cultural group selection and co-evolutionary models?
Sethi, R., & Somanathan, E. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00113-6 · Cited by 4
Cited by
In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.73 · Cited by 2,614
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096
Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
Sobel, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661530 · Cited by 899
Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments
Bochet, O., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006 · Cited by 634
Metadata
- Authors
- Bergstrom, T. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-05-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 67-88
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2155107911
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 80.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.